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SYNOPSIS 
Frederic LANE’S classic study “Andrea Barbarigo – Merchant of Venice, 1418-1449” (1944)1 
must be credited with introducing a new approach to Venetian economic historiography, 
making use of Venice’s richness of mercantile sources to retrace the life of a patrician mer-
chant. Unfortunately, and despite the abundance of comparable source material, this poignant 
methodology has thus far generated little following, as Benjamin ARBEL rightly pointed out 
in a recent article.2 This study is intended to alleviate this shortcoming. Examining docu-
ments from the archive of the Venetian patrician Lorenzo Dolfin (born in the 1390s; died in 
1475), it highlights the functioning of his personal and commercial networks and investigates 
the ways in which they overlap.  
As in the case of Lane, who regards the business biography as a tool to understand wider is-
sues of trade dynamics, economic development and institutional interdependence, this study 
is intended to illustrate general mechanisms of social and economic cooperation in late medi-
eval Venetian long-distance trade. Of central concern is the increasing significance of eco-
nomic agency in the context of trade representation: Lorenzo Dolfin’s life coincided with the 
gradual decline of the late medieval commenda economy and the emergence of the early 
modern corporation economy. As a result, resident agents in distant locations increasingly re-
placed the travelling merchants of commenda ventures, managing sale and acquisition trans-
actions for Venetian principals and maintaining commercial links on behalf of their clients. 
The particularity of the Venetian case, to which the Commissaria Lorenzo Dolfin bears tes-
tament, is given by the predominant role of family structures in determining the underlying 
social dynamics of commercial networks. The transformation towards an economy of long-
term partnerships (compagnie) occurred on the basis of the patrician family acting as a com-
mercial unit. The rise of the corporation economy is therefore closely linked to the emergence 
of family trade coalitions in the economic sphere. As family relations were equally signifi-
cant to the politics of the Venetian Republic, this study also has macro-historical implica-
tions: through the incentives of family-dominated commercial networks, we can derive the 
political incentives of the growing Venetian trading empire and hence the nature of economic 
 
1 Lane, Frederic C.: Andrea Barbarigo, Merchant of Venice 1418-1449, New York: Octagon Books, 1967. 
2 Arbel, Benjamin: "Operating Trading Networks in Times of War: A sixteenth-century Venetian patrician 
between public service and private affairs", in: Faroqhi, S., Veinstein, G. (eds.), Merchants in the Ottoman 
Empire, Paris etc.: Peeters, 2008, pp. 23-33. 
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relations between Christian Europe and the Islamic East championed by the Venetian Repub-
lic in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 
The analysis focuses primarily on the commercial letters contained in the Commissaria Lo-
renzo Dolfin and related archival collections, which provide valuable insights into the struc-
tures of business organisation and thus complement the information on commodities, prices, 
trade volumes, investments and profits found in contracts and account books. A first exami-
nation of these sources suggests that Lorenzo’s family surrounding was crucial in the organi-
sation of his business, as the vast majority of his correspondents were related by kin. Particu-
lar attention is thus given to the role of the patrician family in commerce and business: to 
what extent was patrician commerce organised within family hierarchies and consequently 
subject to cross-generational cooperation? How were business skills transmitted from one 
generation to the next, and what was the institutional basis for intra-family cooperation? Was 
intra-family commerce based on contractual dispositions, or did the patrician family operate 
as a general partnership, an infinite long-term commercial enterprise sustained by socio-
cultural factors rather than individual economic incentives? 
On the basis of the Commissaria Lorenzo Dolfin and related sources, we find that in many 
cases patrician families provided an early commercial socialisation for young nobles; in addi-
tion, the (extended) family would serve as a sphere of mutual commitment that could be 
tapped for business purposes throughout a patrician career. The continuity in Lorenzo’s 
choice of commercial partners and the dominance of relatives in his commercial environment 
suggest the gradual emergence of long-term non-contractual partnerships. Family relations 
thus served as a means of selecting agents and partners for long-distance trade ventures. Fam-
ily-based commercial coalitions entailed a range of advantages, from the transmission of 
skills to the sharing of commercial contacts. The complex structure of the patrician family re-
quires a distinction between nuclear, extended and affinal families in addition to family clus-
ters (comprising both patrilineal and matrilineal lineages), strategic coalitions, clans, and the 
“constructed” family (i.e. the inclusion of non-relatives into a family environment). With the 
“comprehensive family”, this study presents a new model that captures patrician family dy-
namics in both the political and economic spheres and thus reflects the entanglement of poli-
tics and commerce in the Venetian Republic. 
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Method of Transcription 
The transctiption of original sources generally follows the rules set out in Giampaolo Tognet-
ti’s Criteri per la transcrizione di testi medievali latini e italiani.1 Punctuation marks and ac-
cents have been added to facilitate the reading. Personal names are given in the modern Ital-
ian form (e.g. “Zuane” as Giovanni, “Iachomo” as Giacomo etc.). All transcriptions are those 
of the author unless otherwise stated. 
Dating of Sources 
Before 1522, the Venetian calendar year began with the month of March. Sources dated ac-
cording to the more Veneto calendarial system have been updated to the modern equivalent, 
e.g. a source dated 5 February 1422 appears as 5 February 1423 in the citation. 
Referencing and Spelling 
Full reference of secondary literature is given at first citation only and in abbreviated form 
thereafter. UK spelling is used throughout, except for quotations from (English) secondary 
literature, which are reproduced without alterations. Primary sources are cited in the original 
language.
 
1 Tognetti, Giampaolo: Criteri per la transcrizione di testi medievali latini e italiani, Rome: Quaderni della 
rassegna degli archivi di stato, 1982. 
CHAPTER I:  
REASSESSING THE VENETIAN COMMERCIAL 
PATRICIATE – A MICRO-HISTORICAL APPROACH 
This study explores the role of family relations in late medieval Venetian long-distance trade, 
with particular respect to the dynamics of partnership formation. As the place of the individu-
al’s early socialisation, the family is a key transmitter of norms, hierarchies, and means of so-
cial cooperation across generations. On aggregate, it is a key driver of social development. 
For millennia, family ties have distributed political power in virtually all societies, and have 
shaped their economic lives in commerce, manufacturing, and finance. Yet, while the system-
ic link between family structure and economic development has attracted considerable schol-
arly attention in economics and anthropology, historical investigations have remained com-
paratively rare.1 
The present study seeks to reduce the scale of this gap. Based on the private archives of two 
consecutive generations of the patrician Dolfin family, it investigates how Venetian mer-
chants arranged their transactions in long-distance trade against the background of changing 
political environments, technological progress, and increasingly integrated markets in Europe 
and the Eastern Mediterranean. The study advances the notion that, in Venice and its territo-
ries, family-based commercial coalitions became the primary business units on the brink of 
the early modern period, while at the same time different organisational structures made their 
appearance elsewhere. In Florence, another important commercial centre of the northern Ital-
ian peninsula, the predecessor of the modern business firm resembled more closely an institu-
tion that formalised links between (non-kin) commercial partners and put them under the pro-
tection of the emerging city state. Though strongly pronounced in the political sphere, family 
relations were not key to the development of commercial partnerships. When it comes to the 
 
1 For the relationship between family structure and economic development, see e.g. Pensieroso, L., Sommacal, 
A.: "Economic development and family structure: From pater familias to the nuclear family", in: European 
Economic Review 71 (October 2014), pp. 80-100. Also Diebolt, C., Rijpma, A., Carmichael, S., Dilli, S., 
Störmer, C. (eds.): Cliometrics of the Family, Cham: Springer, 2019. Useful historical approaches include 
Cavaciocchi, Simonetta (ed.): La famiglia nell'economia europea secoli XIII-XVIII - The Economic Role of the 
Family in the European Economy from the 13th to the 18th Centuries, Florence: Firenze University Press, 2010. 
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historical evolution of European business organisation, the specific (and varying) roles of the 
family should no longer be overlooked.2  
I approach these issues by conducting a case study of the Venetian merchant and civil servant 
Lorenzo Dolfin (c.1399-1475), whose personal archive is held at the Venetian Archivio di 
Stato. This rich body of sources potentially harbours answers to a range of historical ques-
tions; yet, since Lorenzo noticeably surrounded himself with affinal and consanguineous kin 
during his commercial pursues, the relationship between family structure and business organ-
isation is an appropriate choice of focus when analysing the collection’s commercial corre-
spondence. In comparison to the commercial environment of his uncle Biagio Dolfin (c.1370- 
1420), Lorenzo further intensified the links between his family surroundings and his com-
mercial activities. His example highlights the role of the Venetian patrician family as a busi-
ness unit, the institutional structure in which economic entrepreneurship is organised.3 In late 
medieval Europe, and especially in Venice and the wider Italian pensinsula, commercial or-
ganisation was subject to rapid institutional change that induced the progression from various 
types of partnership to the modern firm.4 While simple sea loans were still prevalent in Genoa 
and Venice in the eleventh and early twelfth centuries, the rise of the commenda economy 
enabled risk-sharing between suppliers of capital and labour and thus made a fundamental 
contribution to the Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages.5 
It would be wrong, of course, to suggest that family structure had an unambiguous effect on 
long-term economic change, or that the relationship between a society’s economic outlook 
 
2 For the emergence of the Florentine ‘partnership system’, see Padgett, J.F., McLean, P.D.: "Organizational 
Invention and Elite Transformation: The Birth of Partnership Systems in Renaissance Florence", in: The 
American Journal of Sociology 111 (March 2006), No. 5, pp. 1463–1568. 
3 It has been suggested that European business history displays a progression through roughly three different 
organisational forms, from individually acting agents via partnerships to companies, see Börner, Lars: 
"Breaking up is hard to do: Partnership Dissolution and the Economy of the Commenda", in: Humboldt 
University Working Paper (Aug., 2007). 
4 Luzzatto, Gino: Storia economica di Venezia dall' XI al XVI secolo, Venice: Centro Internazionale delle Arti e 
del Costume, 1961, pp. 227-230; Reynolds, Robert L.: "Origins of Modern Business Enterprise: Medieval 
Italy", in: The Journal of Economic History 12 (Autumn, 1952), No. 4, pp. 350-365; Spufford, Peter: Handel, 
Macht und Reichtum - Kaufleute im Mittelalter, Stuttgart: Theiss, 2004, pp. 11-44. 
5 For a critical perspective on the historical significance of the commenda, see Williamson, Dean V.: 
Transparency, Contract Selection and the Maritime Trade of Venetian Crete, 1303-1351, Working Paper of the 
Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice, 2002; id.: The Financial Structure of Commercial Revolution: 
Financing Long-distance Trade in Venice 1190-1220 and Venetian Crete 1278-1400, Working Paper of the 
Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice, Aug. 2010. 
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and its social institutions was sustained by typical and universal patterns. Rather, I use the 
case of late medieval Venice and the biography of a single merchant to consider, first, the 
significance of the family to an individual’s commercial career in a specific historical con-
text, and, second, the ramifications of the relative importance of the family for the economic 
and, ultimately, the political functioning of the wider society. Despite not offering a grand-
scale historical narrative, a micro-historical perspective is not principally void of generic in-
sights. Documents on individual personal and commercial activities can, in fact, illuminate 
wider political, social, and economic conditions, as they typically contain the interpersonal 
structure of entire groups and thus reflect the circumstances of a significant number of actors. 
In the case of Venice, which in the fifteenth century also maximised its geographical sphere 
of influence, the opportunities and constraints faced by traders in long-distance commerce of-
ten reflected interregional political and cultural challenges. The life of a single merchant can 
therefore be seen, if not as representative of his wider social sphere, then at least as sympto-
matic for the social and political conditions under which he operated, and their technological, 
informational, and institutional constraints. Thus, with respect to his daily experience, his life 
can be compared more widely, providing a window into his sphere and time.  
A. State of Research 
This research draws on three distinct fields of study: late medieval economic and social histo-
ry, with particular respect to the development of long-distance trade and a specific geograph-
ical focus on Venice, Northern Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean (1); the evolution of 
business organisation – in particular, the emergence of the firm – as seen through the prisms 
of institutional theory (2); and the historical sociology of the family (3). 
(1) 
The sheer abundance of surviving mercantile sources in Venice and other Italian contexts 
makes it permissible – indeed, necessary – to ask about the wider social and political implica-
tions of commercial history. This was the primary aim of Frederic C. LANE’S study Andrea 
Barbarigo: Merchant of Venice, 1418-1449, a classic example of a comprehensive business 
biography.6 Andrea Barbarigo was born in Venice in the late 1390s as the son of the galley 
 
6 Lane: Andrea Barbarigo. 
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captain Nicolò Barbarigo.7 He entered the world of commerce at around eighteen years of age 
with a small inheritance from his mother (his father had gone bankrupt after having famously 
been fined 10.000 ducats for wrecking a galley off the Dalmatian coast in 1417). He joined 
the merchant galleys as a “bowman of the quarterdeck” (balestriere della popa) and was later 
trained in the judicial service at the Curia di Petizion.8 He expanded his business activities 
with the support of relatives in Crete and friends from the Cappello family, into which he 
eventually married in 1439.9 As his fortune rose, he invested in property on the terraferma 
and focused his commercial activities on the cloth trade. In his later years, he separated his 
business from his family surroundings and established strategic alliances with young, ambi-
tious nobles.10 
The significance of the patrician family in the political sphere was further demonstrated by 
Patricia H. LABALME on the basis of the papers of the fifteenth-century patrician diplomat 
and scholar Bernardo Giustiniani.11 Both Labalme’s and Lane’s studies led the way in render-
ing economic sources accountable to questions reaching beyond the economic sphere. Of 
course, individual examples cannot uncritically be deemed representative of their era, and 
Lane’s famous caveat with respect to his object of study applies just as well in the case of Lo-
renzo Dolfin: the reason he is being studied lies solely in the arbitrary survival of substantial 
parts of his personal archive.12 Yet, as Benjamin ARBEL has shown, perusing the Venetian ar-
chives for additional sources is all but a futile exercise. His research on the papers of Giam-
battista Donà, a sixteenth-century Cyprus-based Venetian merchant, highlights the entangle-
ment of political and economic spheres as well as a significant role of kinship structures in 
Venetian Eastern Mediterranean trade.13 Outside Venice, the huge collection of the Fondo 
Datini at the Archivio di Stato di Prato contains the most comprehensive known body of 
sources on late medieval commercial history in Italy.14 The example of the Tuscan Francesco 
 
7 According to the Balla d’Oro register, Andrea Barbarigo was eighteen years of age in December 1417. Ibid., p. 
17. 
8 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
9 Ibid., p. 28. 
10 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
11 Labalme, Patricia H.: Bernardo Giustiniani - A Venetian of the Quattrocento, Rome: Edizioni di Storia e 
Letteratura, 1969. 
12 Lane: Andrea Barbarigo, p. 3. 
13 Arbel: Operating Trading Networks. 
14 Cecchi Aste, Elena: L'archivio di Francesco di Marco Datini, fondaco di Avignone inventario, Roma: 
Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali direzione generale per gli archivi, 2004; Brun, Robert: "A Fourteenth 
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Datini validates the notion that the lives of the Venetians Andrea Barbarigo, Lorenzo Dolfin 
and Giambattista Donà are typical in their own right, as their respective commercial careers 
display striking similarities. Datini’s initial commercial activities, which centred around the 
cloth trade, were of striking similarity to the primary business of Lorenzo Dolfin (sale of 
Eastern spices in Venice and the main Western European markets, purchase of raw fabrics 
and processed cloth, subsequent sale particularly along the Romania trade route) while also 
employing similar instruments of finance.15  
Eliyahu ASHTOR meticulously chronicled the rise of late medieval Venetian commerce vis-à-
vis her Italian rivals amidst a general contraction of trade in Europe and the Near East.16 The 
notion of a pan-European late medieval commercial depression was further corroborated by 
Benjamin Z. KEDAR in a comprehensive sociological study of mercantile mentalities as key 
elements of the social foundations of commercial exchange.17 The building and maintenance 
of cross-regional commercial networks, in which Venice developed a competitive edge over 
its main Italian rivals, depended to a significant extent on a successful strategy of bridging 
differences in socio-cultural mentalities, enabling the Venetian diaspora to trade effectively in 
foreign lands. While LOPEZ, RAYMOND, and others documented the development of commer-
cial techniques and the institutionalisation of trade routes in the late medieval Mediterrane-
an,18 the particular role of commercial diasporas in facilitating cross-regional commercial ex-
change was most vividly highlighted in Philip CURTIN’s seminal Cross-Cultural Trade in 
 
Century Merchant of Italy: Francesco Datini of Prato", in: Journal of Economic and Business History II (May 
1930), No. 3, pp. 451-466; Melis, Federigo: "Francesco Datini come operatore economico", in: Economia e 
storia 9 (1962), pp. 195-198; Origo, Iris: The merchant of Prato: Francesco di Marco Datini, London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1957. 
15 Unlike Lorenzo Dolfin and Andrea Barbarigo, Datini was also active in the banking sector as a large-scale 
creditor. The structure of the compagnia, a typical method of financing commercial enterprises, is discussed in 
chapter VI below. 
16 Ashtor, Eliyahu: Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages, Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University Press, 1983. 
17 Kedar, Benjamin Z.: Merchants in Crisis - Genoese and Venetian Men of Affairs and the Fourteenth-Century 
Depression, New Haven (Conn.) and London: Yale University Press, 1976. 
18 Raymond, I.W., Lopez, R.S.: Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World: Illustrative Documents - 
Translated with Introductions and Notes, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.  
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World History. Eric VALLET, in turn, specifically analysed the Venetian trade diaspora in Syr-
ia on the basis of commercial correspondence.19 
(2) 
In addition, historical research on economic development has benefited from advancements 
in institutional economics, a field that owes much to Schumpeterian thought and thus is un-
ambiguously historical in character. As studying the commercial development of late medie-
val and early modern Venice entails necessarily an examination of business units and their 
historical foundations, an institutional perspective can help categorise observable commercial 
practices by highlighting the systemic links at the intersection of social spheres (government, 
commerce, markets) and the specific incentives that guide them. A useful institutionalist 
model for this purpose has been proposed by Avner GREIF as an extension of the pioneering 
work of Douglass NORTH.20 Greif’s definition of institutions, which emerges from a context 
of medieval trade, encompasses a multidimensional perspective that includes crucial aspects 
of North’s framework.21 To Greif, “an institution is a system of social factors (rules, beliefs, 
norms, and organisations) that together generate a regularity of (social) behavior”,22 consist-
ing of several components that Greif coins “institutional elements.”23  
The aspect of “generating behavior” is critical, for a social factor that does not induce behav-
iourial ramifications is not an element of an institution according to this definition. Unlike 
North, Greif regards “rules” as only one institutional element, not as institutions per se. Of 
equal importance are beliefs and means of collective action (organisations), in short, the mo-
 
19 Curtin, Philip D.: Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984; Vallet, Éric: Marchands vénitiens en Syrie à la fin du XVe siècle - Pour l'honneur et le profit, Paris: 
Associations pour le développement de l'histoire économique, 1999.  
20 Greif, Avner: Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006; North, Douglass C.: Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.  
21 Greif first developed his approach when studying commercial cooperation among Jewish eleventh-century 
merchants in the Muslim west, see Greif, Avner: "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on 
the Maghribi Traders", in: Journal of Economic History 49 (Dec., 1989), No. 4, pp. 857-882. 
22 Greif: Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, p. 30. 
23 Ibid. 
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tivations for following the rules.24 “Institutional elements are social factors as they are man-
made, non-physical factors exogenous to each individual whose behavior they influence.”25  
This assertion is particularly fitting to the present historical context, as the institutional 
framework of Venetian long-distance trade arose on the micro-level from individual strategic 
needs but was ultimately determined on the macro-level as a ramification of collective politi-
cal decisions that also reflected inter-state negotiations and conflicts as well as exogenous 
factors (such as climatic conditions). A radical substantivist stance is therefore unsustainable 
in the light of unambiguous evidence of economic incentive structures.26 
Greif’s approach is holistic in the sense that it extends existing definitions and solves their 
apparent contradictions. Most importantly, it combines agency and structural perspectives. 
An agency perspective holds that institutions are designed by individuals for specific purpos-
es, whereas structuralists maintain that the origins of institutions lie outside of individual con-
trol. While the entirety of the Venetian institutional landscape can thus be described in the 
Greifian sense as a socio-political entity providing incentives for the following of rules, this 
study also resorts to more traditional definitions to describe specific social phenomena such 
as the family. Examples hereof are the perspective taken by Oliver E. WILLIAMSON, which 
identifies a range of different institutional layers, and North’s distinction between formal and 
informal institutions.27 Using Williamson’s framework, the family can be described as a so-
cial institution, which corresponds to the terminology typically employed in sociological lit-
erature.28 
 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., p. 34. 
26 The pertinence of Karl POLANYI’S criticism of historical formalisation has been sufficiently discussed in 
North, Douglass C.: "Markets and Other Allocation Systems in History: The Challenge of Karl Polanyi", in: The 
Journal of European Economic History 6 (Spring 1977), No. 1, pp. 703-716. 
27 Williamson, Oliver E.: "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead", in: Journal of 
Economic Literature 38 (Sep., 2000), No. 3, pp. 595-613; North, Douglass C.: "Institutions", in: Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 5 (Winter 1991), No. 1, pp. 97-112.  
28 As originally used by Parsons, Talcott: "The Social Structure of the Family", in: Anshen, Ruth N. (ed.), The 
Family: its Function and Destiny, Oxford: Harper, 1949, pp. 173-201. For a critical discussion of recent 
literature, see Gilding, Michael: "Reflexivity over and above convention: the new orthodoxy in the sociology of 
personal life, formerly sociology of the family", in: The British Journal of Sociology 61 (2010), No. 4, pp. 757-
777. Also see Greif, Avner: "Family Structure, Institutions, and Growth: The Origins and Implications of 
Western Corporations", in: The American Economic Review 96 (May, 2006), No. 2, pp. 308-312, for an attempt 
to derive the emergence of business units and their impact on overall economic development from family 
structures.  
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Major organisational challenges of commercial exchange have been widely discussed in the 
institutionalist literature, and existing models are to a substantial degree interrelated. Situa-
tions such as Venetian merchants instructing trade partners in distant locations are known as 
principal-agent-relationships inducing a commitment problem, a core element of the funda-
mental problems of exchange: absent adequate means of monitoring, a principal has no ulti-
mate control over their agent’s doings and consequently can be deprived of (a portion or the 
entirety of) their share in a transaction.29 To overcome these monitoring-related difficulties, a 
system of trust needs to be created either through credible commitment or by means of exter-
nal enforcement.30 Enforcement can be endogenised, that is, subject to an internal mechanism 
within the partnership, or provided by an exogenous factor such as a judicial system.31 In the 
context of medieval trade, private-order institutions such as mercantile coalitions resulted 
from a desire to improve transactional security. An important related characteristic of medie-
val commerce is the emergence of collective liabilities by which groups could be held re-
sponsible for individual actions. In a regime of collective liability, individual wrongdoing 
such as betraying commercial partners would lead to the sanctioning of the wrongdoer’s as-
sociates in addition to the wrongdoer themselves. Degrees of association relevant in collec-
tive sanctioning could include family ties, religious affiliation, place of origin, or nationali-
ty.32 The creation of commercial coalitions may thus reflect a strategy to reduce the risk of 
collective punishment by spreading businesses across several jurisdictions and strengthening 
individual liabilities.  
 
29 For the theory of the principal-agent-problem, see Richter, R., Furubotn, E.G.: Neue Institutionenökonomik - 
Eine Einführung und kritische Würdigung, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003, pp. 173-182; for the commitment 
problem, see Greif: Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, pp. 62-65, 273; North, Douglass C.: 
"Institutions and Credible Commitment", in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149 (1993), 
No. 1, pp. 11-23; for game-theoretic foundations, see Greif, A., Milgrom, P.R., Weingast, B.R.: "Coordination, 
Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild", in: The Journal of Political Economy 102 
(Aug., 1994), No. 4, pp. 745-776; for the fundamental problems of exchange, see Gelderblom, O., Grafe, R.: 
"The Rise and Fall of the Merchant Guilds: Re-thinking the Comparative Study of Commercial Institutions in 
Premodern Europe", in: Journal of Interdisciplinary History 40 (Spring 2010), No. 4, pp. 477-511; Greif, 
Avner: "The fundamental problem of exchange: A research agenda in Historical Institutional Analysis", in: 
European Review of Economic History 4 (2000), pp. 251-284. 
30 For a critical perspective on trust, see Guinnane, Timothy W.: "Trust: A Concept Too Many", in: Jahrbuch für 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1 (2005), pp. 77-92. 
31 Greif: Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, pp. 93-94, 343-345. 
32 See e.g. Börner, L., Ritschl, A.: "Individual Enforcement of Collective Liability in Premodern Europe", in: 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 158 (2002), pp. 205-213. 
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(3) 
With respect to Venice, Lane examined the role of the patrician family in the economic 
sphere from a legal perspective.33 Venetian law encouraged the creation of family-based 
business units such as the fraterna, which enabled brothers to keep their inheritance in com-
mon ownership, invest their joint capital in common ventures, and share the returns accord-
ingly.34 Family-based businesses differed from other commercial arrangements in primarily 
three ways: first, their cross-generational outlook introduced a degree of permanence; second, 
they featured a strict internal hierarchy; lastly, their relatively well-defined boundaries meant 
that the selection of business agents followed predetermined, overall more exclusive patterns 
and was often restricted to the family as such. 
David HERLIHY identified the fraterna as a general Italian phenomenon.35 According to 
Herlihy, the “consortial family”36 (derived from the Latin consorteria) was a ramification of 
the medieval great household, where several generations and family branches lived under one 
roof.37 Herlihy notes an overall “increase in family solidarity”38 in the High Middle Ages, 
particularly among the wealthy population, which in the context of Venice manifested itself 
as an intensification of inter-clan cooperation within the patriciate. The work of Stanley CHO-
JNACKI broadly confirms this notion.39 The Venetian patriciate was based on a cognatic fami-
ly system in which different consortial families were linked by marriage, thus creating inter-
 
33 Lane, Frederic C.: "Family Partnerships and Joint Ventures in the Venetian Republic", in: The Journal of 
Economic History 4 (Nov., 1944), No. 2, pp. 178-196. 
34 The until today most rigorous historical account of the legal dispositions of historical family partnerships and 
specifically the fraterna is Pertile, Antonio: Storia del diritto italiano dalla caduta dell'impero romano alla 
codificazione - Vol. III: Storia del diritto privato, Turin: Unione tipografico editrice torinese, 1894, pp. 274-284; 
also see Weber, Max: Zur Geschichte der Handelsgesellschaften im Mittelalter - Nach Südeuropäischen 
Quellen, http://www.textlog.de/weber_handel.html, 1889. 
35 Herlihy, David: "Family solidarity in medieval Italian history", in: Explorations in Economic History 7 
(Autumn-Winter 1969), No. 1-2, pp. 173-184. 
36 Ibid., p. 175. 
37 Herlihy claims that “progressive consolidation” is the observable trend of family development in the Middle 
Ages, as opposed to the notion of “progressive nuclearisation” popularised by Marc Bloch. Ibid., p. 178. 
38 Ibid. 
39 See, for example, Chojnacki, Stanley: "Kinship Ties and Young Patricians in Fifteenth Century Venice", in: 
Renaissance Quarterly 38, No. 2 (Summer, 1985), pp. 215-239.  
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family clans. These clans exerted their influence in both commerce and politics; there is thus 
a specific socio-political significance to the Venetian patrician family.40 
In what follows, I shall use the terms ‘kinship’ and ‘family’ for the most part interchangea-
bly, referring to individuals related by blood or marriage as ‘kin’ and to those lacking con-
sanguineous or affinal ties as ‘non-kin’. With respect to the inclusion of non-kin business 
partners into family arrangements, social affinity will be considered as a separate integrative 
factor (anthropological literature accounts for such phenomena and Venetian sources know 
numerous instances of congruence between family and social affinity).41 
Wherever ‘family’ refers to a nuclear family structure, this will be made explicit. I use the 
term ‘clan’ in a provisional sense to capture groups of individuals banded together in patrilin-
eal systems of descent. This emphasises the patrilineal dissemination of family names, as was 
customary among the Venetian patriciate.42 (The term is redefined in the proposed model of 
the Venetian patrician family presented in chapter VI.) Inter-family clan structures resulting 
from marital links will be named as such (e.g. Dolfin-Morosini, see in particular chapters III 
and IV). A family branch, by contrast, is a sub-group of a clan consisting of nuclear and ex-
tended family structures linked to a specific location in Venice, usually a parish (parrocchia). 
Biagio and Lorenzo Dolfin, for example, originated from the Dolfin branch of Santa Giustina. 
 
40 The cognatic pattern with strong inter-clan linkages was also confirmed by Donald QUELLER and Thomas 
MADDEN, see Queller, D.E., Madden, T.F.: "Father of the Bride: Fathers, Daughters, and Dowries in Late 
Medieval and Early Renaissance Venice", Renaissance Quarterly 46 (Winter, 1993), No. 4, pp. 685-711. In 
addition, Trevor DEAN has examined evidence from inter-family vendettas in medieval Italy to explain intra-
family solidarity: Dean, Trevor: "Marriage and Mutilation: Vendetta in Late Medieval Italy", in: Past & Present 
157 (Nov., 1997), pp. 3-36. Daine HUGHES examined the important relationship between urbanisation and 
family structure in the context of late medieval Genoa: Hughes, Daine O.: "Urban Growth and Family Structure 
in Medieval Genoa", in: Past & Present 66 (Feb., 1975), pp. 3-28. 
41 For anthropological definitions, see Hammel, Eugene A.: "Family Structures and Kinship", in: Mokyr, Joel 
(ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History, Vol. 2, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 
261-266. In addition to the similarity of names as a basis for kinship bonds, there are other indications of the 
significance of social affinity. Etiquettes of merchant letters give important hints in this respect (“simel di 
fradello”, “simel di fio”; nephews, at times, were addressed simply as “fio”, see for example Biagio Dolfin’s 
letters to Lorenzo, e.g. ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (Psm 181), Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. e, f. 
[13a]). 
42 Chojnacki, Stanley: "Dowries and Kinsmen in Early Renaissance Venice", in: Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 5 (Spring, 1975), No. 4, pp. 571-600; id.: "Patrician Women in Early Renaissance Venice ", in: Studies 
in the Renaissance 21 (1974), pp. 176-203; id.: Kinship Ties; Queller and Madden: Father of the Bride; Muir, 
Edward: Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice, Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 7, 170, 302. 
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B. Research Agenda: The Commercial Family 
Overall, the literatures on medieval trade, institutional development, and family structure 
show that 
➢ the relationship between the geographical consolidation of Venetian long-distance 
trade and the social consolidation of the patrician family requires further examina-
tion. 
➢ the role of the family as an economic unit beyond formal legal entities such as the fra-
terna has only been rudimentarily explored; 
➢ further evidence is needed to assess the role of individuals within a social system of 
inter-family cooperation; 
➢ identifying individual incentives within family relationships is crucial for assessing 
the macro-institutional landscape of late medieval Venice and, especially, the inter-
play of politics and economics in the context of long-distance commerce. 
This study hence asks about the extent to which the institutional landscape of late medieval 
Venice was shaped by individual decisions taken within changing family environments. 
Thus, it enquires about the impact of the family on the behavioural constraints of the individ-
ual, and in turn about the relationship between evolving family structures and the organisa-
tion of long-distance trade. The decisive question of “what drives changes in family struc-
ture” can be studied on the micro-level by looking at changing attitudes towards the family 
and its commercial function from one generation of a Venetian patrician family to another. 
Considering the apparent significance of intra-family commercial relations, there are grounds 
to suspect that the Venetian patrician family was not just a social unit, but that it also served 
as an operational framework in the economic sphere beyond formally recognisable units such 
as the fraterna. This hypothesis is quite particular in the context of medieval Italy, as compa-
rable city-state economies do not display an equally central role of family relations in com-
mercial affairs.43 It raises a number of questions relating to the intentionality of family-based 
 
43 In Florence, which is most comparable to Venice on an institutional level despite a more pronounced 
dominance of specific clans, contracting family members in commercial contexts was both economically 
inefficient and politically inopportune (see further discussion in chapter VI below). See Goldthwaite, Richard 
A.: "The Medici Bank and the World of Florentine Capitalism", in: Past & Present 114 (February 1987), pp. 3-
31; Roover, Raymond de: "The Medici Bank Organization and Management", in: The Journal of Economic 
History 6 (Mai 1946 ), No. 1, pp. 24-52; Weissen, Kurt: "Machtkämpfe und Geschäftsbeziehungen in Florenz 
im 15. Jahrhundert - Wie Cosimo de Medici seine Bank im Kampf gegen seine inneren Gegner einsetzte", in: 
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commercial arrangements, the means of selecting and monitoring family-internal business 
partners, and the periphery of family-centred commercial networks: 
1. Was conducting long-distance trade within family structures a successful strategy for 
Venetian merchants? 
2. Given the considerable size of family clans resulting from the cognatic system that 
dominated the Venetian patriciate, on what basis did merchants choose which rela-
tives to include into their personal networks? 
3. Which opportunities did a family-based commercial structure create for inter-family 
cooperation? Specifically, how could non-kin agents be integrated to a family coali-
tion and how did their incentives differ from those of family agents? 
4. Were family-based commercial enterprises decentralised or did they revolve around a 
central node? Did the composition of centralised networks change following the death 
or retirement of the patriarch, and how did the continuation of cross-generational net-
works function in practice? 
The papers of Lorenzo Dolfin shed light on whether the observed patterns of trade organisa-
tion functioned as intended. To generate room for more generic conclusions, the above ques-
tions will be approached by separating distinct elements of Lorenzo Dolfin’s biography (e.g. 
the early death of his father and its ramifications for Lorenzo’s inter-family relations) from 
those elements of his life and career that were grounded in wider circumstances (e.g. his mer-
cantile education and the geographical focus of his commerce). Commercial correspondence 
is particularly useful for detecting both the smooth functioning of, and unforeseen difficulties 
in, commercial transactions, as its newsletter-style structure was designed to capture a broad 
array of personal, commercial, and political information and thus accounts for the intricacies 
of inter-personal relations as well as their wider context. 
C. Sources 
i. The Commissarie Lorenzo Dolfin and Biagio Dolfin 
Lorenzo Dolfin’s archive is preserved at the Archivio di Stato in Venice (ASVe). The Com-
missaria Lorenzo Dolfin (CLD hereafter) is a collection of the ASVe’s Procuratori di San 
 
Häberlein, M., Jeggle, C., Praktiken des Handels - Geschäfte und soziale Beziehungen europäischer Kaufleute 
in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit, Constance: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 2010, pp. 175-189. 
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Marco archive (sections Citra and Miste).44 The Procuratori di San Marco contains the per-
sonal archives of Venetian patricians who entrusted the Procuratori with the execution of 
their wills. They in turn were incorporated into the ASVe between 1826 and 1877.45 
Lorenzo Dolfin was presumably born in the Venitian parish St. Giustina to Antonio Dolfin 
qd. Lorenzo and Cataruccia Gabriel qd. Nicolò. He originated from the same Venetian casa 
vecchia (or i lunghi as those Venetian patrician families that claimed ancient ancestry were 
referred to) that produced the fourteenth century doge Giovanni Dolfin (1356-61).46 In the 
early fifteenth century, his paternal uncle Biagio Dolfin represented the Venetian Republic 
twice as consul in Alexandria (1408-1410 and 1418-1420), during which time he continued 
his extensive commercial activities that included trade with precious stones, spices, and cloth. 
Moreover, he was active on the Venetian property market.47 
Biagio Dolfin’s archive (CBD hereafter) also is of crucial importance to this study.48 It com-
prises a vast number of notarial deeds, judicial files, as well as Biagio’s official and personal 
correspondence. These sources are briefly mentioned in F. Lane’s Andrea Barbarigo, were 
first systematically used in E. Ashtor’s Levant Trade49 and have subsequently been included 
in a variety of studies.50 G. CHRIST has analysed Mamluk-Venetian trade by using Biagio’s 
 
44 ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 281-282; ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Miste, b. 283. The bulk 
of the material is contained in b. 282.  
45 Guida generale degli archivi di stato italiani, vol. IV, Roma: Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali, 
Ufficio centrale per i beni archivistici, 1994, p. 886. 
46 According to Venetian chronicles, other patrician families relevant to this study, such as the Bragadin, 
Contarini, Morosini, Querini, and Soranzo, were also part of this illustrious circle (see Labalme: Bernardo 
Giustiniani, p. 5). 
47 Christ, Georg: Trading Conflicts. Venetian Merchants and Mamluk Officials in Late Medieval Alexandria, 
Leiden: Brill 2012, pp. 94-105; for the housing business see e.g. ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Misti, b. 181, 
fasc. 15, int. f, f. [15].  
48 ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Miste, Commissaria Biagio Dolfin, b. 180-181. 
49 Lane: Andrea Barbarigo, p. 149; Ashtor: Levant Trade, p. 553. 
50 LABIB first mentioned the Arabic documents from the CBD (busta 181) in Labîb, Subhi Yanni: 
Handelsgeschichte Ägyptens im Spätmittelalter (1171-1517), Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1965, pp. 501-
503. Following his recommendation, BAUDEN transcribed and discussed a 1419 document concerning the 
commitment of dragomans to the court of the governour of Alexandria in Bauden, Frédéric: "The Role of 
Interpreters in Alexandria in the Light of an Oath (Qasama) taken in the year 822 A.H./1419 A.D.", in: 
d'Hulster, K., Steenbergen, J. van (eds.), Continuity and Change in the Realms of Islam - Studies in Honour of 
Professor Urbain Vermeulen, Leuven etc.: Uitgeverij Peeters, 2008, pp. 33-64; also see Bauden, Frédéric: "The 
Mamluk Documents of the Venetian State Archives: Handlist", in: Quaderni di Studi Arabi 20/21 (2002/2003), 
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involvement in mercantile and political conflicts as a case study. He shows that Venetian 
commerce in the Eastern Mediterranean was subject to both political and cultural constraints. 
On the institutional level, trade was enabled through official agreements, as in the pepper 
trade, but also through illicit phenomena such as smuggling and bribery. Personal bonds be-
tween merchants mattered significantly.51 
The CLD displays a great deal of cross-generational continuity. It contains five letters written 
to Lorenzo, then resident in Venice, by his uncle Biagio during his second consulship (see ta-
ble 5 in appendix C). We find that Biagio and Lorenzo share a great number of correspond-
ents. Although select documents from the CLD have been used in previous scholarship, no 
comprehensive analysis of the entirety of the collection has thus far been attempted.52 The 
CLD contains Lorenzo Dolfin’s correspondence, a significant number of accounts and lists of 
 
pp. 147-156. Other studies to have used CBD sources include Ashtor, Eliyahu: "The Venetian Supremacy in the 
Levantine Trade: Monopoly or Pre-Colonialism?", in: Journal of European Economic History 3 (1974), No. 1, 
pp. 5-53; Pedani, Maria Pia (Fabris): "Balas Rubies for the King of England (1413-1415)", in: Quaderni di Studi 
Arabi V (2002), No. 7, pp. 1-13. For a complete list see Arbel, Benjamin: Venetian Letters (1354-1512) from the 
Archives of the Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation and other Cypriot Collections, Nikosia: The Bank of 
Cyprus Cultural Foundation, 2007, p. 31. Arbel transcribed and translated a letter written by Biagio’s business 
associate Andrea Verardin, see ibid, p. 72. 
51 Christ: Trading Conflicts, pp. 29, 105-106, 140-147.  
52 Ashtor, Eliyahu. "Die Verbreitung des englischen Wolltuches in den Mittelmeerländern im Spätmittelalter", 
in: Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 71 (1984), No. 1, pp. 1-29; id.: "Levantine Weights 
and Standard Parcels: A Contribution to the Metrology of the Later Middle Ages", in: Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London 45 (1982), No. 3, pp. 471-488; id.: Levant Trade; Doumerc, 
Bernard: "La crise structurelle de la marine vénitienne au XVe siècle: Le problème du retard des Mude", in: 
Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 40e Année (May-Jun., 1985), No. 3, pp. 605-623 ; Christ: Trading 
Conflicts; Doumerc, Bernard: "Par dieu écrivez plus souvent! La lettre d'affaires à Venise à la fin du Moyen 
Age", in: Actes des congrès de la Société des historiens médiévistes de l'enseignement supérieur public. 24e 
congrès, Avignon, 1993, pp. 99-109; Nam, Jong-Kuk: Le commerce du coton en Méditerranée à la fin du 
Moyen Âge, Leiden: Brill, 2007; id.: Les réseaux maritimes de Venise à la fin du Moyen Age, 
http://www.google.de/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=%22les%20r%C3%A9seaux%20maritimes%20de%20venise%20%C3
%A0%20la%20fin%20du%20moyen%20age%22&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCUQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F
%2Fmahan.wonkwang.ac.kr%2Fmedsociety%2Fsymposium%2Fnetworks%2F03.doc&ei=B_1EUJw2ioriBPXL
gPAL&usg=AFQjCNHXDvepSO3c9xyqWrJrhus_XRajFw&cad=rja. In a comprehensive study of Italian 
insurance law, Marco ROSSETTI used (among other medieval sources) a transcribed document from the CLD to 
illustrate the origins of contemporary maritime insurance.  Rossetti, Marco: Il diritto delle assicurazioni. Volume 
I: L'impresa di assicurazione - Il contratto di assicurazione in generale, Milan: CEDAM, 2011. The document 
is ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 2, int. 3, f. [1].  
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merchandise, and several types of contracts. It is among the largest individual collections 
held in the archive of the Procuratori. Busta 282 alone, the core of the collection, contains 
almost 400 documents, mostly business letters. Almost all of the letters are addressed to Lo-
renzo Dolfin. Since most of the letters make reference to pieces of correspondence written 
and sent by Lorenzo, as well as to other pieces written by his correspondents, it is evident that 
a substantial part of the correspondence has been lost. The surviving letters, however, very 
neatly account for Lorenzo’s long-distance trade across Europe and the Near East. They were 
likely preserved for this purpose to help assess claims against Lorenzo’s estate. Yet there are 
also a substantial number of personal letters unrelated to commerce. As most of the surviving 
accounts were produced by correspondents, it is not difficult to link them to the business re-
ports contained in the letters. 
The letters, which include both personal letters and the recordatio (a semi-legal document of-
ten used to provide instructions to trade agents in distant locations53), are of primary interest 
to this study as they provide direct insights into commercial organisation with information on 
actors, locations, goods traded, and operational objectives.54 Correspondence with business 
associates was the primary source of information available to merchants, which explains the 
abundance of this type of source. Merchant letters, which often survive in several copies, dis-
play a high degree of structural congruence featuring personal news, trade-specific infor-
mation and transaction-specific instructions. Thus, they enable conclusions regarding the per-
sonal relationships between merchants, the basis of their mutual commitment, and the wider 
economic significance of commercial agency. 
Accounts, by contrast, reveal the cost structure of a commercial enterprise, giving details on 
prices, commissions (salaries of agents), creditors, and institutional expenses such as customs 
duties and taxes. Contracts indicate the institutional foundations of social and specifically 
commercial cooperation. The CLD contains both personal contracts (such as Lorenzo 
Dolfin’s marriage contract with Giovanetta Morosini) and business-specific agreements. The 
latter include bills of exchange as well as unnotarised documents designed to establish forms 
of bilateral and multilateral business cooperation. 
 
53  Arbel: Venetian Letters, pp. 13-49.  
54 See e.g. Arbel: Operating Trading Networks. 
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ii. Other archival and manuscript sources 
State chronicles document the wider social and political environment. These are official polit-
ical histories commissioned by state institutions (such as the chronicle of Giovanni Giacomo 
Caroldo, secretary to the Consiglio dei Dieci55) or influential members of the Venetian nobili-
ty (such as the casa Celsi that commissioned the chronicle of Giacomo Servidor56, or the fa-
mous chronicle of Antonio Morosini57).  
In addition to the archives of Lorenzo and Biagio Dolfin, I include other personal collections 
from the Procuratori di San Marco series that directly relate to Lorenzo’s commercial net-
work. These include the archival legacies of Giorgio Dolfin, Andrea Gabriel (Lorenzo’s ma-
ternal uncle), and Angelo Michiel (a trade agent in Alexandria).58 Additional letters are pre-
served in the ASVe collection Documenti commercial riservati and in the private collection 
of Reinhold C. Mueller.59 In order to compare Lorenzo’s commercial activities to those of 
other fifteenth-century Venetian merchants, I include letters from the collections of Donato 
Soranzo and Ambrogio Malipiero.60 
To a lesser extent, the analysis also includes legal and institutional sources. Legal sources are 
documents produced by the Venetian courts, such as the Giudici di Petizion, the lawmaking 
bodies, such as the Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio, state chanceries such as the cancel-
 
55 BnF-R Ms. Ital. 320 (seventeenth century). 
56 BnF-R Ms. Ital. 319 (seventeenth century).  
57 Morosini, Antonio qd. Marco: Il Codice Morosini. Il mondo visto da Venezia (1094-1433). Tomo primo: 
Introduzione e Cronaca-Diario dal 1094-1413 (fino a tutto il dogado di Michele Steno), ed. by Nanetti, A., 
Spoleto: Fondazione Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo, 2010; Morosini, Antonio qd. Marco: Il Codice 
Morosini. Il mondo visto da Venezia (1094-1433). Tomo secondo: Diario dal 1414 al 1426 (dogado di 
Tommaso Mocenigo e §§ 1-445 del dogado di Francesco Foscari), ed. by id., Spoleto: Fondazione Centro 
Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo, 2010; Morosini, Antonio qd. Marco: Il Codice Morosini. il mondo visto da 
Venezia (1094-1433). Tomo terzo: Diario dal 1426 al 1433 (§§ 446-1983 del dogado di Francesco Foscari), ed. 
by id., Spoleto: Fondazione Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo, 2010. 
58 ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Ultra, b. 119; ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Ultra, b. 137; ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco, Miste, b. 209A. 
59 These are copies of documents formerly owned by Christie’s, London, which Professor Mueller kindly placed 
at my disposal (see bibliography, “Letters auctioned to unknown collectors in 1987-88 by Christie’s-Robson 
Lowe, Bournmouth, GB, extant in photocopy”). Hereafter, these documents will be referred to as “Christie’s 
collection”. 
60 ASVe, Miscellanea di documenti non appartanenti a nessun archivio, b. 8; ASVe, Miscellanea di documenti 
non appartanenti a nessun archivio, b. 15; ASVe, Miscellanea Gregolin, b. 8. 
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leria inferior and private notaries.61 Institutional sources include decrees of the senate (Delib-
erazioni del senato) as well as the archives of religious and other social institutions (such as 
Ospedali e luoghi pii) and charitable organisations such as scuole. 
iii. Knowledge-sharing: the “Medieval Mediterranean Diasporas Database” 
The primary sources used in this study have been identified and studied by the author in the 
ASVe and the Biblioteca del Museo Correr in Venice. As a means to facilitate future access, 
the documents have for the most part been digitised and included in the Medieval Mediterra-
nean Diasporas Database (MMDD) initiated by Georg Christ at the Transcultural Studies 
programme of Heidelberg University.62 In return, this study has benefited from comparable 
source material contained in the database and from the collaborative research of the Transcul-
tural Studies programme and its external associates.63 Database technology facilitates the 
thematic collections of primary sources and secondary literature and the related exchange be-
tween scholars. In addition, research on kinship and business relations is enhanced through 
the storing and interlinking of prosopographical and genealogical data. In order to separate 
the insights gained from original archival research from those provided by database material, 
the acronym MMDD has been added to all citations of sources that were identified through 
the use of database technology rather than through original archival research.64 Among the 
key support features of electronic data management were the classification of letters and oth-
er commerce-related documents according to criteria such as geographical origin, date, send-
er and receiver, and content (based on a preset keyword system); the linking of documents to 
specific persons, locations, and events in cases where primary information was unavailable; 
and the extended information on family relations generated through the matching of individu-
als on the basis of archival material and additional genealogical data. 
 
61 For a detailed discussion of these and other collections in the ASVe, see De Vivo, Filippo: "Ordering the 
archive in early modern Venice (1400–1650)", in: Archival Science 10 (2010), No. 3, pp. 231-248. 
62 The MMDD has now has now been incorporated to the Linking of Knowledge in the Humanities (LoKiH) 
database at the University of Heidelberg: http://lokih.zaw.uni-heidelberg.de/web/. I am indebted to Georg Christ 
for the opportunity to participate in the project as well as to Andreas Adolphs, Susanne Bosche, Andreas 
Greiner, Franziska Hauer, Vu Nguyen, and Christian Steinhaus for technical assistance and administrative 
support.  
63 I accessed the MMDD via LitLink, a FileMaker-based database application, which allowed for the 
collaborative work on transcriptions and the sharing of primary source material. 
64 As mentioned above, all transctiptions are my own unless otherwise stated. 
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D. Methodology 
The key focus of the analysis lies on the mercantile correspondence between Lorenzo Dolfin 
and his associates. Particular attention is given to names and hierarchies, which are estab-
lished by examining employed letter etiquettes in cases where information on the age or sta-
tus of correspondents is unavailable. At this stage, the foundations of observable hierarchies 
are also scrutinised, which could be, for example, age, degree of kin, or financial strength. 
The internal hierarchies of commercial partnerships are further examined with respect to their 
role in generating inter-personal systems of trust. This will illuminate the internal incentive 
structure of the business and the underlying institutions of enforcement. 
Lastly, the duration of business relationships is taken into account. It remains to be seen 
whether the observed business structures featured an internal mechanism for the dissolution 
of commercial partnerships: were they primarily one-generational or primarily cross-
generational associations, and how could they be terminated? 
Of similar importance are the numerous balance sheets contained in the CLD, which are fre-
quently attributable to a correspondent. They provide insights into the prices of traded goods, 
profit margins, and overall cost structures, which include payments made to agents. More 
specifically, they allow for assessing an individual’s role within (and value to) a commercial 
partnership. 
The letters are analysed with respect to (1) their content structure (2) involved actors and 
types of relationships (3) tertiary parameters (frequency, location, date, type of goods traded). 
The analysis aims to establish the composition of Lorenzo Dolfin’s commercial and family 
surroundings, and to assess the significance of kin relative to non-kin actors as well as the 
relative significance of varying degrees of kin and systems of descent (matrilineal, patriline-
al). Moreover, we can identify the employed investment and sales strategies.  
 
(1) The letters can be classified as either personal or contractual (recordationes; both 
these types are examples of commercial correspondence, as only a handful of 
documents are entirely void of commercial content). Late medieval mercantile 
correspondence typically displays a generic pattern, a tripartite “newsletter”-style 
structure of personal, commercial, and political news.65 Contractual letters, by 
contrast, are limited to instructions given from one business partner to another. 
 
65Arbel: Venetian Letters, p. 23; Christ, Georg: "A Newsletter in 1419? Antonio Morosini's Chronicle in the 
Light of Commercial Correspondence between Venice and Alexandria", in: Mediterranean Historical Review 
20, No. 1 (2005), pp. 35-66. 
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Furthermore, we can differentiate between original documents and so-called copie 
(regrettably, Lorenzo Dolfin’s own ledger of copies does not survive66). Copies 
of letters were typically produced for a sender’s own archive and filed in series of 
topical booklets (quaderno di copialettere). 
(2) By identifying the correspondents and the purpose of their writing, we can in most 
cases determine their degree of relatedness to Lorenzo Dolfin. Modes of express-
ing greetings, gratitude, reservations, disagreements, etc., can be used to identify 
varying degrees of formality. 
(3) The business model employed by Lorenzo Dolfin can be identified on the basis of 
geographical locations, goods traded, and the inter-personal structure of his com-
mercial activities. Frequency of correspondence (i.e. number of letters associated 
with a given correspondent) is another significant indicator, as it may reveal a 
player’s relative importance within a commercial enterprise (this, of course, can-
not rely purely on the surviving record, which is likely to be incomplete; yet it is 
applicable in cases where missing letters are mentioned in surviving ones, hence 
allowing for an approximate reconstruction of a written exchange). Finally, the 
dates stated on the documents (both sending and reception dates) provide infor-
mation about the time span of specific transactions. 
E. Structure 
The following six chapters are organised as follows: chapter II describes the historical con-
text with a principal focus on the late medieval economic depression and the particularity of 
Venice as a crucial trade hub during an age of contraction in international commerce, her 
commercial strategy of territorial expansion and the occurring changes in economic govern-
ance and market structure. This relates primarily to changing dynamics in long-distance trade 
and the emergence of sedentary trade agency. 
 
66 Lorenzo Dolfin was seemingly reluctant to produce and preserve copies of his own letters. Despite his own 
impatience vis-à-vis his correspondents (also see Doumerc: Par dieu écrivez plus souvent), Lorenzo himself 
appears to have been a slow and irregular writer judging by the complaints made by many of his interlocutors. 
For example, his brother-in-law Giovanni Morosini qd. Marino, writing from Constantinople in 1438, lamented: 
“Honorado chugnado, in questi zorni pasati da miser mio padre et da nostri chugnadi hoe rezevudo soe et da vui 
che piui sperava ni una non ho rezevuto che molto me dissconforto. Dubiando non me voliate abandonar che 
non me credo che pur deliberavi de non me scriver me seria sta azeto chome se l’avete fato aver dito a miser 
mio padre over a Michiel mio fradelo me ne dovesse scriver qual chossa de vui. Ma non mene fano mention 
chome se non ve avesseno mai chognosuto et per questo prendo lizentia de scriverve et averla azeta chome mia” 
(letter Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 28.05.1438, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [43]).  
30 
 
Chapters III to V, which form the core of the study, present an analysis of the archival legacy 
of Lorenzo Dolfin with a particular focus on his family surroundings and commercial organi-
sation. Chapter III describes the social position of the Dolfin family and portrays the com-
mercial education of young patricians on the basis of the early mercantile careers of both Lo-
renzo Dolfin and his uncle Biagio, to whom Lorenzo acted as a trade agent. With respect to 
Lorenzo, this covers the period from 1418, the year of the earliest surviving correspondence 
between Biagio and Lorenzo, until 1424, the year of Lorenzo’s last correspondence with 
members of his uncle’s network. Chapter IV covers three decisive years in Biagio’s personal 
development, ending in 1427, when the construction of his own (affinal)-family-based busi-
ness environment was completed. These years also cover the beginning of Lorenzo’s mar-
riage to Giovanetta Morosini, his first commercial activities on the London and Flanders 
markets, his rise to the prestigious position of camerario in Vicenza and Capodistria, and his 
first success as an independent merchant. Chapter V eventually discusses the implementation 
of Lorenzo’s long-term business strategy, the sale of spices and acquisition of textiles on the 
London and Flanders markets, and the sale of textiles along the Romania galley route (a peri-
od lasting at least until 1443). 
Chapter VI offers a theoretical evaluation of the historical evidence. It discusses the merits 
and relevance of institutional theory, reassesses the applicability of various sociological mod-
els of the family, and proposes a new model of incentive structures within family-based 
commercial operations. As additional evidence, I evaluate documents from the collections of 
Donato Soranzo (a contemporary of Lorenzo Dolfin) and Ambrogio Malipiero (a successor). 
Chapter VII offers a conclusion. 
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CHAPTER II:  
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND – INCENTIVES AND 
DYNAMICS OF LONG-DISTANCE TRADE 
Lorenzo Dolfin’s life coincided with a series of political developments in Italy and the East-
ern Mediterranean that had substantial implications for long-distance trade and commercial 
organisation. At the same time, the years of Lorenzo’s commercial activity represent the cli-
max of Venetian commercial and political expansion. In the aftermath of the great plague of 
1348, the political economy of Venice had undergone significant institutional change that in-
duced the gradual switch from a contract to a corporation economy. That is, a system of ex-
change based on short-term commercial contracts such as the commenda (known in Venice as 
colleganza) increasingly gave way to long-term partnerships based on principal-agent rela-
tions.1 
Section A of this chapter summarises the causes and consequences of the territorial expansion 
of the Venetian Republic amidst processes of political consolidation in fifteenth-century Italy 
(A.i), and the role of commercial correspondence in chronicling political developments (A.ii). 
Section B invokes the particular situation of Venice as a leading trade hub – especially in the 
textiles sector – as an explanation for Venice’s commercial exceptionalism during our period 
of interest. Based on these insights, section C highlights the significance of sedentary trade 
agency for Venetian long-distance trade (C.i) and, in consideration of the political pertinence 
of the Venetian patriciate identified in previous scholarship, develops a hypothesis of the pa-
trician family as an economic institution (C.ii) – that is, as a provider of social relations that 
facilitated economic exchange and thus allowed for its internalisation within family struc-
tures. 
 
1 For the commenda and its gradual decline, see for example Ashtor: Levant Trade, pp. 367-382; Börner: 
Breaking up is hard to do, pp. 3-6; González de Lara, Yadira: Enforceability and Risk-sharing in Financial 
Contracts: From the Sea Loan to the Commenda in late Medieval Venice, Florence: European University 
Institute, PhD Thesis, 2000, pp. 30-34, 147-186; Kedar: Merchants in Crisis, pp. 27-28; Lane, Frederic C.: 
"Investment and Usury", in: Braudel, Fernand et al. (eds.), Venice and History - The Collected Papers of 
Frederic C. Lane, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966, pp. 56-68; Luzzatto, Gino: "La 
commenda nella vita economica dei secoli XIII e XIV - Con particolare riguardo a Venezia", in: Comitato 
regionale di Napoli dell'Associazione italiana di diritto maritimo (eds.), Mostra bibliografica e Convegno 
internazionale di studi storici del diritto marittimo medioevale. Amalfi, luglio-ottobre 1934. Atti a cura dell'Avv. 
L.A. Senigallia, Napoli, 1934, pp. 139-164; Luzzatto: Storia economica di Venezia, p. 80-93; Pryor, John H: 
"The Origins of the Commenda Contract", in: Speculum 52 (1977, Jan), No. 1, pp. 5- 37. 
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A. Venice, Italy, and the Eastern Mediterranean 
i. Politics of consolidation 
The principal goal of Venetian foreign policy was to protect the Republic’s access to land- 
and sea trade routes by diplomatic and military means. In Italy, Venice’s access to the land 
routes to Germany and the Champagne fairs was endangered by the conflicts with its main 
rivals, Milan and Genoa. In the East, Venice’s Mediterranean and Black Sea trade was put at 
risk by the rising political and commercial hegemony of the Ottoman Empire. In the first half 
of the fifteenth century, the Republic pursued a proactive military strategy, which reached its 
climax during the dogeship of Francesco Foscari (1424-1457). With the Ottomans increasing 
their influence over South-East Europe up to the fall of Constantinople in 1453, a shrewd bi-
partisan policy of alliances allowed the Republic to limit any trade-related setbacks in re-
sponse to the Ottoman dominance. Venice’s status as a maritime power at the intersection of 
Latin Christendom, the fading Byzantine Empire, and the rising Ottoman power necessitated 
a balanced approach to protect the Republic’s commercial interests across different zones of 
power.  
Lorenzo’s early years as a merchant and public official coincided with a period of territorial 
and political consolidation. Although not void of military conflicts, the period witnessed a 
strengthening of inter-state cooperation as well as a (temporary) mending of ecclesiastical di-
visions. In 1417, the election of Pope Martin V during the Council of Constance had ended 
the Great Western Schism, and, following the death of the Colonna pope in 1431, the con-
clave elected the Venetian Gabriele Condulmer as his successor. Born into a patrician mer-
chant family (his mother was a Correr), Pope Eugene IV re-established the papacy as a supra-
political power, positioning himself against Colonna heirs who expected papal authority to 
serve the interests of the Roman patriciate.2 The political stabilisation of the Italian peninsula 
was eventually achieved during the pontificate of his successor, the Genoese Pope Nicholas 
V. (1447-1455). 
Earlier in this long period of political consolidation, Venice had cemented its leading position 
as a maritime power with its victory over the Genoese fleet at Chioggia (1379-1381), which 
secured its naval and commercial hegemony in the Adriatic Sea. The Venetian expansion of 
the terraferma was driven by the Republic’s desire to consolidate her territorial possessions 
 
2 Hay, Denys: The Church in Italy in the Fifteenth Century: The Birkbeck Lectures, 1971, Cambridge etc.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 26-48. 
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and her access to the northern markets by ridding herself of regional rivals. For this purpose, 
the Republic operated a policy of short-term purpose-driven alliances, such as a pact with 
Giangaleazzo Visconti of Milan that ended the Carrara family’s rule over Padua.3 The fact 
that Visconti Milan should soon turn into Venice’s most formidable adversary highlights the 
volatility of contemporary intra-Italian relations, which could rapidly diminish the political 
weight of state actors. After its defeat in the battle of Chioggia, Genoa had entered an endur-
ing period of military and political inferiority to Venice. The first half of the fifteenth century 
saw the emergence of a five-power system in Italy (Venice, Milan, Florence, the Papal States, 
Naples) of which Genoa was no longer part, having fallen under the dominance of Milan as 
the main regional power in north-western Italy.4 
In accordance with the beliefs of the ruling elite, the Republic’s territorial expansion was 
principally pursued to weaken its rivals, whom the Venetian patriciate suspected of harbour-
ing a destructive desire for conspiracy against the Serenissima.5 A popular object of suspicion 
was the Carrara family of Padua, who pursued a policy of alignment with Genoa and Friuli 
by which Venice felt seriously threatened.6 Following the overthrow of the Carrara, Padua 
became Venetian territory in 1406. Prior to that, Verona and Vicenza had already been sub-
jected to Venetian rule (in 1404 and 1405 respectively). These annexations strengthened the 
Republic’s dominant political role on the Italian peninsula and further broadened her eco-
nomic opportunities in trade and agriculture. Most crucially, they increased the political in-
fluence of the Venetian patriciate, whose members gained powerful administrative positions 
in the newly-subjected cities.7 Venice appointed captains as head of a city’s administration 
(typically a podestà for administrative duties and a capitano as a military leader, two offices 
that occasionally were held by a single person as podestà e capitano), who were typically 
supported in their duties by a chief financial controller (camerlengho). These positions were a 
 
3 Lane, Frederic C.: Venice - A Maritime Republic, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973, pp. 
227-228; also see Black, Jane: Absolutism in Renaissance Milan - Plenitude of Power under the Visconti and the 
Sforza 1329-1535, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 68-72.  
4 Lane: Venice, p. 228. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., pp. 226-227. 
7 Queller, Donald E.: The Venetian Patriciate: Reality versus Myth, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 1986, pp. 29-50; in terms of personal affluence, the patriciate was not a homogenous sphere, as the span 
of individual wealth was substantial. Also see Grubb, James S.: "When Myths Lose Power: Four Decades of 
Venetian Historiography", in: The Journal of Modern History 58 (Mar., 1986), No. 1, pp. 43-94. 
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welcome additional source of income for aspiring nobles and equipped them with regional 
expertise that could be of good use in future commercial activities.  
By aligning herself with Visconti Milan for the ousting of the Carraresi from Padua, Venice 
had acted in defense of her commercial interests in northern Italy, thus securing trade links 
with Lombardy and, via the Alpine region, with northern Europe. Politically, this strategy 
bore significant risk as the military cooperation allowed Milanese mercenaries to advance 
well into the Veneto region. In order to combat a growing Milanese hegemony, Francesco 
Foscari campaigned for a strengthening of Venetian ties with Florence, a traditional ally of 
the Serenissima. Following his election as doge, Foscari succeeded in containing the Milan-
ese expansion by enlarging the Venetian territory westwards. Brescia, formerly controlled by 
the Visconti, fell to Venice in 1426. Bergamo became part of Venetia in 1428, having been 
under Milanese rule only since 1419 – a somewhat predictable outcome of a year-long power 
struggle in which a significant faction of Bergamo’s nobility favoured Venice to Milan.8 With 
the expansion of Venetian territory deep into Lombardy, Filippo Maria Visconti aligned Mi-
lan to the Crown of Aragon in a quest to counter-balance Venetian dominance in northern Ita-
ly. After the ascendency of Alfonso I., King of Aragon, to the throne of the Kingdom of Na-
ples in 1442, an enduring balance of power on the Italian peninsula was finally achieved, put-
ting a Milanese-Napolese against a Florentine-Venetian axis with the Papal States mostly sid-
ing with the latter. Yet the longevity of the Lombardian Wars eventually necessitated an 
agreement between the two sides, which was reached in the Treaty of Lodi (1454). 
By strengthening its influence on the terraferma and in the Adriatic Sea, the Venetian Repub-
lic stabilised its overland trade and the westbound galley routes (‘Flanders’, ‘Aigues mortes’, 
‘Barbary’, and ‘al trafego’). In order to limit the Genoese influence in the Western Mediter-
ranean, Venice forged partnerships with the Crown of Aragon and the Kingdom of Spain.9 By 
contrast, its commercial activities in the Eastern Mediterranean became more precarious as a 
result of the developing tensions with the Ottoman Empire, which substantially weakened 
Venetian commerce in the Black Sea and eventually led to the dismantling of the Romania 
galley route in 1452.10 However, the loss of the Romania trade must not be attributed to Ve-
netian diplomatic negligence, as the Republic, compared to the other Western powers, had 
 
8 Lane: Venice, p. 230. 
9 Ibid., pp. 176-178. 
10 Ibid., pp. 348-349. 
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enjoyed rather stable relations with the Ottomans even after the failure of the Crusade of 
Varna.11 
The downfall of the Byzantine Empire cemented Ottoman dominance in the Black Sea and 
practically ended Italian trade with the Crimea and Romania regions (with the once important 
Genoese and Venetian outposts Caffa and Tana) for more than two decades. The Venetian 
loss of Negroponte in 1470 and Tana in 1471 to the Ottomans further confirmed this trend. 
Trade relations between Venice and the Ottomans only recovered with the peace treaty of 
1479, which again granted the Venetian Republic access to the Romanian sea route and the 
right to pursue commerce in the whole of the Ottoman Empire, although having to perma-
nently concede Scutari and Negroponte to the Ottomans.12 
ii. Commercial correspondence 
Contemporary mercantile correspondence illustrates the practical implications of these devel-
opments as experienced by Venetian merchants. Medieval long-distance trade depended to a 
critical extent on the availability of information, and the exchange of information through 
written correspondence was therefore a primary task of post-commenda merchants. Collec-
tions of letters such as the CLD, which contains a great number of letters with almost identi-
cal content (written as backups if particularly important pieces of information needed to be 
conveyed), bear vivid testament to this daily mercantile obligation. Their significance is par-
ticularly apparent in the context of the Venetian expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean, as 
the gradual decline of the Byzantine Empire and the parallel rise of the Ottomans created, for 
a brief period, a political and economic vaccum that Venice was able to fill. 
Newsletter-style commercial correspondence represents an important milestone in the history 
of political communication.13 While the conveying of political news was an important aspect 
of the merchant letter, its principal motive was to assess the economic and commercial rami-
fications of political developments. Political news, therefore, was typically discussed against 
the background of commercial considerations. In the politically unstable and constantly fluc-
tuating environment of the fifteenth-century Eastern Mediterranean, markets displayed a 
great deal of volatility resulting from interruptions of supply routes, impositions of collective 
 
11 Romano, Dennis: The Likeness of Venice - A Life of Doge Francesco Foscari 1373-1457, New Haven etc.: 
Yale University Press, 2007, pp. 181-184. 
12 Luzzatto: Storia economica di Venezia, p. 185. 
13 Christ: Trading Conflicts, pp. 38-42; Habermas, Jürgen: Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit - Untersuchungen 
zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990, pp. 69-71. 
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liabities, and military conflicts. Political news with direct relevance to commercial activities 
was in no short supply. 
The types of commodities traded in the Eastern Mediterranean by Venetian merchants, the 
vast majority of which must be classified as luxury goods, required particular attention to the 
whereabouts of rulers. For merchants such as Lorenzo Dolfin and his partners who special-
ised in the trade with precious cloth, princely courts were key clients on whom demand de-
pended to a critical extend. The correspondence from Constantinople and other Romanian 
centres contains frequent references to the whereabouts of the powerful, which are precious 
historical descriptions of the contemporary political fragmentation of the Black Sea region. 
 A striking symptom of this is the frequent use of the term “imperador” in mercantile 
letters, which only in rare cases refered to the nominal imperial powers of Byzantium and the 
Holy Roman Empire and hence must be understood as a reference to political authority more 
generally. The Roman king Sigismund, for instance, appears as “imperador” in Venetian let-
ters long before he was eventually crowned Holy Roman Emperor in 1433.14 The eastern 
Black Sea, dominated by the Golden Horde in the north (in the area of Tana) and west (Cri-
mea) and Trebizond in the south, was known to Venetian merchants as a profitable market 
with a great number of economically potent regional centres. Venetians resident in the Black 
Sea region closely monitored regional market conditions and reported their observations in 
their letters sent to the Serenissima. Merchants resident in Venice were thus able to estimate 
the quantities of goods likely to be sold and assess the overall risk of shipping them to a given 
destination. Their surviving correspondence depicts the Eastern Mediterranean and Romania 
regions as politically fragile and hence economically volatile areas in which the flexible Ve-
netian trading-post system was well-placed to succeed. The phenomenon of sedentary mer-
chants in Venetian outposts was quickly embraced by the Venetian mercantile milieu and 
thus unfolded strongly in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.15 
 
14 See e.g. Letter Dolfin, Nicolò qd. Benedetto to Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo, 27.10.1418, ASVe, Procuratori di 
San Marco, Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. d, f. [5]. 
15 Lorenzo Dolfin’s (mostly Constantinople-based) correspondents provided ample information on the 
whereabouts of regional rulers. His cousin Giacomo Dolfin qd. Francesco, writing from Constantinople in 1424, 
reported, for example, on the movements of two Mongol rulers, likely referring to the Crimean khan – possibly 
the rising Haji I Giray (“imperador de Sorgati”) – and Barak Khan, the nominal ruler of the Golden Horde 
(“imperador del Lordo”): “Io iera desposto per nuove averiemo abudo da la Tane romagna da qui da passa che i 
pani nostri asai ben per el dito luogo iera acoloradi et ancor per proveder a i pani bastardi e i sex nostri iqual 
seria per sto luogo. Hora per eser capitado in questo dy une nave da la Tane per laqual avemo ch’el inperador 
del Lordo iera retornado in suo stado e l’inperador de Sorgati non sa dove sia de che per questo ar(?) quanto 
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B. Geographical Expansion and the End of the Commenda Economy 
In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the geographical reach of the Venetian Republic was 
advanced through the expansions of the stato da mar and the terraferma. The Venetian ex-
pansion in the Eastern Mediterranean triggered the establishment of commercial outposts and 
thus permanently altered the dynamics of Venetian long-distance trade. In essence, it has-
tened the end of the commenda economy of short-term contracts, which had flourished during 
the medieval Commercial Revolution, and the creation of a new corporation economy based 
on long-term institutionalised partnerships. Despite its eventual decline as a major commer-
cial centre, the foundations of this substantial shift were laid in Venice and eventually affect-
ed, through emulation and rivalry, the entirety of the Italian peninsula and the Mediterranean 
region more widely.  
Following the defeat of Genoa in the War of Chioggia, Venice achieved a second great wave 
of expansion. Korfu (1386), Nauplia (1388), Durazzo (1392), Argos and Malvasia (1392), 
Scutari (1396), Lepanto (1407), Patras (1408) as well as large parts of the Dalmatian coast 
(1409-1420) fell under Venetian rule or quasi-rule. The territorial expansion was driven by a 
combination of military and economic considerations. The Republic’s principal goal was to 
maintain control over strategic locations across the Eastern Mediterranean in order to secure 
its naval trade in the region, which explains the concentration of Venetian outposts along the 
 
pensa par meio faremo che non sava prima per eser quelo puovolo in gran raro. Al prexenti tuty son in accendo 
e dixe che par tavolte de queli no capito versso la Tana de che ve dicho io son disposto de montar suxo respeto 
che de qui nula si fano ben che mi deperti sia insido come vedenti.” Letter Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to 
Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.06.1424, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [44]. 
Following Giacomo’s death in 1433, his son Dolfino Dolfin continued to correspond with Lorenzo. Also 
residing in Constantinople, he informed Lorenzo about the tense relationship between the declining Byzantine 
Empire and the rising Ottoman power: “Nuove de qui el signor turcho con el disporti fradel de l’imperador he 
acordato a desfacion de l’imperador e de Constantinopoli sollo per far signor el dispotti che tegno non su gneia 
facta alla raxon e no che questa de lo luogo non el s’ofreria mai per dubio del turcho. Avixandovi che el predicto 
dispotti ogni zorno con el favor de turchi chare suxo le partte de qui che he gran dano a sto luocho per esser tucti 
i passe de Grettia seradi e Turchia. Et a vostra informattion l’imperador in sti zorni passatti mando suo 
ambassadori sollene al turcho iqual rettorno senza far nulla tegnando sechondo l’opinion mia la cossa antedicte 
starmo assai ai’ zonsse che gram dano sera alla marchadantia. I enovexi a mandatto in questi zorni do suo 
ambassadori al Turcho et in brieve a ho tegnudo bona paxe con el dretto che he bem facto perché si lor<o> fosse 
sta in guera totalmentte bexognava abandonari sto luocho dicho in facto de con ma<i> piui spierano essendo 
avortta pera sera meni mal dio per la sua infinieta miserichordia faza el beni de christo.” Letter Dolfin, Dolfino 
qd. Giacomo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 17.06.1442, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 
1, int. 2, f. [20]. 
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Eastern Mediterranean coasts. Originally, their purpose was to support the trading system of 
the commenda, as the control over key port cities and the military protection of regular naval 
trade routes improved the safety of travelling commenda merchants. Yet it was the increase 
in commercial security and inter-regional connectivity (with the related improvement in the 
flow of information) that eventually led to the commenda’s decline, as the Republic’s strate-
gic expansion reduced the necessity to travel with merchandise.16 Instead, the unaccompanied 
shipping of wares became increasingly common as Venetian merchants opted to delegate 
their transactions in distant ports to sedentary trade agents.17 
The historical literature on economic institutions has identified the corporation and the com-
menda contract as two distinct arrangements of business organisation whose institutional de-
signs varied across regions. The commenda and its various regional variations have been re-
garded as a ubiquitous phenomenon in medieval Eurasian trade involving merchants from 
Latin Europe, Byzantium, Muslim Arabia, and China. By contrast, the corporation is said to 
have been a specifically European institution.18 In the historical progression from individually 
acting agents via partnerships to companies, the corporation is one (equity-based) variant that 
emerged much later than the commenda.19 
Thus, the institutional evolution of contracting methods in late medieval Europe resulted pri-
marily from the geographical expansion of European long-distance trade and the intensifica-
tion of maritime trade in particular. The emergence of maritime insurance reflects the related 
increase in informational asymmetries.20 Risk-sharing mechanisms, such as the commenda, 
arose as a direct consequence of informational asymmetries.21 Hence the gradual switch from 
debt-like contracts such as sea loans to equity-like contracts such as the commenda was pri-
 
16 Kamenaga-Anzai, Yoko: "Attitudes towards public debt in medieval Genoa: the Lomellini family", in: 
Journal of Medieval History 29 (2003), No. 4, pp. 239-263. 
17 Christ: Trading Conflicts, pp. 43-44. The collegeanza initially rose in importance in Venice during the second 
half of the twelth century, reflecting an economy of travelling merchants (Lane: Venice, p. 52). The Venetian 
colleganza “continued to be used in the fourteenth century for those branches of trade in which conditions still 
resembled those that had faced earlier travelling merchants” (Lane: Venice, p. 138). 
18 Harris, Ron: "The institutional dynamics of early modern Eurasian trade: The commenda and the 
corporation", in: Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization 71 (2009), No. 3, pp. 606-622. 
19  Börner: Breaking up is hard to do, p. 2. 
20 Rossetti: Il diritto delle Assicurazioni, pp. 30-40. The CLD document transcribed in this work documenting 
Lorenzo’s use of maritime insurance is ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 2, int. 3, f. [1]. 
21  Williamson: Transparency, p. 1. 
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marily linked to monitoring problems.22 In the case of Venice, it was facilitated by the devel-
opment of strong state-provided enforcement institutions in the form of “verifiable infor-
mation, coercive power, and incentives for merchants to submit themselves to the coercive 
power of the state.”23 
This literature regards state-provided enforcement institutions as an alternative to enforce-
ment through reputation mechanisms in private-order networks. However, monitoring re-
mained a ‘fundamental problem of exchange’ even after the commenda became widespread 
in Italy and across the Mediterranean. Family-based as well as other exogenously-induced 
commercial networks then added another layer of transactional security. Their emergence re-
sulted from an increase in inter-regional connectivity, as the rise of principal-agent partner-
ships was paralleled by the relative decline of the commenda.24 In addition, they played a 
crucial role in the evolution of business organisation and the emergence of companies.25 
i. Was Europe’s trade hub immune to economic decline? 
A prominent branch of scholarship has purported the notion of a late medieval economic cri-
sis. LOPEZ, their most salient representative, described the medieval Commercial Revolution 
as a period of demographic growth, emerging trade routes, developing contracting methods, 
fiscal stabilisation, technological innovation, and increasing agricultural productivity.26 The 
political unrest in the Mongol states in East Asia and the subsequent deterioration of Europe-
an long-distance trade routes, coupled with the destruction of one third of the European popu-
lation in the great plague of the fourteenth century, subsequently led to a sharp decline in 
trade volumes and overall economic activity.27 In short, this view questioned the continuity of 
economic progress between the late Middle Ages and the early modern period.28 
 
22 González de Lara: Enforceability and Risk-sharing, p. 3. 
23 Ibid., p. ii; also see González de Lara, Yadira: "The secret of Venetian success: a public-order, reputation-
based institution", in: European Review of Economic History 12 (Dec., 2008), No. 3, pp. 247–285. 
24 Kedar: Merchants in Crisis, pp. 27-29. 
25 See chapter VI.A below. 
26 Lopez, Robert S.: The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950-1350, Englewood Cliffs (N. J.): 
Prentice-Hall, 1971, pp. 27-29, 56-59, 73-78, 79-84, 154-161. 
27 These are the two main causes of the late medieval depression according to Kedar: Merchants in Crisis. 
28 Cipolla, Carlo M: Before the industrial revolution: European society and economy, 1000-1700, London: 
Routledge, 1993 (part. chapters 9, 10). 
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The disagreements between “growth sceptics” and “crisis sceptics” can be summarised as fol-
lows: first, while there is agreement that the feudal economy did not produce for the market, 
its alledged inability to keep food production in line with population growth has been ques-
tioned.29 Second, crisis sceptics have pointed to a greater degree of regional variability in 
grain output and technological innovation in agrarian production, thus contradicting the claim 
that economic stagnation was a general European phenomenon in the late thirteenth and early 
fourteenth centuries.30 Third, and most crucially in the present context, crisis sceptics have 
challenged the idea that trade made only a minor contribution to economic growth. On the 
contrary, this line of argument holds, long-distance trade was the key driver of capitalist eco-
nomic organisation, as merchants needed to reinvest their revenues to much greater extents 
than feudal lords.31 The expansion of markets through long-distance trade had spillover ef-
fects on agrarian production and manufacturing and was a crucial driver of technological 
transfers.32 In short, the proposition of a whole-scale late medieval commercial crisis has 
come under intense scrutiny. 
Yet, regardless of its general historiographical validity, the purported decline in manufactur-
ing and trade must have known regional exceptions, since innovations in commercial organi-
sation did not generally cease. The historiography of European trade rightly regards the insti-
tutional development of the Venetian Republic as both a key contributor to the rise of medie-
val long-distance trade and a pivotal example of the impact of commerce on medieval econ-
omies in general. Venice’s dominant position in Mediterranean trade was rooted, on the one 
hand, in its innovative market institutions with the provision of staple rights and the auction-
 
29 Epstein, S.R.: Freedom and Growth - The rise of states and markets in Europe, 1300-1750, London and New 
York: Routledge, 2000, p. 38. 
30 Cipolla, Carlo M: "Economic Depression of the Renaissance?", in: The Economic History Review, New Series 
16 (1964), No. 3, pp. 519-524. 
31 Cipolla: Before the industrial revolution, p. 183; Epstein: Freedom and Growth, p. 50-51. 
32 For technology transfers through trade in the Later Middle Ages, see Jacoby, David: "The Economic Function 
of the Crusader States of the Levante a New Approach", in: Cavaciocchi, Simonetta (ed.), Relazioni economiche 
tra Europa e mondo islamico, secc. XIII - XVIII, Florence: Le Monnier, 2007, pp. 159-192; id.: "Cross-cultural 
Transfers of Industrial Technologies in the Late Middle Ages: Incentives, Promoters and Agents", in: mimeo, 
2011. 
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ing of merchant galleys.33 At the same time, a shrewd management of diplomatic affairs fur-
thered the Republic’s economic rise.34 
This privileged position may have largely exempted the Serinissima from the pan-European 
decline. This is consistent with the notion that the Venice’s geographical expansions was 
driven by a rapid augmentation of its capital stock, which had profound social ramifications 
for the organisation of long-distance commerce. The family served, before developing into a 
commercial unit, as a socio-geographical link between the Serenissima, its overseas outposts, 
and the Venetian diaspora in foreign territories. As overseas commercial opportunities grew, 
family links between different commercial centres provided an easy and flexible means of 
enabling exchange. 
ii. The cloth trade – a source of wealth 
Among the key industries to contribute to the rise of Venetian commerce was the production 
of, and trade in, textiles (processed fibres). Production was concentrated mainly on the ter-
raferma where in the fifteenth century it reached output levels comparable to the great indus-
tries of Tuscany and Lombardia.35 As a result of its geographical ubiquity – textiles were in 
strong demand across Europe and the Near East – the cloth trade was potentially least endan-
gered by economic recession, and the labour-intensive textile industries had been a potent 
factor of late medieval urbanisation.36 Four types of cloth dominated late medieval European 
and Mediterranean markets: wool, made from animal hair, typically of sheep; cotton, made 
from the fiber of the cotton plant; linen, made from flax; and silk, a luxury textile made from 
the cocoons of the mulberry silkworm. Wool was primarily produced in England and Spain 
(sheep hair is protective against both heat and cold gives cold and hot climates a comparative 
advantage in wool production) and exported either as an intermediary good or as a raw prod-
uct to areas that had developed a comparative advantage in the processing of wool and other 
 
33 Gonzalez de Lara: The secret, p. 262; Stöckly, Doris: Le système de l'incanto des galées du marché à Venise, 
Leiden etc.: Brill, 1995, pp. 49-63.  
34 González de Lara: Enforceability and Risk-sharing, pp. 106-140; Fuess, Albrecht: "Why Venice, not Genoa? 
How Venice Emerged as the Mamluks’ Favourite European Trading Partner After 1365", in: mimeo, 2011.  
35 Luzzatto: Storia economica di Venezia, p. 69; for the significance of the woollens industry to the medieval 
economy in general see Lopez: The Commercial Revolution, pp. 130-137.  
36 Hunt, E.S., Murray, J.: A History of Business in Medieval Europe, 1200-1550, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008, pp. 20, 38-41; Schofield, J., Vince, A.: Medieval Towns, London: Leicester University 
Press, 1994, pp. 20-21. 
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fibres (that is, in the production and dyeing of textiles from raw fabrics and the fashioning of 
processed products). In Italy, major centres of wool-based textile production were Florence 
and, from the end of the fourteenth century, the Venetian terraferma.37 The acquisition of 
English raw wool from Flanders and London in support of the domestic textile industries had, 
in fact, been a main reason for expanding Italian trade relations to Flanders and England from 
the early fourteenth century (the Venetian Flanders galley route was set up in 1319).38 
The cotton and flax plants flourish in hot climates, and thus the South-Eastern Mediterranean 
region, particularly Egypt and Syria, maintained a comparative advantage in cotton and flax 
production even as their processing industries declined in response to faster technological ad-
vancements in Europe. The decline of the Eastern textile industries, which began as early as 
the late twelfth century and was largely completed by the time of Lorenzo Dolfin, was met by 
an increase in European cloth exports to the Near East, where there continued to be a strong 
demand for luxury textiles of all sorts.39 Silk, although traditionally an Oriental and far-
Eastern speciality, began to be produced competitively in Italy for export to the Near East 
from the thirteenth century onwards.40 Yet, the Black Sea markets of Tana, Trebizond and 
Constantinople – all three of which were among Lorenzo Dolfin’s places of activity – re-
mained crucial suppliers of Persian silk to Venetian merchants until the Ottoman conquest of 
Constantinople, which terminated Venetian access to the Black Sea region.41 
The commercial strategy of Lorenzo Dolfin with respect to the cloth trade very much reflects 
the general business model of fifteenth-century Italian merchants. Profits were made from the 
import of raw fabrics (mainly English wool in the case of Venice), and the sale of European 
cloth in Romania and the Near East. Revenues for the acquisition of wool in England and 
Flanders were generated through the sale of Eastern spices on these markets, which is cap-
tured in Lorenzo Dolfin’s Bruges accounts maintained by the brothers Francesco and Marco 
 
37 Ashtor, Levant Trade, p. 152; Mozzato, Andrea: "The Production of Woolens in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-
Century Venice", in: Lanaro, Paola (ed.), At the Center of the Old World: Trade and Manufacturing in Venice 
and the Venetian Mainland, 1400-1800, Toronto: CRRS, 2006, pp. 73-107. 
38 Ashtor: Levant Trade, p. 4. For the particular role of Venetian merchants see Gelder, Maartje van: Trading 
Places: The Netherlandish Merchant Community in Early Modern Venice (1590-1650), Leiden: Brill, 2009, p. 
41. 
39 For the decline of the Eastern textile industry, see Ashtor: Levant Trade, p. 6. 
40 Ibid., p. 5. 
41 Molà, Luca: The Silk Industry of Renaissance Venice, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2000, p. 57.  
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Renier.42 Processed textile products were typically marketed according to their places of 
origin. Major centres of English wool and cloth production in the fifteenth century were the 
Cotswolds (whose cloth products appear as cotsegualde43 in the Venetian sources), Gilford 
(gilfordione), Essex (sex), Southampton (santone) and possibly Lowestoft, from where the 
famous coarse cloth typically referred to as lovesti or loesti in the Venetian sources may have 
derived its name.44 English and Flemish cloth products that were produced from wool of dif-
ferent origins were sold as bastardi. The Italian term pani was used by Venetian merchants to 
refer to woollen cloth generally, but in most cases pani were Italian textiles. These types of 
cloth were sold in untailored rollable pieces – so-called balle45 – whereas fashioned textiles, 
also exported to the Eastern Mediterranean markets, were named for their specific purpose 
(e.g. veste, pelize).46 
With the establishment of the Flanders galleys, London and the great Flemish cities – in dire 
need of Oriental spices – had become the main markets for Venetian buyers of cloth, a posi-
tion they should retain throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. (By contrast, the ri-
val Catalan markets were more intensively frequented by the Florentines and Genoese.47) By 
the 1420s, at the beginning of Lorenzo Dolfin’s mercantile career, Bruges had long emerged 
as the primary market for textiles and retained its leading position at least until 1477 when 
King Louis XI. of France attempted the military conquest of the Burgundian Netherlands fol-
 
42 See below, V.A.i. 
43 As these labels were used for both raw and processed woollens, it can be difficult to distinguish between them 
in the sources. However, the context usually gives it away: raw products were not usually sold in Romania and 
the Near East because of a lack of processing industries in these regions. 
44 On lovesti, see Fleet, Kate: European and Islamic trade in the early Ottoman state - The merchants of Genoa 
and Turkey, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 177; also Kerridge, Eric: Textile manufacturers 
in early modern England, Manchester and Dover: Manchester University Press, 1985, p. 23. A notable 
discussion of these brands can be found in the letters of Girolamo Bragadin qd. Andrea, see e.g. letter Bragadin, 
Girolamo qd. Andrea to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 07.03.1430, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 
282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [13]. Also see Vallet: Marchands vénitiens, p. 323 for a glossary of various textiles. The 
inferior English kersey is more of an end-fifteenth century phenomenon. 
45 See e.g. letter Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 31.07.1423, ASVe, Procuratori 
di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [12].  
46 “Pelize” (fur coats) are mentioned, for instance, in Catarucia Dolfin’s testament, Dolfin née Gabriel, 
Catarucia: Testament, 30 April 1453.  30.04.1453, ASVe, Archivio Notarile Testamenti, b. 1157, prot. II, 62r. 
For mentions of “veste” (robes), see e.g. Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: 
Recordatio, 8 August 1437.  08.08.1437, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [6].  
47 High-quality Florentine cloth was typically woven from Spanish wool, see Ashtor: Levant Trade, p. 152. 
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lowing the sudden death of Charles the Bold.48 On the Bruges market, both English and 
Flemish woollens were sold. The Flemish textile industry, at the time the largest in Europe by 
output, was in need of foreign raw fabrics to supply its manufacturers and thus imported Eng-
lish wool in addition to processing its rich homegrown production.49 Through this channel, 
English suppliers of processed textiles found their way onto the Flemish markets and thus in-
creased, through the help of Italian and specifically Venetian middlemen, their share on the 
marketplaces of Romania and the Near East.50 By the mid-fifteenth century, the Syrian ports 
and urban commercial centres, formerly major expert markets, had become chiefly importers, 
with import volumes of textiles far outweighing their export of plant-based fabrics such as 
cotton. Whereas Lorenzo Dolfin was not greatly involved with the Syrian cloth trade, the pa-
pers of Donato Soranzo and Ambrogio Malipiero poignantly illustrate this development.51 In 
the early fifteenth century, Donato Soranzo still made a fortune as a leading cotton trader in 
Syria by supplying European manufacturing industries with raw fibres. By the time of Am-
brogio Malipiero’s commercial activity in Syria in the 1480s, the page had turned: his papers 
depict him as a major exporter of cloth, whereas his acquisitions in Syria remained feable at 
best. 
C. Venetian Ascent in Times of Crisis 
Despite post-plague demographic change and economic setbacks, Venice’s long-term mili-
tary and naval hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean (in particular following the War of 
Chioggia, 1379-1381) secured its commercial advantages, which were also grounded in a pa-
pal permission for trade with the Islamic Levant (beginning in April 1344) and eventually by 
the conclusion of favourable trade agreements with the Mamluk Sultanate in 1415.52 As a re-
 
48 Gelder: Trading Places, pp. 41-42. 
49 Hunt and Murray: History of Business, p. 160; Murray, James M.: Bruges, Cradle of Capitalism, 1280-1390, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 261. 
50 At specific times English exports to Flanders were restricted, see Hunt and Murray: History of Business, p. 
167. 
51 See below, VI.E. 
52 For Venetian trade agreements with the Mamluk Sultanate see “Litterae Scheich Mahmud soldani Babiloniae 
ad Thomam Mocenigo Ducem Venetorum”, “Privilegia Venetis concessa a soldano Babiloniae Scheich 
Mahmud”, in: Thomas, G.M., Predelli, R. (eds.): Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum sive acta et diplomata res 
venetas graecas atque levantis illustrantia a. 1351 - 1454, pars II, Venice: R. Deputazione Veneta di Storia 
Patria, 1899, pp. 306-315; also Christ: Trading Conflicts, pp. 56-60; Fuess: Why Venice ?; for papal 
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sult, naval trade routes between Venice and its major trade hubs – mainly Alexandria and 
Candia – were strengthened through regularly operating state galleys. The mude, yearly gal-
ley tours between Venice, the Mediterranean and the North Sea, secured the Mediterranean 
waterways and thus yielded spillovers to private navigation and smuggling.53 Public auction-
ing of state galleys, which began in 1329, enlarged access to commercial investments and 
significantly broadened the Venetian capital market by opening long-distance trade to wider 
parts of the population.54 As a result, long-distance trade became an even greater pillar of the 
Venetian economy and led to a further expansion of the Venetian diaspora in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. Instead of relying purely on elaborate financing tools such as the colleganza, 
Venetian merchants increasingly made use of the services of commission agents and, eventu-
ally, family representatives.55 
Venetian trading diasporas existed both in foreign lands and in territories controlled by the 
Venetian Republic. Diasporic communities operating under foreign jurisdictions faced greater 
operational challenges than their counterparts in affiliated territories, often – as in the case of 
the Venetian diaspora in Mamluk Alexandria – being subject to stringent economic regulation 
as well as occasional religious discrimination.56 Yet all of the known communities shared an 
economic significance for the facilitation of trade and a role as mediators. Diaspora traders 
acted as agents to business partners in distant locations while also being masters in their own 
 
permissions, see Labîb, Subhi Yanni: Handelsgeschichte Ägyptens im Spätmittelalter (1171-1517), Wiesbaden: 
Franz Steiner Verlag, 1965, p. 73; Zachariadou, Elizabeth A.: Trade and Crusade - Venetian Crete and the 
Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300-1415), Venice: Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post- Byzantine 
Studies, 1983, pp. 46-47.  
53 Christ, Georg: "Passagers clandestins? Rôle moteur des galères vénitiennes et concurrence des navires ronds à 
Alexandrie au début du xve siècle", in: Coulon, D., Valérian, D., Picard, C. (eds.), Espace et réseaux en 
méditerranée médiévale, mise en place des réseaux, les politiques d’Etat dans la formation des réseaux, Paris: 
Éditions Bouchène, 2010, pp. 275-290. 
54 González de Lara: The secret; Lane: Venice, pp. 129-131. 
55 In a colleganza, the typical Venetian commenda-type contract, “one party contributed capital and the other 
labour”. The fact that these kinds of partnerships continued to be used in more hazardous environments up to the 
late fourteenth century indicates that their disappearance is linked to the establishment of overseas resident 
merchant communities and the resulting stabilisation of capital flows, see Lane: Venice, p. 138.  
56 Christ (2008, 2012) describes the conditions Venetian merchants in Mamluk Alexandria had to fulfil before 
being admitted to the Alexandria market. One element of this was the forced acquisition of pepper (above mar-
ket price) from the Sultan. See Christ, Georg: "Les réseaux Vénitiens de navigation à Alexandrie au début du 
XVe siècle – rôle promoteur des galères et concurrence des navires ronds", in: mimeo, 2008, p. 4. On religious 
discrimination see Christ: Trading Conflicts, pp. 167-186. 
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right. They acquired knowledge about their market environment, informed their collaborators 
about demand and prices, acquired goods for shipment, and received wares for sale.57 
Surviving correspondence indicates commercial links between Venetian merchants and dias-
pora agents that were largely generated by family ties.58 Correspondence documenting the 
thriving commercial activity between Venice, Northern Europe and the Islamic Levant ena-
bles us to retrace the institutional foundations of principal-agent relationships, examine the 
incentives for the constitution of business networks, and thus explain the rise of the family as 
a commercial unit. 
i. Sedentary trade agency 
The system of trade representation in distant locations through sedentary partners (in the par-
lance of institutional economics, the system of principal-agent relationships) manifested itself 
in three main forms: first, there was the common principal-agent partnership between a Vene-
tian merchant and an unrelated individual acting as commission agent (typically, but not nec-
essarily a fellow Venetian). Second, there was the practice of sending junior merchants on 
apprenticeship missions to distant locations, which was partly a private, family-internal ar-
rangement and partly backed by the state. Lastly, there were cooperations between related 
merchants of the same generation in different commercial centres. In such an arrangement, 
merchants were linked to each other through (consanguineous or affinal) family links or co-
operated by reciprocally providing services such as the acquisition and sale of goods, the dis-
bursement of bills of exchange, or the monitoring of accounts. As merchants typically operat-
ed in various ports along a given galley route, they were linked to a number of fellow traders 
on this basis, creating veritable webs of interconnections.59  
Lorenzo Dolfin’s collaboration with fellow Venetians along the Romania route exemplifies 
this form of commercial cooperation, and the additional interaction between his various cor-
respondents, as documented in their respective letters, reveal a densely interconnected multi-
lateral business arrangement. Lorenzo’s brother-in-law Giovanni Morosini qd. Marino, for 
example, was an important partner in Lorenzo’s Romania business and provided Lorenzo 
with regular information on political and economic developments. A recordatio, left to Lo-
renzo before Giovanni embarked on a journey to Constantinople in August 1437, documents 
 
57 Ashtor: Levant Trade, pp. 69-70; also Lane: Family Partnerships.  
58 Ibid., p. 195; Lane: Venice, p. 138.  
59 See appendix E for a formal definition of networks and coalitions. 
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the reciprocity of their arrangement. Lorenzo was asked to sell Giovanni’s textiles during his 
absence from Venice and to pay Giovanni’s debts to members of the Contarini family and 
Giovanni’s own sister Giovanetta (Lorenzo’s wife).60 Giovanni thus instructed Lorenzo de-
spite being his junior.61 While Lorenzo did not benefit financially from the transactions he 
performed, Giovanni shared his expertise of the Romania markets and reported, for instance, 
on commodity prices in Constantinople.62 In return, Giovanni heavily relied on the advice of 
his more experienced family partners such as Lorenzo.63 His (often lyrically expressed) re-
flections on the nature of their relationship – prasing Lorenzo as a fatherly figure and invalu-
able source of trust – are a tangible illustration of the personal and emotional proximity that 
allowed patrician families to function as business coalitions in long-distance trade.64 
 
60 Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Recordatio, 8 August 1437.  08.08.1437, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [6]: “Richordaxòn fazo mi Zuane Morexim di 
miser Marrin […] a vui miser Lorenzo Dolfin fo de miser Antunio conzosia chossa che in bona gratia io vada a 
Constantinopoli con le prexente galie chapetanio miser Zorzi Soranzo per chaxon chome vui save io sio algune 
me veste di pani sonte che sicho me apar per uno mio libereto lequal mia intentiòn sie tute sia vendude. Et per 
tanto io ve priego charamente quanto a vui è posibile chel non ve sia da fano a prochura de vender le dite. Et 
chusi io ve priego debie vender tute le dite mie veste che apar per el mio libereto le qual debie vender per el 
priexio a vui parera et far dele dite chosse chome si vostre fosse et chome a vui parera in tuto e del trato de le 
dite o de quela parte vui vendere debie dar per mio nome a ser Mafio e a ser Anbruxo Contarini quondam miser 
Nicholò per ducati 50 achalenar proximii che die vognir. Anchora dibie dar a Zaneta mia suor ducati 8 per mi e 
del resto tignere apruono di vui fin che altro ordene io ve daro.” 
61 Giovanni frequently addressed Lorenzo as “honorado chugnado amado quanto padre”. When Giovanni wrote 
from Constantinople, his brothers Pietro and Michele, then still adolescents, were entrusted to Lorenzo’s 
guidance: “Che michiel inprenda ben a lezer et a scriver et far ben hogni raxon”, letter Morosini, Giovanni qd. 
Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 27.12.1437, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 
2, f. [30].  
62 Letter Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 28.05.1438, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [43].  
63 “Per quello me confortate et per lo simel fano tuti hi nostri del mio rimanir in Constantinopoli. Et non me 
debia partir dalì conselgli de ser Antonio nostro chugnato dichove che semper tenerò hi vostri conselli et anchor 
i queli del dito”. See letter Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 21.10.1438, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [41]. 
64 See e.g. Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 05.10.1438, ASVe, Procuratori di 
San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [29]: “Et dichove che chonosco fate per me quelo die far el padre per 
el fiolo et chusi me reputo vostro in tute chosse. Et che abiate sopra di me in conmandamenti et choretiam et tute 
altre cosse libertade quanto padre che altramente non ve tegno. Et perché me dite che le bon saver tenir hi amixi 
e masime quelli che me puol zovar. Questo conselio mi piaze.” 
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ii. The family as a commercial unit? 
In the Venetian patriciate, family relations played a pivotal role in establishing social hierar-
chies and in generating inter-personal links for political and commercial purposes. Long-
distance trade, a key economic activity, therefore frequently involved family-based partner-
ships. 
These family relations exhibited a complex cognatic system of social order that was princi-
pally organised around consanguineous and affinal (marital) ties while also containing ele-
ments of social affinity (chosen relations between non-kin individuals based on friendship).65 
Affinal marriages represented a norm between members of the patriciate, whereas same-
blood liaisons were rare due to their social and political inefficiency.66 Affinal relationships 
in the sense of strong social bonds or common economic interests often existed between mer-
chants in distant locations and complemented consanguineous ties as a means of overcoming 
commitment problems. Members of a lower class, so-called cittadini, could thus raise their 
social status by becoming integrated into a patrician family environment.67 In some cases, 
even a similarity of names was sufficient to include individuals from outside the family.68 
The precise social significance of the patrician family was therefore all but straightforward. 
Families such as the Malipiero and the Dolfin did not display well-defined boundaries. Their 
structure was neither strictly patrilineal nor purely matrilineal. In commerce, just like in poli-
tics, the family of an individual’s mother often was equally important as the side of the father. 
Various family archives document intra-family business relations among both matrilineal and 
 
65 Economic studies of social networks have found that social affinity, although being a widespread 
anthropological phenomenon, is more likely to occur between individuals with shared (specifically ethnic) 
characteristics, a phenomenon dubbed “social homiphily”.  See Currarini, S., Jackson, M.O., Pin, P.: "An 
Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities, and Segregation", in: Econometrica 77 (July, 2009), 
No. 4, pp. 1003-1045. 
66 Chojnacki, Stanley: "Marriage Legislation and Patrician Society in Fifteenth-Century Venice", in: Bachrach, 
Bernard S., Nicholas, D. (eds.), Law, Custom and the Social Fabric in Medieval Europe - Essays in Honor of 
Bryce Lyon, Kalamazoo (MI): Medieval Institute Publications, Western Michigan University, 1990, pp. 163-
184; also see Botticini, Maristella: "A Loveless Economy? Intergenerational Altruism and the Marriage Market 
in a Tuscan Town, 1415-1436", in: The Journal of Economic History 59 (Mar., 1999), No. 1, pp. 104-121.  
67 One example is Filippo di Malerbi, a cittadino resident in Cairo and “simel di fradelo” to many Venetian 
patrician merchants. See Christ: Trading Conflicts, e.g. p. 104; Apellániz, Francisco: "Lower-Rank Actors in 
Elite Networks: Venetian Merchants in Alexandria (early 15th Century)", in: mimeo, 2011, p. 7. 
68 E.g. the case of Leonardo Dolfin in Candia (Crete), see Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 98. 
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patrilineal kin, and both matrilineal and patrilineal elders were potential supporters of aspir-
ing young patricians seeking to launch their political careers.69 
As powerful patrician family clans controlled the legislative bodies of the Republic and 
shaped its trading system, wealth was a pivotal asset in the quest for political influence 
through the acquisition of public offices, and business and politics were interlinked to an ex-
tent that the mercantile and political careers of wealthy patricians often were two sides of the 
same strategic coin. Yet, the narrative of a homogenous Venetian patriciate that operated as a 
unified force in the service of ubiquitous economic interests is misleading. Although trade 
remained the key pillar of the Venetian economy and its main impetus for growth throughout 
the later Middle Ages, artisanry, manufacturing, and finance also gained in importance.70 
With the rising significance of the terraferma, agriculture emerged as another significant sec-
tor. For wealthy patricians, the retreat to the countryside and the switch to landownership was 
not merely a secure strategy of investment, but also an exercise in gaining additional social 
distinction through the emulation of continental aristocracy.71 Steadily broadening business 
and investment opportunities created divergent political needs within the patriciate. Conse-
quently, the state’s ability to mediate between different economic interests was increasingly 
neutralised.  
On a second look, the economic role of the patrician family was thus far from straightfor-
ward. In many cases, the pursuit of different trades divided patrician clans. At times, emerg-
ing dichotomies in business interests could quickly halt family unity and cause severe intra-
clan conflicts. The patrician family should therefore be understood not as a closed operational 
entity, but as a provider of basic informal mechanisms that facilitated personal exchange in 
 
69 Biagio Dolfin maintained business relations with members of the Pasqualigo family, who were descendants of 
relatives of his wife. For the significance of cross-clan cooperation in politics, see Chojnacki’s discussion of 
matrilineal sponsors of Balla d’Oro applications in Chojnacki: Kinship Ties. 
70 Mackenney, Richard: Tradesmen and Traders - The World of Guilds in Venice and Europe, c.1250-c.1650, 
Beckenham and North Ryde: Croom Helm, 1987, pp. 80-84. 
71 As discussed in chapter III, Lorenzo Dolfin himself resided in the terraferma while on official duty in 
Vicenza and (about a decade later) in Padua. In Padua, however, he appears as the tenant (of a house owned by 
Pietro Dolfin qd. Domenico) rather than as an investor (Dolfin, Pietro qd. Domenico to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. 
Antonio: Receipt, 1 September 1435.  01.09.1435, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, 
fasc. 1, int. 3, f. [10]). However, Lorenzo’s branch of the Dolfin family was involved in terraferma property 
investments, as revealed in the correspondence between Biagio and Lorenzo Dolfin (e.g. Letter Dolfin, Biagio 
qd. Lorenzo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 24.03.1419, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (Psm 181), 
Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. f, f. [5]. 
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business and commerce – such as mutual trust and loyalty amongst relatives with mutually 
compatible economic interests.  
A distinction should therefore be made between the patrician family as a business entity and 
as an economic institution. Venetian law explicitly considered the (agnatic) family as an op-
erating unit in economic affairs. Following the death of a patriarchal principal, his male heirs 
were able to keep his estate in common ownership, thus creating a fraterna compagnia.72 In 
fact, the fraterna was the default arrangement of the cross-generational transmission of 
wealth. Within this arrangement, Donato Soranzo and his brothers Giacomo, Lorenzo, and 
Pietro jointly imported cotton from Syria.73 It is also likely that Biagio Dolfin initiated his 
mercantile career in a fraterna-based venture with his brother Antonio, investing their com-
mon inheritance in the Alexandria muda.74 
By contrast, the (cognatic) family enabled intra-clan business cooperation on the basis of a 
family ethos placing a strong emphasis on intra-family loyalty and coherence. The employ-
ment of relatives as trade representatives in distant locations was hence a logical ramification 
of the rise of sedentary trade agency, as family loyalties could thus be exploited for commer-
cial purposes. This widely neglected aspect of late medieval Venetian commerce was the key 
pillar of family-based business coalitions. Existing scholarship in trade history and economic 
institutions provides a number of plausible explanations for the use of family trade agents that 
are pertinent in the Venetian context: Venice’s naval dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean 
around 1400 changed the organisational dispositions of long-distance trade in that it triggered 
the gradual decline of short-run contractual trade ventures. Contractors were replaced by sed-
entary trade agents who needed to be monitored.75 For this purpose, family loyalties could be 
exploited by principals as a means of exerting control over agents. Because of their dual roles 
as trade representatives and heirs, family agents had a personal interest in increasing the 
wealth of the clan and thus to devote utmost attention to maximising gains from a given 
transaction. In addition, they could reasonably expect to build on their family’s commercial 
coalition in their later careers. They were incentivised to maintain its external reputation in 
order to strengthen their own position within the coalition and to extend the coalition through 
their own personal networks. Besides operating as an officially legislated economic unit, the 
patrician family thus created a sphere of mutual economic interdependence that functioned as 
 
72 Pertile: Storia del diritto privato, p. 282.  
73 Lane: Andrea Barbarigo, p. 145. 
74 Christ: Trading Conflicts, pp. 97-100.  
75 Kedar: Merchants in Crisis, p. 27-29; Labib: Handelsgeschichte Ägyptens, p. 288. 
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an initial network of commercial exchange. Through the inclusion of non-kin partners, these 
networks could grow into permanent coalitions and eventually formally institutionalised 
commercial units. 
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CHAPTER III:  
AN APPRENTICESHIP IN COMMERCE AND POWER – 
ALEXANDRIA, VENICE, LONDON (1418-1424) 
According to Venetian chronicles, the Dolfin family originated from Torcello, the cradle of 
Venice, which would make it one of the oldest patrician families.1 The first Dolfin to appear 
in historical sources is Domenico Dolfin, who became Procurator of Saint Mark in 1095, an 
office also held by his son Giovanni from 1114.2 From its early beginnigs the Ca’ Dolfin de-
veloped into a significant casa vecchia that steadily increased its influence on Venetian poli-
tics, culminating in the election of Giovanni Dolfin to the office of doge in 1356.3 Through-
out the later medieval and early modern periods, members of the Dolfin family held high po-
litical and ecclesiastical offices as procurators and cardinals. 
This chapter describes Lorenzo’s years as a commercial apprentice under the supervision of 
his uncle Biagio Dolfin. Section A retraces the commercial activities and public service of 
Biagio Dolfin (A.i) and examines the organisation of his business (A.ii). Section B turns to 
Lorenzo Dolfin, his family background (B.i), his commercial apprenticeship (B.ii), and his 
commercial operations as a junior merchant within a family environment (B.iii). Section C 
examines the biographical parallels between Biagio and Lorenzo Dolfin, their respective 
ways of transmitting business skills from one generation to the next, and the resulting means 
of maintaining family relations as an operational framework in long-distance trade. 
A. Biagio Dolfin quondam Lorenzo 
Biagio Dolfin was presumably born in Venice in the second half of the fourteenth century to 
Lorenzo Dolfin quondam (= son of the deceased) Pietro and his wife Maria Malipiero. He 
 
1 E.g. Anonymous: Cronaca di Venezia fino al 1446, preceduta dal catalogo dei dogi e delle famiglie nobili fino 
al 1440, BNF, BnF-R Ms. Ital. 318; for a critical guide on the use of Venetian historical chronicles, see Thiriet, 
Freddy E.: "Les chroniques vénitiennes de la Marcienne et leur importance pour l'histoire de la Romanie gréco-
vénitienne", in: Etudes sur la Romanie greco-vénitienne (Xe-XVe siècles), London: Variorum Reprints, 1977, 
pp. III: 241-292. 
2 Roberto CESSI’s article in the original Enciclopedia Italiana (1932) is available online at 
http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/dolfin_%28Enciclopedia-Italiana%29/ 
3 The dogeship of Giovanni Dolfin ended with his death in 1361. 
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began his mercantile activities in the late 1390s under the guidance of relatives.4 His paternal 
family was vested in a mercantile tradition, while his mother’s side, the Malipiero, was com-
parable to the Dolfins in terms of size and political influence. Pasquale Malipiero succeeded 
Francesco Foscari as doge in 1457 and ruled until his death in 1462. The late fifteenth centu-
ry also witnessed the consular service and commercial activities of Ambrogio Malipiero, 
who, because of a great number of surviving personal papers, has become a prominent figure 
in Venetian diasporic history.5 
i. Gem trader and consul: the use of relatives as trade proxies 
Biagio’s earliest commercial journeys led him to Alexandria, where stays are documented for 
1392, 1396, 1397 and 1398.6 In this initial phase of his career, Biagio relied heavily upon the 
contacts and skills of his older brother Antonio who travelled with him during the 1396 mu-
da.7 In Alexandria, the two brothers worked closely with the Jewish merchant Sabatino Russo 
of Lecce.8 For their gemstone trade, they formed a business (compagnia delle zoie) with Gio-
vanni da Canal9 and Perazio Malipiero, who was the Venetian consul in Alexandria from 
1396 to 1398,10 which later was dissolved amidst controversies over outstanding claims.11 
 
 
4 The following biographical stub draws on Christ: Trading Conflicts, pp. 97-112 and Pedani: Balas Rubies, pp. 
1-13. Primary source material is cited where consulted.  
5 See discussion below, VI.E.ii. Also Arbel: Venetian Letters, p. 40; Vallet: Marchands vénitiens, p. 319. 
6 ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Misti, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. a, f. [3]; ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Misti, 
b. 181, fasc. 15, int. e, f. [5]; also see Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 95. 
7 For the muda system, see Lane: Venice, pp. 68-73; also Stöckly: Le système de l'incanto, pp. 93-178. 
8 ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Misti, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. a, f. [3-9]. 
9 Biagio describes Giovanni di Canal as “chugnado”, thus indicating an affinal relation: “Zan da Chanal mio 
chugnado”, Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo 1418, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie miste, b. 180, fasc. 
8, f. [1]. 
10 Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 97 corrects Ashtor: Levant Trade, p. 552, who declared Malipiero’s consulship as 
having lasted from 1398 until 1399. 
11 Christ: Trading Conflicts, pp. 97-98; Ashtor: Levant Trade, p. 552. 
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FIGURE 1: PEDIGREE DOLFIN (DA SANTA GIUSTINA) 
Biagio Dolfin twice held the office of Venetian consul in Alexandria. Not much is known 
about his first spell in office from 1408 to 1410, whereas his second term from 1418 until his 
death in 1420 (while on official mission to the Sultan in Cairo) is well documented.12 The 
bulk of the correspondence preserved in the CBD dates from these years, providing insights 
into Biagio’s commercial affairs as well as into official and personal matters. During and be-
tween his consulships, Biagio remained active in long-distance trade, with his affairs chiefly 
focused on (but not confined to) the gemstone business, the only type of commercial ex-
change that was not subject to severe restrictions for the Republic’s official representatives.13 
After his return from Alexandria in 1410, Biagio established a regular gemstone business in 
London while working closely with his brother-in-law Polo Pasqualigo and the brothers An-
drea and Nicolò Molin, who acted as his London-based agents.14 
The surviving letters documenting Biagio’s gem trade during his second consulship display a 
remarkable degree of congruence in terms of the roles attributed to involved individuals. 
While Biagio stayed in Alexandria, his nephew Lorenzo and his cousin Nicolò Dolfin were 
 
12 Most of the correspondence is contained in ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Misti, b. 181, fasc. 15. 
13 For official restrictions, see Ashtor: Levant Trade, p. 414. 
14 ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Misti, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. b, f. 1; see also Christ: Trading Conflicts, pp. 96-
101. 
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both resident in Venice and frequent recipients of Biagio’s written commerce-related instruc-
tions.15 A notable example16 of this correspondence is a letter dated 1 November 1418,17 in 
which Biagio asked Lorenzo to enquire about the sale of two of Biagio’s balasy (precious 
stones) that was meant to be performed by Polo Pasqualigo.18 Lorenzo was told to consult 
with Giovanni Morosini and Nicolò Dolfin about the specifics of the sale and to send the rev-
enues to Alexandria as a bill of exchange.19 In case the gems had not been sold, Lorenzo was 
asked to exchange them for fine cloth (veludy) chosen by Morosini and Nicolò and to entrust 
Orso Dolfin, another close relative, with the transport to Alexandria. Another document reaf-
firms this business structure.20 In a letter sent after 24 March 1419, Biagio mentioned the sale 
of two balasy, owned by Polo Pasqualigo, which Lorenzo was asked to supervise while con-
sulting again with Giovanni Morosini. Biagio opines that Orso Dolfin ought to invest the rev-
enues in the Alexandria galleys.21 Presumably, this indicates further involvement in the spice 
 
15 Nicolò was the son of Benedetto Dolfin, captain of the Alexandria galleys in 1394, 1396, and 1398 (Stöckly: 
Le système de l'incanto, pp. 285, 309). Since the degree of kin between Biagio and Benedetto is not clearly 
known, Nicolò is referred to as a “cousin” here for simplicity (see also Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 95). 
16 ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Miste, Commissaria Biagio Dolfin, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. e, f. [24]. 
17 The following draws on Morche, Franz-Julius: "The Dolfin Collection – A Medieval Venetian Trade Network 
(1418-1420)", in: Christ, G., Morche, F.-J., Zaugg, R., Kaiser, W., Beihammer, A., Burkhardt, S. (eds.), Union 
in Separation: Diasporic Groups and Identities in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1100-1800, Rome: Viella, 2015, 
pp. 555-570. 
18 BOERIO defines “Balasso” as “pietra preziosa, ch’è una specie di rubino”, Boerio, Giuseppe: Dizionario del 
dialetto veneziano, Venezia: Giunti, 1993, p. 8. 
19 “Che li dity dener me sia mandady de qui per chanbio con pluy utel se pò”, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, 
Miste, Commissaria Biagio Dolfin, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. e, f. [24]. For the use of the bill of exchange, see 
Denzel, Markus A.: "Wechsel, -brief, Wechsler", in: Lexikon des Mittelalters, München and Zürich: Artemis 
Verlag, 1989, pp. 2086-2089. 
20 ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Miste, Commissaria Biagio Dolfin, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. f, f. [5]. 
21 Ibid.: “Anchor romagno avixado de lo rezever tu fesy de la mie do balasy che aveva mio chugnado ser Polo 
Pasqualigo di qual sia el dito so scriver niente de avery fato che despiaxier de rezevuodo. Et inpero quando poso 
te prego che con ser Nicholo Dolfin et con ser Zan Morosini over senza el dito ser Zan si prochury de baratarly a 
veludy de le sorte ch’io avy el dito ser Zan Morexini el so parer de Veniexia et quely che pluy ve conseio et 
conforto sie de zetanin uno cremexi verde a veludi et deli vende plany et de grana plany uno cremexin plan ve 
saverian confortar pur che soto bone robeet non guardar al prexio ch’io ve scrisy che dovese meter a balasy che 
se ben me arechordo si fo duc. 4 d’oro del charato se per 1/4 de duc. mancho el charato et se vostra posa metely 
fin et mandady in man de Orso Dolfin arechordandote che quely ch’io paty con my non ho may posudo veder 
siche sa tuto te pode fra a le galie de insuge et quando ta non el posy far si li da conty destra et chautamente. Et 
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trade with the Mamluk Sultanate, with relatives such as Orso Dolfin acting as Biagio’s prox-
ies to circumvent the official restrictions on trade faced by representatives of the Republic. 
Nicolò Dolfin provided similar services to Biagio in relation to the gemstone business. Biagio 
instructed his cousin to sell gemstones in Venice while following the advice of two other 
business associates, Bernardo Bembo and Matteo Spira.22 Nicolò was routinely asked to 
oversee the distribution of a gem shipment to various insiders of the Venetian market, among 
them Bembo and Spira.23 The entirety of the surviving correspondence from the CBD reveals 
the relative importance of these players to Biagio’s commercial operations. Fourteen of the 
letters relate to Lorenzo Dolfin while fifteen involve Nicolò.24 
The presence of both kin and non-kin components in Biagio’s business is a noticeable factor, 
which reflects the ambiguous role of family relations in Venetian commerce. Whereas in var-
ious other historical contexts, family bonds seem to have played a lesser role (compared to 
other parameters such as ethnicity, religion, or language), scholars of Venetian history have 
long emphasised the importance of family relations to Venetian economic development.25 
The interaction of kin and non-kin, however, did not occur at random, but instead was subject 
to strategic selection. 
ii. Agent and principal: business skills in the service of fellow traders 
Acting as both providers and recipients of agency services was a key characteristic of the dai-
ly activities and obligations of Venetian merchants. Biagio and Lorenzo Dolfin both acted as 
agents at certain points in their mercantile careers while also profiting, to an even larger ex-
tent, from the services provided by others. In this respect, their personal histories resemble 
those of other contemporaries.26 It is worth noting that Biagio’s and Lorenzo’s experiences as 
fattore (agent) began early in their commercial careers, as it was common practice for young-
 
baratandoly chomo ho dito per le galie fa saver in to nome tuto et sovradezio non diro altro.” (Transcription by 
G. Christ, MMDD). 
22 ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Miste, Commissaria Biagio Dolfin, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. e, f. [15]. 
23 ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Miste, Commissaria Biagio Dolfin, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. e, f. [6]. 
24 Other letters relevant to Biagio Dolfin are dispersed across other fascicoli of buste 180 and 181 as well as 
other collections (Commissaria Lorenzo Dolfin, Documenti commerciali riservati, Misc. Gregolin). 
25 E.g. Lane: Family Partnerships; Lane: Andrea Barbarigo; Ashtor: Levant Trade; Christ: Passagers 
clandestins? 
26 E.g. Andrea Barbarigo, Francesco Datini, and the individuals mentioned in chapter VI of this study, Donato 
Soranzo and Ambrogio Malipiero. 
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er patricians to gradually acquire commercial skills by submitting themselves to the guidance 
of elders and by providing services to others.  
Biagio Dolfin was related to both the Morosini and the Bragadin families. The famous chron-
icler Antonio Morosini was his uncle,27 the brothers Marco and Alban Morosini, whom 
Biagio represented as agent in Damascus in 1404, were his cousins.28 Antonio Bragadin, 
Biagio’s partner during his residence in Damascus, was his brother-in-law.29 Thus, the Da-
mascus episode of 1404 was essentially a family-based agency relationship.30 In fact, his only 
direct correspondents to whom Biagio was not linked by affinal or consanguineous ties were 
the Jewish merchant Sabatino Russo and his commercial partners from the Molin family. 
Biagio’s partnerships that involved non-kin all ended in controversy. It was only in 1414 that 
Sabatino Russo, who partnered with Biagio in the pepper trade during Biagio’s early voyages 
to Alexandria, ceased to be confronted with Biagio’s demands for compensation.31 Nicolò 
Molin, his representative in London from 1412 onwards, was eventually sued by Biagio in 
the Giudici di Petizion. Biagio’s gemstone business with Giovanni da Canal, Perazio Malipie-
ro, and Lorenzo Donado was taken to the rason vecchie and the Giudici del Percolator in 
1419.32 While these episodes reflect an apparent difficulty of enforcing commercial coopera-
tion among non-kin, Biagio reserved his most fervent wrath about supposed unduly behav-
iour for his maternal relatives, the Malipiero.33 Biagio’s reference to a Malipiero who most 
 
27 Christ: A Newsletter in 1419?, p. 36. 
28 Ibid.; on the Damascus episode see Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 96.  
29 Ibid. 
30 According to Christ, the episode is only documented in one account in b. 181, fasc. 23. 
31 Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 95. 
32 Ibid., pp. 96-97. 
33 Ibid., p. 98; “Tu avesy meso li dener a li inprestedy tuta fiada se non dubitasy de lo ribaldo da cha Malipiero”, 
letter Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 4 August 1419.  04.08.1419, ASVe, Procura-
tori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [4]; “Et questo fazo a chaxion che quel ribaldo da cha’ 
Malipiero non me dese inpazo”, Letter Biagio qd. Lorenzo Dolfin to Lorenzo qd. Antonio Dolfin, 01.11.1418, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. e, f. [24B]; “Apreso te arechordo che 
sete artento et date a sentir con mio suoxero over con ser Nicholo Dolfin se quelo ribaldo da cha' Malipiero a 
fato far niente da nuovo et sel bixogna se sie solizito con tuty i nostri apomdege? azio chel non me fese dano et 
de quando senti sy sovradezio si manda? fa avixado”, letter Biagio qd. Lorenzo Dolfin to Lorenzo qd. Antonio 
Dolfin, 22.01.1419, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. e, f. [4]; etc.  
“deve asentir se quel ribaldo da cha’ Malipiero a fato far niente de nuovo”, letter Biagio qd. Lorenzo Dolfin to 
Nicolò qd. Benedetto Dolfin, 22.12.1418, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (Psm 181), Commissarie miste, b. 
181, fasc. 15, int. e, f. [3C] (transcriptions by G. Christ, MMDD). 
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fervently denied his compensation claims as “ribaldo da cha Malipiero” suggests that he con-
nected his personal grievance with an individual to the reputation of this individual’s wider 
family.34 A conception of collective liability could thus, as shown by this episode, be levied 
against parts of a patrician family: having unsuccessfully sought economic support from his 
maternal relatives, Biagio eventually abandoned this side of his extended family. In the same 
way the family could serve as a basis for the creation of commercial partnerships, it could al-
so inspire a collective sense of distrust. Biagio’s rupture with his maternal family also high-
lights the flexibility with which family-internal commercial cooperation was established and 
dissolved if deemed unfunctional. 
B. Lorenzo Dolfin qd. Antonio 
Lorenzo and Nicolò Dolfin both played central roles in Biagio Dolfin’s business. Lorenzo, 
the son of Biagio’s brother Antonio, was Biagio Dolfin’s principal heir and thus an example 
of Venetian cross-generational business cooperation, stepping into his deceased father’s role 
as his uncle’s partner. While Nicolò’s precise consanguineous ties to Biagio are more diffi-
cult to retrace,35 his long-term cooperation with Biagio makes him a primary example of the 
use of family loyalties in commerce.  
As Biagio’s heir, Lorenzo likely rescued substantial parts of Biagio’s papers from Egypt be-
fore handing the documents over to the procurators. While this would partly explain his own 
centrality within the collection, the surviving correspondence between Biagio and Lorenzo 
(see table 4 in appendix C) is by no means the only documentation of their close relationship. 
In addition, Lorenzo is mentioned in many of Biagio’s surviving letters to third correspond-
ents. The direct correspondence between Biagio and Lorenzo dates entirely from the years of 
Biagio’s second consulship in Alexandria (1418-1420).  
i. Lorenzo’s family background: the Gabriel side 
Lorenzo Dolfin was born presumably in the 1390s as the son of Antonio Dolfin qd. Lorenzo 
and Catarucia Dolfin, daughter of Nicolò Gabriel qd. Andrea and his wife Coletta of the par-
rocchia Santa Maria Mater Domini.36 Antonio Dolfin’s wealth fell to his brother Biagio after 
 
34 Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 98. 
35 Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 96. 
36 Letter Gabriel, Andrea qd. Nicolò, 11.11.1400, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (Psm 181), Commissarie mi-
ste, b. 181, fasc. 23, int. b, f. [1]. 
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Antonio’s premature death from the plague in 1399.37 Lorenzo was raised under the auspices 
of Biagio Dolfin and his maternal family. His mother Catarucia had five siblings: a sister, 
Maria, who married Giorgio Loredan qd. Marco; and four brothers, Andrea, Michele, Bene-
detto (who had two sons, Alvise and Girolamo, and a daughter, Suordamor, with his wife 
Marina), and Silvestro. 
 
 
FIGURE 2: PEDIGREE GABRIEL38 (DA SANTA MARIA MATER DOMINI) 
The Procuratori di San Marco collection does not contain commissarie relating to either 
Nicolò Gabriel qd. Andrea or his wife, and of their children only Andrea had his will admin-
istered by the procurators.39 Due to the resulting lack of surviving correspondence, little can 
be said about the intensity of intra-family relations within this branch of the Gabriel family. 
The testaments of Nicolò Gabriel and of his daughter Catarucia Dolfin must therefore serve 
as the primary points of reference.40 
 
37 Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 97. 
38 The above pedigree only represents an excerpt of this branch of the Gabriel family. Nicolò Gabriel’s 
testament mentions other individuals who are less relevant to the present discussion. 
39 ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Ultra, b. 137. 
40 Nicolò Gabriel’s testament is contained in the busta of his son Andrea Gabriel, Procuratori di San Marco, 
Ultra, b. 137; Catarucia’s testament can be found in Dolfin née Gabriel, Catarucia: Testament, 30 April 1453.  
30.04.1453, ASVe, Archivio Notarile Testamenti, b. 1157, prot. II, 62r. 
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Nicolò Gabriel’s testament can be found in the Commissaria of his son Andrea.41 Nicolò was 
the son of Andrea Gabriel and Catarina Gabriel of Santa Maria Mater Domini. The document 
reveals that Nicolò was married to Coletta Gabriel at the time of his death, yet, as the great 
number of direct descendents would suggest, he possibly had been married more than once. 
In addition to the sons and daughters listed in the above family tree, three additional unmar-
ried daughters are mentioned in the testament as heirs of a total of 1000 ducats. Their respec-
tive share of this sum is intended as a dowry either for a potential marriage or for entry into a 
monastery.42 Nicolò’s two married daughters, Catarucia Dolfin and Aloisa Querini, likely re-
ceived their inheritance in the form of dowries at the time of their marriage as their share of 
the final inheritance is restricted to a modest ten ducats respectively.43 The bulk of the inher-
itance, which includes the family property in Santa Maria Mater Domini, is given to Nicolò’s 
male descendants. Although this would suggest a patrilineal focus in the cross-generational 
transmission of wealth, the provision of dowries and the inclusion of affinal kin in the notari-
al process highlight the cognatic structure of the patrician family. Aloisa’s husband Marco 
Querini is named as one of the executors of the testament alongside Nicolò’s cousin Zaccha-
ria Gabriel, his nephew Andrea Bembo, a certain Andrea Contarini qd. Giovanni of Santa So-
fia and Nicolò’s widow Coletta. Affinal kinship thus emerges both as a social foundation for 
commercial cooperation and as a basis for the establishment of future marital links. Through 
affinal links such as the marriage between Marco Querini and Aloisa Gabriel, the Querini 
were linked both by kin and, as is evident in Nicolò Gabriel’s testament, also economically to 
the Gabriel family of Santa Maria Mater Domini. Lorenzo Dolfin, as a descendant of this Ga-
briel branch, eventually became further involved with the Querini through his marriage to 
Giovanetta Morosini, as there had been previous marital links between the Morosini and the 
Querini. Lorenzo shared his father-in-law with a certain Francesco Querini qd. Fantino, who 
wrote to him in very personal terms (as “fradello e chugnado”) from Candia in 1427.44 
 
41 See note 40.  
42 “Anchor lago a mie fie per maridar o per munegar quado lexe a tenpo per andar a marido o munegarse cioè a 
Sofia, Benicia, […], Lucia, Maria, e ad altre me nascese che a quela parte le parera demandar ebia ducati mile.” 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Ultra, b. 137, Testamento Nicolò Gabriel qd. Andrea. 
43 “Anchor lago a mia fia Aloicha Querini dexe et a mia fia Catarucia Dolfin vedia el vuier di un ano stagando 
con suo fradeli quoro voia ducati dexe chomo lago a soa suor Aloicha.” Ibid. 
44 Letter Querini, Francesco qd. Fantino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 19.09.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [54]: „Seguro chome miser nostro suoxero me scrive…” 
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The significance of affinal relationships for inter-family cooperation and the creation of long-
term inter-family partnerships is also visible in the testament of Lorenzo’s mother Catarucia 
Dolfin, dated 30 April 1453 and drawn up by the notary Benedetto Croci.45 As the executors 
of her will, Catarucia appointed Lorenzo, her sister Maria with her husband Giorgio Loredan, 
and her sister-in-law Marina, widow of her brother Benedetto. Following detailed specifica-
tions regarding Catarucia’s burrial and donations to various churches, the document deter-
mines the future ownership of her property. Next to personal belongings, such as Catarucia’s 
clothing that she left to her sister-in-law Marina,46 the bulk of her wealth comprised 1000 
ducats in state bonds (imprestiti), which she left to Lorenzo.47 In the case of Lorenzo not 
leaving legitimate heirs, the bonds would fall to Cateruccia’s niece, Suordamor Contarini née 
Gabriel, whose marriage to Pietro Contarini was equally grounded in a long tradition of inter-
family relations between the Ca’ Contarini and the Gabriel.48 
Catarucia shared a household with her son Lorenzo until her death.49 Lorenzo maintained a 
close relationship to his maternal uncles Michele, Benedetto, and Andrea qd. Nicolò and their 
 
45 Dolfin née Gabriel, Catarucia: Testament, 30 April 1453.  30.04.1453, ASVe, Archivio Notarile Testamenti, 
b. 1157, prot. II, 62r.  
46 Ibid.: “Ite lasso tuti mie drapi zoe de mio … e pelize sia dade per amor de dio per anema mia iqual sian dadi a 
la districion e voluntade de mia cugnada donna marina relieta de ser benedeto Gabriel veramente se a la dita 
domina Marina i pariese de dover tegnir per si i dite over chosa alguna di i diti drapi e pelize io voio i si son 
contrata che la dita dona marina possa tegnir per si tuta vuer parte di i diti drapi e pelize e farne chome a lie 
aparera.” 
47 Ibid.: “Item lasso ducati mille di imprestidi a Lorenzo Dolfin mio fio chondezionadi con le condicion 
sotoscrite” 
48 Ibid.: “E… che el dito Lorenzo Dolfin mio fio moresse senza heriedi legittimi e senza desendera legitimi in 
questo chaxo voio e si hordeno che i diti ducati 1000 di imprestidi sia seria a la chamera de imprestidi a la mia 
chomesaria iqual sia seria a la ditta mia chomesaria chon quondam che zamai per algun modo aver ingegno e 
non se possa vender ne dar ne denar ne impignar ne ublegar ne alienar ne tralatar ne chorlar da la dita chamera 
di imprestedi ma sempre e proprio el chavedal de i dia ducati 1000 di imprestedi si sera fermo a la chamera di 
imprestidi seria a la dita mia chomesaria e cun tute condicion sorascrite e sotoscrite el pro de i diti ducati 1000 
di imprestedi voio chel debia esser e sia de mia neza Soradamor fia che fo de ser Benedeto Gabriel fo mio 
fradelo e moier de ser Piero Contarini zoe invita soa solamente de la dita mia neza Soradamor e da poi la moier 
de la dita mia neza Soradamor e voio che el soradito prodi i soraditi ducati 1000 di imprestedi debia esser e sia 
de la giexia e luogo de santa Justina in Veniexia per amor de dio per anema mia e de el dito Lorenzo Dolfin mio 
fio amprio di questa condicion e in cargo che quela che stesse a habitasse in la dita giexia e luogo de santa 
justina sia sempre e perpetuo tegndudi e ubligadi de dir over far dir a lo altrat de santa maria hogna setemana 4 
mese sagramental per l’anema mia e del dito Lorenzo Dolfin mio fio.” 
49 Merchant letters to Lorenzo written by close relatives usually contain wishes to Catarucia. 
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children. The intensity of these family bonds is well reflected in Catarucia’s testament. Lo-
renzo had no siblings and thus his maternal family played an important role in his early so-
cialisation and commercial career. He cooperated commercially with his uncles as well as 
with his cousins Alvise and Girolamo qd. Benedetto. By contrast, Benedetto’s third son An-
drea, who later became Procurator di Ultra, does not occur in the CBD sources. His testa-
ment is contained, as is the will of Nicolò Gabriel, in the commissaria of his uncle Andrea 
Gabriel qd. Nicolò.50 Lorenzo’s (extended) maternal family was also closely linked to his 
eventual affinal family, which provided further opportunities for family-based commercial 
cooperation. 
ii. Apprentice between Venice and Alexandria 
Lorenzo’s earliest surviving correspondence with Biagio Dolfin dates from November 
1418.51 In a long letter, Biagio, then just over a month into his second consulship in Alexan-
dria, instructed his nephew, resident in Venice, on various transactions. Biagio and Lorenzo 
corresponded regularly until Lorenzo travelled to Alexandria with the autumn galleys of 
1419.52 
Lorenzo journey to Egypt occurred shortly before a planned official mission of the consul to 
Cairo. Lorenzo’s last known letter to Biagio was written on 31 March 1420 from Rosetta, 
shortly before the consul’s death less than a month later (on 26 April 1420).53 Lorenzo re-
ported his overland journey from Alexandria via Abû Oîr to Rosetta and the subsequent con-
tinuation of his voyage on the Nile to Cairo. He informed Biagio on the fading of a plague 
epidemic in Cairo, and a number of business-related notes suggest that he acted as a commer-
cial proxy for his uncle.54 Said letter was received on 2 April 1420 in Alexandria, shortly be-
fore Biagio left for Cairo himself, where he died presumably amidst a minor plague epidem-
 
50 ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Ultra, b. 137, Testamento Andrea Gabriel qd. Benedetto Procurator. 
51 Letter Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 01.11.1418, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (Psm 181), Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. e, f. [23] 
52 The last of their letters prior to Lorenzo’s voyage to Egypt is Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo to Dolfin, Lorenzo 
qd. Antonio, 04.08.1419, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [4]. The record of 
their correspondence begins in November 1418 (Letter Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. 
Antonio, 01.11.1418, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (Psm 181), Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. e, f. 
[24]). 
53 Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 97. 
54 Letter Lorenzo qd. Antonio Dolfin to Biagio qd. Lorenzo Dolfin, 31.03.1420, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. d, f. [50]. 
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ic.55 After Biagio’s death, Lorenzo left Mamluk territory and returned to Venice carrying his 
uncle’s bequest, which he had assembled despite opposition from Biagio’s successors in the 
consulate.56 
Lorenzo entered the Republic’s civil service and, at about 1426, became financial controller 
(camerario) of Vicenza, which had fallen under Venetian dominion in 1404.57 He held this 
office until at least December 1427.58 His marriage to Giovanetta Morosini, daughter of Ma-
rino Morosini qd. Giovanni, may have enhanced his political rise.59 This marriage, begun in 
1425, stood in a long tradition of affinal links between the Dolfin and Morosini clans60 and 
created a number of advantageous relationships for Lorenzo that added to his already well-
established interconnections within Venetian power structures: his maternal uncle, Andrea 
Gabriel qd. Nicolò, was governor with military and civil command (podestà e capitano) of 
Zimella,61 while Andrea’s brother Benedetto was appointed bailo of Trebizond in 1436.62 Lo-
renzo’s affinal uncle Giorgio Loredan qd. Marco held the office of podestà e capitano in 
 
55 Letter Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo to Dolfin, Nicolò qd. Benedetto, 15.03.1420, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (Psm 181), Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. e, f. [19]; also see Christ, Trading Conflicts, p. 254. 
56 Christ: Trading Conflicts, chapter XV. 
57 Letter Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni an Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 29.08.1426, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [41]. 
58 Letter Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.12.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [56]. 
59 Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Marriage contract between Giovanetta Morosini and Lorenzo Dolfin qd. 
Antonio.  29.01.1425, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [46]. 
60 As noted above, there was an affinal link between Lorenzo’s father Antonio (and his uncle Biagio) and the 
chronicler Antonio Morosini, who had been married to a paternal aunt of Antonio and Biagio. Giovanni 
Morosini, a commercial partner of Biagio’s during his second Alexandria consulship, may have been the father 
of Lorenzo Dolfin’s eventual father-in-law Marino Morosini. In a letter to Lorenzo, his father-in-law Marino 
Morosini mentions “Alban” as a cousin of Lorenzo’s – possibly the Alban Morosini with whom Biagio Dolfin 
cooperated in Damascus: “Tu la festi montar su un por tanto e da puo la stete molto ben piaxer asai avesemo he 
festa molto ben a farla montar a chavalo piaxer asai avessemo che tu desmontasy a chaxa de tui cuxini miser 
Alban e miser Michiel he festu to honor he nostro” (Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. 
Antonio, 19.08.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [50]). Here, Alban Morosini 
appears as a resident of Vicenza. 
61 Letter Gabriel, Andrea qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Catarucia, 24.02.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 
282, fasc. 3, f. [47]. 
62 Gabriel, Benedetto qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Recordatio, 22 July 1436.  22.07.1436, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [9]. 
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Chioggia and later became captain of the Flanders galleys.63 Nicolò Dolfin qd. Benedetto was 
appointed podestà of Sacile in 1426.64 
Lorenzo resided in Venice for most of his life. In 1423 we find him renting a house in Chiog-
gia from Angelo da Canal qd. Giacomo.65 Apart from his journeys to Alexandria as a young 
man and his spell as camerario in Vicenza, he must also have resided in Padua and Koper 
(Capo d’Istria, Istria/Dalmatia, modern-day Slovenia). In Padua, he rented a house near Santa 
Giustina from Pietro Dolfin qd. Domenico.66 In Koper, he again held the office of camer-
lengho (as suggested by a letter addressed to “Lorenzo Dolfin onorado camerlongho”).67 This 
office is equivalent to the post he occupied in Vicenza, but the heavily damaged document 
does neither reveal a sender nor a date.68 
One important aspect of Lorenzo’s commercial activity is the geographical dispersion of his 
business, which is particularly striking in comparison to the commercial activities of his uncle 
that were confined mostly to the Alexandria galley route (and, to a lesser extent, London). On 
the other hand, while Biagio’s commercial portfolio was more diversified, ranging from pre-
cious stones to real estate, Lorenzo’s much longer commercial career had a clearer focus on 
 
63 Giorgio Loredan was married to Maria Loredan, Giovanetta Dolfin’s maternal aunt. See letter Loredan, 
Giorgio qd. Marco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 04.10.1440, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, 
fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [65]. 
64 Letter Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 011.1426, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [45]. 
65 The purpose of this residence cannot be identified in the sources. There are eleven documents in b. 282 that 
were received by Lorenzo Dolfin in Chioggia. Canal, Angelo da qd. Giacomo an Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: 
Receipt, 16 October 1423. 16.10.1423, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [26]. 
66 Dolfin, Piero qd. Domenico to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Receipt, 1 September 1435.  01.09.1435, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 3, f. [10]; to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: 
Receipt, 15 November 1435.  15.11.1435, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 3, f. [12]. 
At the same time, Lorenzo occurs as landlord to Michiel Pentor, who had already been a tenant of Biagio’s. This 
must have been the inherited house in St. Giustina in Venice, where Lorenzo’s father-in-law collected rents on 
his behalf: Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni an Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Receipt, 30 August 1435.  
30.08.1435, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [36]. 
67 Letter Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [64]. 
68 The “Rulers of Venice” database by Benjamin G. Kohl, Andrea Mozzato and Monique O’Connell 
(http://rsa.fmdatabase.com/fmi/iwp/cgi?-db=venice4-0%20intact&-loadframes) lists Pola (Dalmatia, modern-
day Croatia) as an additional residence of Lorenzo Dolfin. There is, however, no documentation of this episode 
in the CLD. 
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the cloth trade.69 Lorenzo began exploring the Romania trade route in the 1420s, forming a 
compagnia venture with distantly related members of the Dolfin clan. With his co-owners, 
the brothers Giacomo and Giorgio Dolfin qd. Francesco, he had previously shared a business 
in London.70 In later years, Lorenzo traded in Romania by co-operating closely with affinal 
relatives who had settled in the Venetian communities in Constantinople and Tana. 
The commercial links between Lorenzo and the Morosini also proved useful in Lorenzo’s 
Flanders business. By the mid-1420s, Lorenzo had retreated commercially from Alexandria, 
settled all outstanding claims from his uncle’s associates, and established himself as an inde-
pendent merchant. From 1422, he began selling Eastern spices and acquiring cloth in Bruges 
through the brothers Francesco and Marco Renier qd. Nicolò, who acted as paid agents cho-
sen on the basis of their commercial reputation and market-specific skills.71 The London 
business, first handled in association with Giacomo and Giorgio Dolfin, remained the second 
pillar of Lorenzo’s commerce and was eventually taken over by the Dolfin-Morosini coali-
tion. Lorenzo’s brother-in-law, Michele Morosini qd. Marino, represented his commercial in-
terests in London in the 1440s.72 
iii. Lorenzo Dolfin as a family representative 
As a half orphan, Lorenzo Dolfin’s political and commercial prospects were weakened from 
the beginning. Since an individual’s standing within the patriciate depended on their wealth 
as well as on their personal integration into their social environment, a lack of paternal sup-
port was bound to imply social disadvantages. Though patrician family structures were not 
strictly patrilineal, and affinal kin relationships often were of equal significance to direct con-
sanguineous ties, the early death of a father could reduce an individual’s influence in his pa-
 
69 This is not to say that other fields of business were not pursued by Lorenzo. There is evidence for his 
continued engagement in the gem trade e.g. in the correspondence with his nephew Dolfino Dolfin.  
70 Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Account, 20 September 1423.  20.09.1423, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [67]. 
71 The oldest surviving letter docmenting this relationship is Renier, Francesco qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo 
qd. Antonio, 07.08.1422, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [54]. Another 
document, a letter from the Renier brothers to Lorenzo Dolfin that presumably was previously part of the CLD, 
is included in Aboussouan, Camille (ed.): Exposition “Le livre et le Liban jusqu'à 1900”, Paris: 
Unesco/AGECOOP, 1982, p. 106. 
72 The earliest letter is Morosini, Michele qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 31.10.1441, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [14]; the last is Morosini, Michele qd. Marino to 
Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 07.01.1446, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [57]. 
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ternal family and hence damage his prospects because of the legal weight attached to paternal 
family relations.73 The fact that Lorenzo’s career still developed in every measurable respect 
like that of a successful and reasonably influential patrician bears testament to the impact of 
his uncle’s mentoring. By the time of Biagio Dolfin’s second consulship in Alexandria, Lo-
renzo had become his primary agent, closest personal aid, and heir. Biagio’s personal affec-
tion to Lorenzo is expressed in his letters, in which Lorenzo is addressed as “dearest son” (fio 
carissimo). The scope of their surviving correspondence, as well as its confidentiality, further 
highlight their personal proximity.  
In a commercial context, letters are the only evidence of direct personal interaction docu-
menting the respective roles of principals and trade agents within commercial relationships 
(unlike notarial deeds, court records etc., which required mediators). Biagio Dolfin’s archive 
contains seventeen pieces of correspondence with Lorenzo, whereas four letters from Biagio 
to Lorenzo survive in Lorenzo’s Commissaria.74 In addition, Lorenzo is mentioned in much 
of Biagio’s other correspondence, and vice versa.75 The references to Lorenzo in Biagio’s let-
ters, combined with the repetitive patterns of interaction between Biagio and his correspond-
ents, constitute the foremost evidence for a coalition of traders bound together by a self-
enforcing institution; that is, the coalition, an arrangement in which individuals collaborate 
for the benefit of long-term commercial advantages (primarily in the form of low per-unit 
transaction costs) rather than short-term monetary gains, was self-enforcing in the sense that 
no individual member could gain from breaking their commitment. The coalitional structure 
primarily emerges from the letters involving Nicolò Dolfin qd. Benedetto as a correspondent. 
The CBD contains sixteen of these letters (or copies).76 In Lorenzo Dolfin’s archive, where 
similar frequencies of written communication can be found with other interlocutors, fourteen 
to seventeen documents also indicate a more profound relationship. For example, Lorenzo 
maintained a close partnership with the brothers Francesco and Marco Renier qd. Nicolò, his 
 
73 For the dual significance of matrilineal and patrilineal ties, see Chojnacki: Kinship Ties; also Queller and 
Madden: Father of the Bride. For the political importance of the clan see Faugeron, Fabien: "L'art du 
compromis politique: Venise au lendemain de la conjuration Tiepolo-Querini (1310)", in: Journal des Savants 
(2004), No. 2, pp. 357-421. 
74 Fourteen documents are contained in CBD, b. 181, three in b. 180; the four documents in the CLD are 
contained in fasc. 3. 
75 Mentions of Biagio are less frequent in Lorenzo’s correspondence, but they occur nevertheless, see e.g. letter 
Polo, Nicolò di to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 22.02.1418, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie di 
Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, int. 1, f. [1]. 
76 One in b. 180, fifteen in b. 181. 
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Bruges agents, which is documented from August 1422 until January 1427. Eighteen of their 
letters to Lorenzo survive in the CLD. Another frequent correspondent of Lorenzo’s was his 
brother-in-law Michele Morosini qd. Marino, who represented Lorenzo in London between 
(at least) 1441 and 1446 and of whom twenty-seven letters remain. Michele’s father, Marino 
Morosini qd. Giovanni, has a surviving record of eighteen letters that were sent from Venice 
to Vicenza.77 By comparison, the brothers Vettore, Giacomo, and Giorgio Dolfin qd. Fran-
cesco, who were partners in Lorenzo’s first Romania compania, together have only sixteen 
letters surviving in Lorenzo’s archive.78 
Because of a lack of direct correspondence between Lorenzo and Nicolò Dolfin, the intensity 
of their cooperation must be deduced from their respective correspondence with Biagio 
Dolfin between 1418 and 1420.79 At the time of Biagio’s second consulship, Lorenzo resided 
in Venice where he took care of Biagio’s business interests, mainly in the gem trade, and ad-
ministered his property.80 Nicolò Dolfin qd. Benedetto equally provided agency services to 
his cousin Biagio. Their commercial relationship is further confirmed in a letter from 
Pasqualiga Dolfin, Biagio’s third and last wife, which told Biagio about Nicolò’s financing of 
a property deal with a certain Marco Teldi.81 Yet in addition to the letters documenting the 
individual agency roles of Lorenzo and Nicolò, there are surviving pieces of correspondence 
documenting their continuous cooperation.82 In total, the CBD and CLD contain ten letters 
authored and received by either Biagio, Lorenzo, or Nicolò Dolfin, which document the 
 
77 One of these letters is contained in Reinhold Mueller’s Christie’s collection, letter Morosini, Marino qd. 
Giovanni to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 13.01.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (Reinhold C. Mueller - 
Christie's Collection), Citra, b. 282-283. 
78 See below, V.B.i. Three of these letters stem from the Christie’s collection. 
79 The aforementioned 1426 letter is the only surviving document (letter Dolfin, Nicolò qd. Benedetto to Dolfin, 
Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 011.1426, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [45]). Their lack of 
written correspondence between 1418 and 1420 obviously results from the fact that both resided in Venice at the 
time. 
80 See p. 64, note 66. 
81 Letter Dolfin, Pasqualiga to Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo, 16.06.1419, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, 
Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. d, f. [37].  
82 E.g. the November 1418 letter cited above: letter Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 
01.11.1418, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (Psm 181), Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. e, f. [24]. 
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commercial cooperation between Lorenzo and Nicolò as members of Biagio Dolfin’s person-
al commercial network.83 
C. Cross-Generational Pattern: The Strategic Transmission of Business Skills 
There are striking similarities between the commercial careers of Biagio and Lorenzo Dolfin. 
Lorenzo, like his uncle, undertook his first steps in commerce under the supervision of close 
relatives. Biagio Dolfin first travelled to Alexandria on the muda of 1398, accompanied by 
his elder brother Antonio. The galley convoy was commanded by Benedetto Dolfin, the fa-
ther of Nicolò, who became one of Biagio’s most trusted partners. As Biagio’s associates, 
Nicolò and Lorenzo Dolfin cooperated closely and remained in close personal terms even be-
yond their commercial partnership.84 
Biagio Dolfin further developed his business skills as fattore to Venetian merchants in Da-
mascus. As noted above, we know of transactions he undertook on behalf of Marco and Al-
ban Morosini in association with his brother-in-law Andrea Bragadin in 1404.85 Biagio’s 
jewel business in London, which he initiated after his first consulship in Alexandria, was per-
formed through an intricate network of (consanguineous and affinal) relatives and non-kin 
partners. He partnered with members of the Canal family and a certain Giovanni Dolfin, 
 
83 In addition to the 1 November 1418 letter, these are (taken from the MMDD): Dolfin, Nicolò qd. Benedetto to 
Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo, 27.10.1418, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, 
int. d, f. [5]; Dolfin, Nicolò qd. Benedetto to Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo, 30.01.1419, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM 181), Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. d, f. [7]; Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo to Dolfin, 
Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 24.02.1419, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [2]; 
Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 18.04.1419, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (Psm 
181), Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. e, f. [13 a]; Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. 
Antonio, 24.04.1419, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [5]; Dolfin, Nicolò 
qd. Benedetto to Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo, 29.05.1419, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie miste, 
b. 181, fasc. 15, int. d, f. [38]; Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 04.08.1419, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [4]; Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo to Dolfin, Nicolò 
qd. Benedetto, 11.11.1419, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. e, f. [5]. 
84 There is no preserved correspondance between Lorenzo and Nicolò regarding Lorenzo’s Romania and 
Flanders activities. The aforementioned 1426 letter is the only documentation of their (seemingly very cordial) 
personal relationship.  
85 Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 96. 
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whose precise relation to Biagio remains uncertain.86 The brothers Andrea and Nicolò da 
Molin represented their joint gemstone business in London until the partnership was dis-
solved amidst a judicial row.87 Biagio’s brother-in-law Polo Pasqualigo was eventually sent 
to London to take care of the Canal-Dolfin interests. Biagio’s negative experiences regarding 
the reliability of non-kin and distant-kin associates (such as the Molin and the Malipiero) 
made him rely primarily on the services of Lorenzo Dolfin and his cousin Nicolò Dolfin qd. 
Benedetto for managing his trade-related affairs during his second consulship in Alexandria. 
Lorenzo Dolfin, who in all likelihood never knew his father, benefited greatly from his expe-
rience as his uncle’s understudy. While wrapping up uncle’s Alexandria business after 
Biagio’s death, Lorenzo worked with the Alexandria resident Nicolò Bernardo qd. Francesco 
who had been a galley commander during the 1418 muda.88 He also corresponded further 
with Giacomo Barbarigo qd. Filipo, Gregorio Orso, Giacomo Zorzi qd. Giorgio and Matteo 
di Sori, all of whom had previously been correspondents of Biagio Dolfin.89 
In addition to the business links that he inherited from his uncle, Lorenzo relied heavily on 
the support of his mother’s Gabriel family after Biagio’s death. His maternal uncles Bene-
detto, Andrea, and Michele Gabriel qd. Nicolò all corresponded with him in commercial 
 
86 Letter Molin, Nicolò da qd. Michael to Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo, 08.01.1414, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (Psm 181), Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. a, f. [2]. 
87 Christ: Trading Conflicts, pp. 97-99. 
88 Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco: Galley cargo list, 11 November 1418.  11.11.1418, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM 181), Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 13, int. carichi, f. [4]. 
89 Giacomo Barbarigo qd. Filipo: Letter Barbarigo, Giacomo qd. Filippo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 
23.09.1420, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [15]; Gregorio Orso: Letter 
Orso, Gregorio to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 27.03.1424, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, 
b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [26], Letter Orso, Gregorio to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 31.07.1425, ASVe, Procuratori di 
San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [26], Letter Orso, Gregorio to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 
20.11.1425, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [34]; Giacomo Zorzi qd, 
Giorgio: LetterZorzi, Giacomo di qd. Giorgio to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 20.11.1424, ASVe, Procuratori di 
San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [29], LetterZorzi, Giacomo di qd. Giorgio to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. 
Antonio, 19.11.1425, ASVe, Documenti Commerciali Riservati (1985), b. 1, 211; Matteo di Sori: Letter Sori, 
Matteo de to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 12.12.1421, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 
282, fasc. 3, f. [16]; Letter Sori, Matteo de to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: 28 October 1422.  28.10.1422, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [20]; Sori, Matteo de an Dolfin, Lorenzo 
qd. Antonio: Declaration, 08 May 1430.  08.05.1430, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, 
fasc. 3, f. [58]. 
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terms.90 Michele Gabriel91 was Lorenzo’s agent in Damascus while Lorenzo closed his Alex-
andria accounts.92 Benedetto Gabriel’s son Alvise acted as Lorenzo’s agent on the Beirut gal-
ley route, writing to Lorenzo from Acre among other places in the 1440s.93 
The dominance of family relations in commercial organisation was thus as pronounced in the 
case of Lorenzo Dolfin as in the case of his uncle Biagio, while the differences merely relate 
to different degrees of significance assigned to specific family branches. The nuclear family 
remained central to Biagio’s commerce (through his brother Antonio and eventually his 
nephew Lorenzo), while Lorenzo was more heavily involved with his maternal and affinal 
families.  
Cross-generation similarities between the careers of Biagio and Lorenzo Dolfin thus relate to 
both career development and mercantile strategies. In both cases, mercantile education was 
provided by the immediate family environment and supported by state institutions. Young pa-
tricians were gradually given more commercial responsibility within family coalitions, while 
facilitated access to merchant galleys created opportunities for the practical application of ac-
quired business skills and for gaining additional commercial experience in distant locations. 
Their introduction to existing trade coalitions operating within wider commercial networks 
led them to strengthen their commercial links within their own families while simultaneously 
developing relationships with their families’ external associates. Lorenzo Dolfin’s continuous 
exchange with members of his uncle’s network indicates that commercial partnerships, alt-
hough often built for specific purposes and limited in scale and scope, were generally intend-
ed as long-term alliances that could be put on hold and reactivated at will.  
 Biagio and Lorenzo Dolfin thus shared a commercial strategy that connected them to 
a key circle of relatives and selected individuals from outside their family. Their personal 
 
90 According to Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 22.11.1437, ASVe, Procuratori 
di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [32], Benedetto died in 1437.  
91 Michele Gabriel may have been the “merchant from Damascus” with whom Biagio Dolfin corresponded in 
1419, see Christ: Trading Conflicts, pp. 232, 299.  
92 Letter Gabriel, Michele qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 22.10.1421, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [18]. The “compagnia Michiel Gabriel” is also mentioned in the two 
CLD accounts signed by Nicolò Bernardo qd. Francesco: Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. 
Antonio: Account, Alexandria 1423.  001423, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 
3, f. [135]; Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Account, 1425.  001425, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [104]. 
93 Letter Gabriel, Alvise to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 06.11.1445, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 
282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [75]. 
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commercial environments overlapped to some extent, yet Lorenzo also created a distinct 
sphere of personal and commercial interaction tailored to his specific circumstances. Both 
core and periphery of Lorenzo’s own commercial environment emerged clearly only after the 
death of his mentor Biagio. However, the choices he later made in terms of investments and 
geographical focus were influenced by his uncle’s experiences, to which he was a close wit-
ness as Biagio’s agent.  
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CHAPTER IV:  
MASTER OF AFFAIRS – FAMILY, POLITICS, BUSINESS 
ORGANISATION: VICENZA AND VENICE (1424-1427) 
In the lives of many Venetian patricians, pivotal instances of reaching personal maturity were 
not (merely) official events like marriage or entering the Great Council. For Andrea Barbari-
go, subject of Frederic Lane’s classic study, the most formative ‘coming-of-age’ moment was 
the bankruptcy of his father Nicolò following a fine of 10.000 ducats for the wrecking of a 
galley during his captaincy of the Alexandria fleet in December 1417.1 For Lorenzo Dolfin, it 
was the untimely death of his uncle and mentor Biagio Dolfin in 1420. The loss of his patri-
arch obliged Lorenzo to return Biagio’s property from Egypt to Venice, settle his accounts, 
fight off unjustified claims on Biagio’s estate, and lead the transition of family hierarchies by 
gradually taking on his uncle’s role as a family principal. While in Egypt, Lorenzo estab-
lished close ties to the Venetian consulate and Venetian Alexandria residents. Most im-
portantly, he had to act in his own interest when transforming his uncle’s business into a set 
of arrangements that would facilitate his own commercial pursuits.  
 Although the legal formalities of capital inheritance are well established in Venetian 
historiography, less is known about the practical dynamics that structured the cross-
generational transformations of Venetian business arrangements. Moreover, the wider social 
and political backgrounds of patrician commercial cooperation have rarely been considered 
as constitutional factors of partnership formation in long-distance trade.2 When examining the 
early commercial career of a young patrician like Lorenzo Dolfin, the social context of per-
sonal, political, and commercial liaisons are therefore of primary concern. As the combined 
archives of Biagio and Lorenzo Dolfin contain a rare and relatively extensive documentation 
 
1 Lane: Andrea Barbarigo, p. 16. 
2 For capital inheritance, see Pertile, Antonio: Storia del diritto italiano dalla caduta dell'impero romano alla 
codificazione - Vol. III: Storia del diritto privato, Turin: Unione tipografico editrice torinese, 1894, pp. 274-284; 
also Weber, Max: "Zur Geschichte der Handelsgesellschaften im Mittelalter - Nach Südeuropäischen Quellen", 
in: http://www.textlog.de/weber_handel.html, 1889; for the specific case of Venice, see Lane: Family 
Partnerships. With respect to the social embeddedness of (economic) partnerships, the model of network co-
constitution provided by McLean and Padgett is a useful framework for assessing the interdependencies 
between relational categories, although it has thus far not been evaluated against the Venetian context (McLean, 
P., Padgett, J.: "Obligation, Risk and Opportunity in the Renaissance Economy: Beyond Social Embeddedness 
to Network Co-Constitution", in: Dobbin, Frank (ed.), The Sociology of the Economy, New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2004, pp. 193-227).  
73 
 
of cross-generational cooperation within wider patrician networks, the emerging interdepend-
encies can be analysed in terms of both individual and collective incentives. The functioning 
of patrician networks thus also sheds light on the pertinence of political institutions and the 
commercial law to the development of trade. 
This chapter examines the factors that enabled Lorenzo to build a commercial network span-
ning from the Near East to Flanders and London. While the operational specifics of Lo-
renzo’s long-distance trade are described and analysed in chapter V, the following section (A) 
examines how Lorenzo created his own business opportunities by consolidating his links with 
Biagio’s former partners and initiating new partnerships of his own, in the course of which 
family-based partnerships eventually emerged as his primary operational framework. Sec-
tions B and C explore Lorenzo’s web of family relationships that became a crucial basis of 
mutual support in both commerce and politics, with different branches of Lorenzo’s extended 
family each fulfilling specific roles. Section D explores the social interdependencies that gen-
erated intra-family cooperation and their extension into the commercial sphere. 
A. The Transformation of a Business Network: Biagio’s Death and Lorenzo’s Com-
ing-of-Age 
Biagio Dolfin qd. Lorenzo died in Cairo on 26 April 1420 while serving the Venetian Repub-
lic for a second time as consul in Mamluk Alexandria. Lorenzo Dolfin resided in Venice dur-
ing his uncle’s service but was present in Egypt at the time of Biagio’s death. Lorenzo’s last 
letter to Biagio was sent on 31 March 1420 from Rosetta.3 Biagio’s last preserved letter to 
Lorenzo, by contrast, had been sent as early as 4 August 1419 but reached Lorenzo more than 
half a year later, on 10 March 1420 (it had reached Venice after Lorenzo’s departure and was 
then forwarded to Egypt on the spring cotton cogs).4 On the back of the letter, Lorenzo noted 
Alexandria as the place of reception.5 
 
3 Letter Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio to Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo, 31.03.1420, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. d, f. [50]. 
4 Letter Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 04.08.1419, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [4]. 
5 Ibid.: „Rezevuto del 1420 a dì 10 Marzo per la nave patron ser Andrea da Charvaza in Allexandria…” 
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Lorenzo temporarily remained in Alexandria, from where he wrote his first letter after 
Biagio’s passing on 11 May 1420.6 We further find a notarial deed drawn by the Candia-
based notary Benedetto di Sori in the Cancelleria inferiore, dated 25 June 1420,7 and a bill of 
exchange benefiting Angelo Michiel qd. Luca, dated 20 October 1420.8 While still in Alex-
andria, Lorenzo wrote to Carlo Contarini qd. Giacomo, Biagio’s successor in the office of 
Venetian consul9, on 11 November of the same year.10 A copy of a letter written to Matteo di 
Sori, brother of the aforementioned Benedetto, is dated 27 August 1421, but this document 
had very probably been written in Venice.11 Lorenzo’s definite return is documented in a let-
ter to his maternal uncle Benedetto Gabriel qd. Nicolò, written from Venice one month lat-
er.12  Another letter from Antonio di Gusanieri qd. Marco, which Lorenzo received in March 
1421, further confirms his return to the Serenissima.13 
Although only one document, testified by Giacomo Barbarigo qd. Filippo, documents Lo-
renzo’s direct exchange with local residents during his stay in Alexandria, his later corre-
spondence reveals that he used his stay in Egypt to forge strong ties to Biagio’s former com-
mercial partners on which he was to rely heavily in the following years.14 Between 1422 and 
 
6 The recipient of this letter can no longer be identified due to damages on the document: Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. 
Antonio, 11.05.1420, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (psm 180 fasc II), Commissarie miste, b. 180, fasc. 2, f. 
[1]. 
7 Notarial deed Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 25.06.1420, ASVe, Cancelleria inferiore (Canc Inf Notai 22), 
Notai, b. 22, fasc. 9, int. 3, f. [10]. 
8 Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: bill of exchange, 20 October 1420.  20.10.1420, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco 
(PSM citra 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 2, int. 2, f. [2]. 
9 Carlo Contarini held the office on an interim basis. He was succeeded by Francesco Michiel qd. Giovanni (as 
specified in Gusanieri’s letter, see note 13 below; also in: letter Barbarigo, Giacomo qd. Filippo to Dolfin, 
Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 23 September 1420.  23.09.1420, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 
282, fasc. 3, f. [15]). 
10 Letter Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio to Contarini, Carlo qd. Giacomo, 11.11.1420, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [14]. 
11 Letter Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio to Soro, Matteo, 27. August 1421.  27.08.1421, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (Psm 181), Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. f, f. [4]. 
12 Letter Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio to Gabriel, Benedetto qd. Nicolò, 11.11.1421, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (Psm 181), Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. e, f. [18]. 
13 Letter di Gusanieri, Antonio qd. Marco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 01.03.1421, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [51]: “…miser Franzescho Michiel nostro consolo…”. 
14 Letter Barbarigo, Giacomo qd. Filippo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 23.09.1420, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [15]. It is, of course, not surprising that there is little documentation 
of Lorenzo’s interaction with Alexandria residents, since all Venetians must have lived in the same fondaco.  
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1425, Nicolò Bernardo qd. Francesco, one of his uncle’s former Alexandria associates, fre-
quently informed Lorenzo about the Egyptian markets.15 Two letters survive from Giacomo 
de Zorzi qd. Giorgio, a Venetian merchant active in Alexandria during and beyond Biagio 
Dolfin’s second consulship. In addition, Lorenzo received at least two letters from the afore-
mentioned Matteo di Sori, which had also been written in Alexandria. Thus, parts of Biagio’s 
commercial network also became the basis of Lorenzo’s initial business environment. 
The document testified by Giacomo Barbarigo qd. Filippo was written by Lorenzo Dolfin on 
23 September 1420.16 Therein, Lorenzo challenged the decision of the Council of Twelve to 
seize 220 ducats worth of gemstones from Biagio’s former commercial partner Angelo Mich-
iel qd. Luca to settle Biagio’s outstanding debt with the consulate. Lorenzo pleaded to spare 
the belongings of his uncle’s associate and promised to repay any of his uncle’s outstanding 
dues himself.17 The document has no commercial significance in the sense of a commercial 
partnership between Giacomo Barbarigo and Lorenzo Dolfin. Antonio di Gusanieri’s letter, 
which Lorenzo received in Venice on 24 April 1424, had been written in Rhodes.18 Lorenzo 
had entrusted Gusanieri with settling his Alexandria affairs before leaving Egypt. Gusanieri 
accordingly reported on settling Lorenzo’s remaining dues with the consulate and consigning 
Lorenzo’s belongings (which the consul had declined to guard to avoid suspicions of bribery) 
 
15 Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco: galley cargo list, 11 November 1418.  11.11.1418, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM 181), Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 13, int. carichi, f. [4]. 
16 Barbarigo, Giacomo qd. Filippo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: expertise, 23 September 1420.  23.09.1420, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [15]. 
17 Ibid.: „Chonzossia che per miser Charllo Conttaryny consollo el me abia intromesso in man de ser Anzollo 
Michiel tuty zoy de raxon de mi Lorenzo Dolfin in spizialitade liqual se trova al prexente in man del dito ser 
Anzollo Mychiel. E fato metar i dity zoy al’inchontto per venderli con gran mio dano e vergugna per pagarse de 
ducati 220 el me domanda a my Lorenzo Dolfin da beny de miser B.D. fo nostro consollo per vigar et un parte 
paxa nel chonseyo di 12 a dì 8 del prexente diqual beny et miser Blaxio Dolphin non mi trovo aver in le man 
alguna chosa in a le prexente. Ma per chaxon che i dity mye zoy non sia vendudi chon gran myo dano e vergo-
gna et anchor perché el sia tolto zoxo el seiuessto fato a miser Anzollo Mychiel chome chonssento per dito my-
ser lo consollo io si a prexentar in chorte ducati 220 faty de zustto pexo mesi in nun sacheto ligadi e boladi et 
lavanty segno de raxon de mi Lorenzo Dolphin. In spizialitade per chaxon de aver li dity zoy in mia libertade 
perché di beny de myser Blaxio Dolphin non me trovo aver alguna chosa in le raxon salvo e reservade le mye 
raxon azo chè a tenpo e a luogo e le posa lì. Lorenzo Dolphin che fo de miser Anttonio scryse.” 
18 Letter di Gusanieri, Antonio qd. Marco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Letter, 1 March 1421.  01.03.1421, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [51]. 
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to Pietro Bernardo qd. Francesco,19 brother of the aforementioned Nicolò Bernardo.20 He 
concluded the letter by offering future services from Damascus.21 
i. Nicolò Bernardo qd. Francesco: a cross-generational business contact 
Nicolò Bernardo qd. Francesco was Lorenzo’s most frequent Alexandria-based correspondent 
according to the surviving record. Nicolò was a galley captain on the Alexandria route who 
had transported Biagio Dolfin’s cargo to Egypt in 1418.22 Nicolò Bernardo acted as Lo-
renzo’s Alexandria agent until at least 1425, which is documented in two account books and 
twelve letters. The earliest of Nicolò Bernardo’s letters from Alexandria is dated 3 March 
1422,23 while his last remaining letter was written more than two years later on 20 November 
1424.24 Nicolò’s letters signal a certain personal proximity between sender and recipient, who 
is addressed as “fradelo” rather than as “mazor” despite instructing a principal-agent relation-
ship. In Alexandria, Nicolò partnered with his brother Pietro who is mentioned in four of 
Nicolò’s letters (the Bernardo brothers presumably operated as a fraterna, the default ar-
rangement of intra-family partnerships).25 They took strategic decisions in close cooperation 
when performing transactions on behalf of clients.26 One of Nicolò’s accounts (compiled in 
 
19 The fact that Lorenzo entrusted Pietro Bernardo is remarkable since Pietro had been a major opponent of the 
Venetian consul Biagio Dolfin in the “Lorach affair”, see Chris: Trading Conflicts, p. 236. 
20 Letter di Gusanieri, Antonio qd. Marco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Letter, 1 March 1421.  01.03.1421, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [51]: „… vi avixo chome tuty denari vostri che 
resto pagado quelo me dixese al vostro partir d’Alesandre ho consegnado in chorte a miser Franzescho Michiel 
nostro consolo. Simel le vostre taze e paroni e chuslier e la vostra corteliera fornida de le masarie vostre da 
chuxina e chase el dito miser Consolo non volse fese alchuna desegrazion in corte digando chel non volea 
guardar simel cose e per tanto provity de darle a ser Piero Bernardo de ser Francescho e da lui tute vostre 
masarie ho consegnado.” 
21 Ibid.: „Altro per ora non ho per dirve salvo de ofrirme a vostri piaxeri e se a Damascho vedy pose far chosa ve 
piaza son al vostro chomando che Christo ve guardi.” 
22 Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco: galley cargo list, 11 November 1418.  11.11.1418, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM 181), Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 13, int. carichi, f. [4]. 
23 Letter Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 03.03.1422, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [6]. 
24 Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco an Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Letter, 20 November 1424.  20.11.1424, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [33]. 
25  Lane: Family partnerships. 
26 E.g. Letter Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 03.03.1422, ASVe, Procuratori di 
San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [6]: “...i maudi de vostra raxon mi laso Piero ho spazadi e dene<r> tanto 
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1423, filed on 13 April 1424), as well as numerous references to his brother in Nicolò’s let-
ters, reveal that Nicolò and Pietro had common liabilities towards Lorenzo.27 
The accounts unequivocally state that Lorenzo Dolfin was a buyer on the Alexandria pepper 
market. The oldest account, compiled during the muda of 1423 (“al viazo d’Alexandria”), 
lists the purchase of pepper as the only goods expense on the debit side, alongside expenses 
for taxation (“cottimo”) and provisions for the agent.28 The account’s credit side lists the 
quantity of acquired pepper as well as payments from Pietro Bernardo qd. Francesco and Ba-
tista Contarini on behalf of Giacomo Dolfin qd. Francesco. The second surviving account 
displays a similar structure.29 
The letters provide the most comprehensive insights into Lorenzo Dolfin’s early commercial 
career. Nicolò Bernardo, a long-term resident of Alexandria, had maintained close links to 
Biagio Dolfin while serving as his fattore (agent) and accountant, and his letters reveal both 
his agency services to Lorenzo and his involvement in closing Biagio’s Alexandria ac-
counts.30 They also prove Lorenzo’s initial interest in the Eastern spice trade, as Nicolò per-
formed a number of spice-related transactions on Lorenzo’s behalf. By contrast, an involve-
ment in the gem trade does not emerge from these sources. 
 
chome a vui ho scrito per siché … date qual hordene vi par ch’io mandero asechuziòn.” Also, Bernardo, Nicolò 
qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 25.10.1422, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Com-
missarie miste, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [7]: “…dele arnixe Piero niente me dise ne non so che arnixe sia vostra perché 
fate che Piero perso e me ne avixa e date hordene a le dite che chusi seguirò…”. 
27 Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: account, Alexandria 1423.  001423, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [135]: “ser Lorenzo Dolfin de aver a dì 20 hotubre 
che ser Piero Bernardo me laso in maide maide 1006 a r. 34 a bx…”; also see: letter Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Fran-
cesco an Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 31.07.1423, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, 
fasc. 3, f. [12]: “I maidi me disegno mio fradello Piero di vostra raxon fo per conto maidi 1006 iqual spezie a 
maidi 34 per bx. trasente bx. 29 b. 13 e pui non ne o abuto.” 
28 Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco an Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: account, Alexandria 1423.  001423, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [135]. 
29 Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: account, 1425.  001425, ASVe, Procuratori 
di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [104]. 
30 For Nicolò Bernardo’s role in settling the Biagio Dolfin accounts, see letter Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco 
to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 20.11.1424, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, 
f. [33]: “Fradelo per le galie che qui zonse rezevi vostra equal intexa farove resposta e prima ve avixo ch’el resto 
di pane de la comesaria de ser Michiel ho meso a vostro conto. […] Le maserie de vostro barba a chi dio 
perdone e no sta trovande in un albergo per afano deste galie niente ne o posudo far fenirole da puo.” 
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In addition to the support Nicolò provided in securing Biagio Dolfin’s estate, he enabled Lo-
renzo to pursue commercial interests of his own. Although there remain no letters from Lo-
renzo to Nicolò, the latter’s diligence in referencing Lorenzo’s instructions allows for recon-
structing their entire correspondence. Lorenzo instructed Nicolò with the purchase of pepper 
at numerous occasions and asked to be kept informed about prices of both import and export 
goods in Alexandria, which Nicolò provided in almost all of his letters. Apart from the vola-
tile price of pepper, Lorenzo was regularly informed about the Alexandria prices of different 
types of ginger, saffron, soap from Naples and Venice, honey from Candia and Koroni, Lom-
bardi (Lombardian cloth), and metals such as tin and lead (stagno, pionbo), although Lorenzo 
does not appear to have purchased or sold large quantities of any of these goods.31 
In the Dolfin sources, Nicolò Bernardo appears as Lorenzo’s most significant Alexandria 
contact. Yet, repeated mentions of a number of additional individuals in Nicolò’s letters give 
rise to a small network that Bernardo maintained on Lorenzo’s behalf. In his first surviving 
letter, Nicolò gives account of numerous other documents relating to Lorenzo’s dealings with 
Carlo Contarini qd. Giacomo, Biagio Dolfin’s successor as Venetian consul, which were tes-
tified by the aforementioned Giacomo Barbarigo qd. Filippo.32 As an eminent Venetian mer-
chant, Nicolò consulted with the consul at numerous occasions and accompanied him twice 
on official missions to Sultan Al-Ashraf Sayf-ad-Din Barsbay in Cairo.33 Carlo Contarini’s 
 
31 E.g.  letter Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 12.04.1423, ASVe, Procuratori di 
San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [13]: “Fratelli per mollte mie a questo dì ve ho scrito e 
d’avixadove che della moneda vostra niente aveva fato per non poder aver piper perché de qui non se ne trovava 
se no sporte 300 in man de mori che aveano le teste inferade perché tal piper vender i non vol se ai bx. 170 per 
le galie. […] Nostre merze hoio val bx. 8 savoni da Napolli bx 8 ¼ da Venexia bx 7 ½ miel de Chandia bx. 6 de 
Choron bx. 5 ½ lonbardi bx. 4 ½ zira bx 24 stagno bx. 18 pionbo bx. 35 zafran bx. 4 ½ vari bx. 80 altre chose 
segondo uxanza.” 
32 Letter Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 03.03.1422, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [6]: “La letera scriveva […] al consolo quela al dito die e subito el fexe conman-
damento al suo chapelan che tute scriture e abì fati ne là al termenaziòn de ser Andrea Ziorzi e ser Iacomo Bar-
barigo.” 
33 Letter Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 19.02.1423, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [49]: “Fradello per le gallie ve scrisi da puo nulla ve o scritto perché 
stado al Chaiero pa mexi 3 in conpagnia con il consollo.  E per el soldan ne vegni domanda ducati 25 milla per 
una so gallia laqual fo perexa da do gallie de chatillarii su lequal n’era molltti veniziani. E per ditta chaxo el ne 
domandava la soperaditta moneda e senpere per nui i fo resposta non i disamo un falaro pur la chosa e pasada 
che nui avemo convegnudo dar al soldan per nostro spazamento ducati 11 milla e dadi a la so perexenzia fosamo 
vestidi e subitto vegnisamo in Allexandria a dì 26 del pasado que sta e sta la chaxon perché non ve o scritto 
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brother Battista was also part of this circle.34 Making use of his close links to the consul, 
Nicolò represented Lorenzo in the aforementioned ‘gemstone affair’ in which Lorenzo sought 
to defend his inheritance against what he regarded as unjustified claims from the officials.35 
Nicolò Bernardo also maintained ties to Angelo Michiel qd. Luca, a former partner of Biagio 
Dolfin, whom he convinced to transfer Biagio’s share of their common business to Lorenzo’s 
accounts.36 Angelo Michiel is mentioned in three of Nicolò’s letters 37: he maintained joint 
accounts with Lorenzo, mostly in the cloth trade, with Nicolò Bernardo taking care of their 
exports to Alexandria.38 They also partnered with the compagnia of Lorenzo’s maternal uncle 
Michele Gabriel qd. Nicolò in exporting cloth from Venice to Alexandria while purchasing 
Mamluk spices with the support of Nicolò Bernardo as their agent and local market expert.39  
 
abiatene pazienzia e per l’avegnir ne faro el mando.” Second letter with identical message: Bernardo, Nicolò qd. 
Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 19.02.1423, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 
282, fasc. 3, f. [10]: “Fradello per le gallie ve scrisi da puo nula ve ho scrito per eser stado al Chairo zionnexi 3 
et chonpagnio con el chonsollo. E per el soldan ne vegniva domandado ducati 25.000 per una so gallia laqual fo 
prexo de do gallie de i Chatallani sulle qual ne iera mollti Veneziani e per dita chaxon el ne domandeva la so-
pradita moneda e senpre per nui i fo resposto non idasemo un folloro pur la chosa. È pasada che nui avemo con-
vegnudo dar al soldan per nostro spazamento ducati 11.000 e dadi a la soa perexenzia fosamo vestedi e subito 
vegnisemo e Allexandria a dì 26 del pasado. Questa e sta la chaxon perché non ve ho scrito abiate ne pazienzia 
per l’avegnir ne faro el mendo.” 
34 First mentioned in (alongside Giacomo Dolfin qd. Francesco, Toma Duodo, Pietro Bernardo, Nicolò 
Bernardo, Lorenzo Dolfin): Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: account, 
Alexandria 1423.  001423, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [135]; letter 
Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 22.08.1423, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco 
(PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [11] (which is the same as f. [12]). 
35 See note 17. 
36 Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Letter, 20 November 1424.  20.11.1424, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [33]: “Fradelo per le galie che qui zonse 
rezevi vostra equal intexa farove resposta e prima ve avixo chel resto di pane de la comesaria de ser Michiel ho 
meso a vostro conto…” 
37 One of which is preserved in two versions: b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [11] and f. [12]. 
38 Letter Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 31.07.1423, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [12]: “Vui me avixate che ser Michiel Chabriel e conpagni a charega-
to sula nave de ser Bernardo Fellato balle do pani loesti con hordene a mi siano dati perché ve avixo in diti aver 
rezev<u>di faro difenirlli chome per ser Anzollo e per vui me sta scrito e quanto ne seguiro nel’avegnir per mie 
ve ne avixerò.” 
39 Referring to a specific cargo of two units of Flanders wool, Nicolò Bernardo informed Lorenzo about the sale 
of twelve pieces of the said cloth for 20 ducats apiece. While the remainder could not be sold at the same price 
nor be exchanged for pepper as suggested by Angelo Michiel, Nicolò nevertheless acquired pepper from the 
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The support Lorenzo received from his uncle Michele Gabriel qd. Nicolò is documented 
more clearly in the letters of Nicolò Bernardo than in the direct correspondence between 
Michele and Lorenzo.40 Michele Gabriel and his compagnia were active on the Alexandria 
market as sellers of fine cloth, mainly from Flanders, which was typically shipped to Alexan-
dria on vessels captained by Bernardo Fellato.41 Lorenzo’s commercial cooperation with his 
uncle Michele is further confirmed by Nicolò Bernardo crediting Lorenzo’s account with 
wool cloth from his uncle’s stock.42 A 1425 account, countersigned by Nicolò (the last of 
Nicolò Bernardo’s documents in Lorenzo’s archive), confirms this procedure; it was filed two 
years later in the books of the compagnia Michele Gabriel e conpagni.43 The same document 
also refers to Michele Gabriel’s brother Benedetto as Lorenzo Dolfin’s creditor.  
The incentive and enforcement structure of Lorenzo’s partnership with Nicolò Bernardo thus 
emerged from a cross-generational commercial network passed on by Biagio Dolfin to his 
nephew. As a result, Nicolò was well-acquainted with Lorenzo, and they were closely inter-
linked through a number of additional actors. Monitoring was ensured through mutual de-
pendencies, which prevented opportunistic behaviour. Nicolò, whose reputation in Alexan-
dria was critical to his commercial success, received commission payments (“provixion”) for 
each transaction he performed. 
Yet commission agency was just one form of business organisation that Lorenzo Dolfin 
adopted. The following two chapters will discuss the compagnia, Lorenzo’s primary business 
 
revenues of the cloth sale on behalf of Michele Gabriel and his compagnia: letter Bernardo, Nicolò qd. France-
sco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 23.10.1423, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, 
fasc. 3, f. [25]: “De pani loesti de ser Michiel Chabriel e conpagnia ne ho vendude peze 12 a ducati 20 la peza. 
El resto non ho posudo fenir a i diti prexii e baratari a piper chome me a recorda ser Anzol Michiel non ho po-
sudo fenirvi el piui presto potro. Per dita raxon ho achata pero do rotoli piper prexa neto sporta 1 rotoli 11 costa 
bx. 128 el dito ho sig<nato> del segno di pani e scrito sia dado a ser Michiel Chabriel e conpagni siate ne avi-
xa.”  
40 See section B of this chapter. 
41 See note 38. 
42 Letter Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 20.11.1424, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [33]: “prima ve avixo chel resto di pane de la comesaria de ser Mi-
chiel ho meso a vostro conto […].” 
43 Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Account, 1425.  001425, ASVe, Procuratori 
di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [104]. Verso: “rezevudo 1426 a dì 8 Marzo. Meso in libro a dì 
15 luio 1427 in quaderno di la conpagnia di ser Michiel Chabryel e conpagni […] el conto diga a mi Lorenzo 
Dolfin.” 
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unit in the context of his Flanders and Romania trade.44 For now, suffice it to note that the 
agency partnership was not as loose an arrangement as its name might suggest. Nicolò Ber-
nardo and Lorenzo Dolfin’s business relationship was buttressed by a social institution of 
trust – a network of reputation.45 A crucial component of this network was Lorenzo’s cousin 
Giacomo Dolfin qd. Francesco, who is mentioned in four of Nicolò’s letters.  
ii. Giacomo Dolfin qd. Francesco: a new component of an inherited network 
A distant cousin of Lorenzo’s, Giacomo was resident in Alexandria in October 1422, the date 
of his earliest record in a Nicolò Bernardo letter.46 He played a crucial role in Lorenzo’s Ro-
mania business towards the end of the decade.47 In 1427, he wrote48 to Lorenzo as the new 
Venetian vize-bailo of Constantinople, to which he had been appointed by the Council of 
Twelve by unanimous vote.49 In the aforementioned letter, Nicolò Bernardo told Lorenzo 
about agreements he had reached with Giacomo, who clearly appears as a partner of Lo-
renzo’s. Lorenzo and Giacomo kept a joint account and collaborated on the Alexandria mar-
ket while employing Nicolò Bernardo as a market expert50 who advised them on investments 
 
44 See chapters V; VI.A. 
45 The reputation mechanism within lose and informal patrician networks, however, must be seen as emerging 
from patrician identity politics and is thus different from reputation mechanisms in commercial coalitions (see 
chapter V.B). On patrician identity, see in particular Chojnacki, Stanley: "Social identity in Renaissance Venice: 
the second Serrata", in: Renaissance Studies 8 (December 1994), No. 4, pp. 341–358; O'Connell, Monique: "The 
Venetian Patriciate in the Mediterranean: Legal Identity and Lineage in Fifteenth-Century Venetian Crete", in: 
Renaissance Quarterly 57 (Summer, 2004), No. 2, pp. 466-493. For reputation based on commercial incentives, 
see for example Greif: Reputation and Coalitions; id.: "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in 
Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition", in: The American Economic Review 83 (Jun. 1993), No. 3, pp. 
525-548. 
46 Letter Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 25.10.1422, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM 282), Commissarie miste, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [7].  
47 See chapter V.B. 
48 Letter Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.10.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (Reinhold C. Mueller - Christie's Collection), Citra, b. 282-283.  
49 Letter Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.12.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [56]: “Come per l’altra te scrisy el [Giorgio Dolfin qd. Francesco] me dise che te 
scrivese come so fradelo ser Iacomo fo fato vizo bailo da Constantinopoli per el conseio di 12 et ave tuti le 
baloti.” 
50 Letter Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco an Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 25.10.1422, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM 282), Commissarie miste, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [7] (heavily damaged document): „I maidi vostri vendi 
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and sales and implemented their joint transactions.51 A 1423 account countersigned by Nicolò 
Bernardo, which records details of Lorenzo’s acquisition of pepper in Alexandria, further 
confirms the commercial collaboration between Giacomo and Lorenzo Dolfin.52 This partner-
ship did not arise out of the personal commercial network of Biagio Dolfin, as Giacomo does 
not appear in Biagio’s papers. Giacomo Dolfin is thus the first observable individual whom 
Lorenzo added to the commercial network he inherited from his uncle.   
 While Giacomo and Lorenzo Dolfin eventually partnered in commercial activities 
along the Romania galley route, the foundations of this cooperation were laid in the early 
years after Biagio Dolfin’s death. Giacomo was of particular significance in Lorenzo’s per-
sonal commercial network as they collaborated in all of Lorenzo’s (foreign) places of busi-
ness: Alexandria at around 1420 (covering the Near East), London in the early 1420s (cover-
ing Northern Europe), and eventually Constantinople (covering the Romania galley route). 
Giacomo’s earliest recorded activities in Constantinople are reported in a letter to Lorenzo on 
10 June 1424.53 Prior to this, Giacomo cooperated commercially with Lorenzo in London, of 
which a 1423 letter and two accounts bear testimony. The letter, although heavily damaged 
and only partially legible, documents the sale of Lorenzo’s Alexandria acquisitions on the 
London market. Giacomo thus performed an agency role akin to the one provided by the 
brothers Francesco and Marco Renier qd. Nicolò in Bruges, which according to their written 
record began around the same time.54 Yet, unlike the Renier brothers, Giacomo appears as a 
 
chome ve disi […] bx. 29 s. 13 p. 0 e niente ne ho fato per eser pochi e perché ser Iachomo Dolfin me a dito i 
chometestri(?) che se ducati 250. I denti el non podeva investir segondo […] hordene che qu[…] a mi el debia 
lasar perché se i diti el me lasera tegniro anche per tanti dei maidi e seguirò l’ordene el me lasera e se niente el 
me lasera manderova queste […] per eser pochi da investir qu’el ne seguirò per man qui vene qui soto ve ne 
avixerò.” 
51 Ibid.: „Da puo per eser spirado el termene de conp<r>ar voxe e montra se a infiuxa la testa a non vender a 
men de bx. 140 pero ser Iachomo me a disegna de vostra raxòn bx. 264 k. 19 <que di maidi> e bx. 29 k. 13 che 
eser bx. 294 k. 8 e da me lasa el vostro hordene i debia investir quando per cha m<e>ia conpererò. E chusì farò e 
spiero darve bona ventura. Altro per ora non me achade salvo che ai piazera vostra hoferirme. I dio ve conser-
vi.” 
52 Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Account, Alexandria 1423.  001423, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [135]: “…die 29 che ser Iachomo Dolfin me de 
ducati 31 mancho bixanti 3 karati 5 val…. Piper contrascrito die aver a dì per ser Lorenzo Dolfin per la montar 
con tute spexe prodi 2 piper i mande per le galie chapetanio ser Toma Duodo…” 
53 Letter Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.06.1424, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [44]. 
54 See chapter V.A. 
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co-owner of the enterprise, thus performing his agency role as a co-investor rather than as a 
mere employee.  
While Giacomo’s 1423 letter documents Lorenzo’s early commercial presence in London, 
where he acted as a seller of Eastern spices and a buyer of cloth,55 their investment partner-
ship (instead of a principal-agent partnership) emerges from Giacomo’s references to their 
joint transactions.56 The pair’s acquisitions and sales strategies were partly based on barter 
deals (“baraty”) of exchanging spices for cloth in cases where the monetary sale of spices 
would yield unsatisfactory gains. Giacomo reported on a concrete barter transaction intended 
to avoid the sale of ginger at an undervalued price. One unit of pepper and ginger respective-
ly were exchanged for no less than sixty dozen (“dozene”) of fine pieces of Lowestoft cloth 
(loesti).57 He also monitored price levels on other northern markets, such as Bruges, and in-
formed Lorenzo about where their spices should be shipped to and sold for maximal gains.58 
 The earlier of the two surviving account books, dated 20 September 1423, details the 
ownership structure of the enterprise. The family branch of Francesco Dolfin was accordingly 
represented by Giacomo’s brother Giorgio Dolfin qd. Francesco, who appears to have held a 
joint capital stock with Giacomo and additional siblings. Giorgio and Lorenzo Dolfin owned 
a compagnia of which Giorgio and his brothers held four fifth of the equity while one fifth 
was owned by Lorenzo.59 Giacomo was involved as a co-owner through the Dolfin brothers’ 
joint capital share and managed the compagnia’s commerce in London as a family repre-
 
55 Letter Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 27.08.1423, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [52].  
56 Ibid.: “Anchor per quela ve avixai qu’el aveva seguido de fati nostri siché per questa pocho me achade ma per 
chaxòn che per tute ve abiady mia e per avixarvi dele cosse siegue a la zornada.” 
57 Ibid.: “A mancho prexio i baratai botte una de piper e botte una de zonzeri a loesti molto fin iqual fono dozene 
50 missi el piper per non valer a quel tenpo a ducati plui de 17 ducati 18 ¼ e i zonzeri ducati 18 esera la botte 
avy una corona e i pani eser 17 la dozena.” 
58 Ibid.: “questy zorni el piper iera a montando a bruza a dì 18….” 
59 “Conto de ser Lorenzo Dolfin per 1/5 inssista de una conpagnia lui a con ser Zorzi Dolfin e fradelli al viazo 
da Londra. Capetano miser Larenzo Capolo asigna per mi Iachomo Dolfin fo de miser Franzesco.” Page 2: 
“Piper botte 5 de raxòn de ser Lorenzo Dolfin per 1/5 e ser Zorzi Dolfin per 4/5 die dar dy 4 avosto…”, Dolfin, 
Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Account, 20 September 1423.  20.09.1423, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [67]. This document is a complete account book (“libro 
di conti”) containing twenty pages, whereas the younger account is a single sheet, which confirms, in lesser 
detail, the observations drawn from the account book. This second account is: Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to 
Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Account, 1424.  01.03.1424, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 
3, f. [91].  
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sentative. Two of the five transactions listed on the first credit entry (“die aver”) of the said 
account book are barter transactions that exchanged pepper against Lowestoft wool (pani lo-
esti).60 Similar barter deals are listed concerning the exchange of ginger for loesti.61 
Although acting as a group of investors, Lorenzo and the Dolfin brothers kept separate ac-
counts and made a clear distinction between their respective capital shares. Giacomo Dolfin 
made his living as a family representative in London partly by retaining a commission pay-
ment of two percent of Lorenzo’s share of the total turnover, which occurs in all debit-side 
entries of the compagnia’s accounts.62 By contrast, since the Dolfin brothers kept a joint ac-
count and thus presumably acted as a fraterna, Giacomo did not receive additional commis-
sion payments from his siblings.  
The commercial relationship between Lorenzo and his cousins, and specifically between Lo-
renzo and Giacomo Dolfin, was thus, although partly grounded in family ties, guided by 
transaction-specific economic incentives. From Lorenzo’s perspective, the venture was a 
temporary instead of a long-term commercial commitment. Yet Lorenzo’s continuous com-
mercial cooperation with Giacomo Dolfin, his only relative among his Alexandria contacts, 
constitutes an early sign of the eventual significance of family relations in Lorenzo’s com-
mercial strategy.  
iii. Rise of the family 
The Nicolò Bernardo letters show that Lorenzo walked in the footsteps of his uncle Biagio in 
the early years after Biagio’s death. Lorenzo’s first steps in long-distance commerce were 
closely modeled on, but not unreservedly imitative of, Biagio’s business. Lorenzo was in-
volved in the export of European cloth to Alexandria, while acquiring Eastern spices, pri-
marily Mamluk pepper, for the Venetian, English, and Flanders markets. His papers do not, 
by contrast, reveal any gemstone-related transactions, which was Biagio Dolfin’s core busi-
ness while active in Alexandria. 
Yet the most striking fact about Lorenzo’s early Alexandria network is its congruence with 
Biagio’s commercial environment. While we can identify two new players who had not pre-
viously been part of Biagio Dolfin’s Alexandria circles (Michele Morosini and Giacomo 
 
60 Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Account, 20 September 1423.  20.09.1423, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [67], p. 3. 
61 E.g. ibid., p. 5: “dì 20 dito ave ser Piero Michiel botte 1 de zonzeri abarato de pani loesti…” 
62 E.g. ibid., p. 4: “e per provixion mesi per valor de lira 43 soldi 12 a do perzento lira (0) soldi 17 denari 6 tocha 
per 1/5 al dito: lira (0) soldi III denari 6.” 
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Dolfin), Lorenzo did not add any non-relatives to his uncle’s network. The key players in-
volved in Biagio Dolfin’s Alexandria business, primarily Nicolò Bernardo, his brother Pietro, 
and Angelo Michiel, all remained part of Lorenzo’s business circle in Egypt. This continuity 
reflects the fact that Lorenzo had been closely integrated into Biagio’s commercial activities 
and consequently had no incentives to change the partnership structure that was known to 
him as stable and trustworthy. More remarkable about the composition of Lorenzo’s Alexan-
dria network is the growing impact of his family environment as exemplified by the increas-
ing significance of Michele Gabriel and Giacomo Dolfin. Lorenzo gradually abandoned so-
cial affinity as a principle for selecting agents and partners in long-distance trade; instead, he 
began appreciating the family as a social institution with mutually reciprocal functions in the 
economic and personal spheres. Regardless of whether this reflects an intentional strategy or 
a chance development, the intensification of family-based commercial relations is evidently 
noticeable in Lorenzo’s business after Biagio’s death. How exactly did this occur? And which 
branches of the extensive Dolfin-Gabriel-Morosini clan were most prominently involved? 
B. Creating a Family Network  
During the five years between his uncle’s death and the beginning of his marriage to Gio-
vanetta Morosini, Lorenzo’s commerce focused on Alexandria before gradually encompass-
ing Flanders, London, and the Romania galley route. While Giacomo Dolfin qd. Francesco 
was the earliest link between Lorenzo’s Alexandria and London businesses, he had not partic-
ipated in Biagio Dolfin’s commerce.63 Instead, Giacomo and his brother Giorgio are repeat-
edly mentioned in the letters written to Lorenzo by his father-in-law Marino Morosini, which 
suggests a link to the Morosini circle.64 
i. Cognatic-matrilinear alliance: the Gabriel connection 
In addition to the alliances inherited from his paternal uncle Biagio, Lorenzo relied heavily 
on the support of his mother’s family after Biagio’s passing. His three maternal uncles Bene-
detto, Andrea, and Michele Gabriel qd. Nicolò all corresponded with him in commercial 
 
63 Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Account: Lorenzo Dolfin qd. Antonio, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [113].  
64 Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 04.10.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco 
(PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [55]; Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 
19.08.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [50]. 
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terms. Michele appears as the most infrequent interlocutor, as only one of his letters survives 
in Lorenzo’s archive. Andrea has four65 letters, one of which is addressed to his sister Cata-
ruccia, Lorenzo’s mother66 (another letter, which he wrote on behalf of his sister, can be 
found in the archive of Biagio Dolfin67; in addition, he is mentioned in seven other docu-
ments68). Three documents originate from Benedetto: one 1420 account of Lorenzo’s, which 
Benedetto had countersigned, and two letters, written in 1434 and 1436 from Sacile and Ven-
ice respectively. He is mentioned in eight additional documents.69 Benedetto Gabriel’s son 
Alvise acted as Lorenzo’s agent along the Beirut galley route, writing to Lorenzo from Acre 
among other places in the 1440s.70 His brother Girolamo wrote to Lorenzo from Damascus in 
1442.71 Alvise and Girolamo had two cousins, sons of their uncle Andrea: Nicolò Gabriel qd. 
Andrea repeatedly wrote to Lorenzo during Lorenzo’s residence in Padua (in 1435 and 
143672); his brother Angelo also corresponded with Lorenzo and countersigned two of Lo-
renzo’s accounts.73 
 
 
65 One of which is: Gabriel, Andrea qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Antonio qd. Lorenzo, 15.10.1426, ASVe, Procuratori 
di San Marco (Reinhold C. Mueller - Christie's Collection), Citra, b. 282-283. 
66 Letter Gabriel, Andrea qd. Nicolò to Dolfin née Gabriel, Catarucia, 24.02.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [47]. 
67 Letter Gabriel, Andrea qd. Nicolò, 11.11.1400, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (Psm 181), Commissarie 
miste, b. 181, fasc. 23, int. b, f. [1] (found by Georg Christ). 
68 Two of these are court files from the Giudici di Petizion: court file, 27 October 1423.  27.10.1423, ASVe, 
Giudici di Petizion (GdP S a G 34), Sentenze a giustizia, 34, f. 1r; court file, 18 May 1424.  18.05.1424, ASVe, 
Giudici di Petizion (GdP S a G 36), Sentenze a giustizia, 36 (both found by Georg Christ). 
69 Six of these are letters to Lorenzo written by Marino Morosini qd. Giovanni; the aforementioned marriage 
contract between Lorenzo and Marino’s daughter Giovanetta; and a contract with Nicolò Bernardo qd. 
Francesco. 
70 Letter Gabriel, Alvise to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 06.11.1445, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 
282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [75]. 
71 Letter Gabriel, Girolamo qd. Benedetto to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 010.1442, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [81]; Letter Gabriel, Girolamo qd. Benedetto to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. 
Antonio, 20.11.1442, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [73].  
72 See e.g. Dolfin, Piero qd. Domenico to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Receipt, 1 September 1435.  01.09.1435, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 3, f. [10]. 
73 Gabriel, Angelo qd. Andrea to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Account, 1435.  001435, ASVe, Procuratori di 
San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [15]; Gabriel, Angelo qd. Andrea to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: 
Account, 1435.  001435, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [15]. 
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FIGURE 3: PEDIGREE GABRIEL (DA SANTA MARIA MATER DOMINI) [= FIG. 2] 
Michele Gabriel wrote his only surviving letter from Damascus in 1421, when Lorenzo was 
closing his Alexandria accounts.74 He mentioned his meeting with Andrea di Sori in Rhodes 
while en route to Syria, who reportedly told him to have instructed (his agent) Angelo Mich-
iel qd. Luca to settle his outstanding debt with Lorenzo, presumably money owed to the de-
ceased Biagio.75 Michele’s brother Andrea Gabriel advised Lorenzo during Lorenzo’s tenure 
as camerario of Vicenza by keeping him informed about the Venetian cloth market and over-
seeing transactions on Lorenzo’s behalf.76 Andrea Gabriel was appointed bailo e capitano 
 
74 Letter Gabriel, Michele qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 22.10.1421, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [18]; Michele Gabriel’s compagnia is also mentioned in the two 
accounts signed by Nicolò Bernardo qd. Francesco. 
75 Ibid.: „Me trovi esser a Ruodo con ser Andrea di Sori e li fixi la vostra anbassida e di lì la so letera vuy man-
davi e si la domanda el vostro conto el per lo simel lovesto e dito me paga de parole e dise me che la ve dao orde 
in Alexandria a ser Agnelo Michiel chel i fose dado el so conto e i danari e din quinto e dito so fradelo no i ave-
se dadi che lo i scriveli al tuto per lo retorno de prexente galie o veramemte per le galie d’Alesandria el soldera-
ve el dito conto e manderave el conto e la moneda.” 
76 Letter Gabriel, Andrea qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Antonio qd. Lorenzo, 01.09.1426, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [42]. 
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(envoy and military governor) of Negroponte in 1431. He did not maintain commercial links 
to Lorenzo during this tenure, and the letter he wrote after his arrival in Negroponte was of 
purely personal content.77 Lastly, Benedetto Gabriel’s three surviving documents are all 
commerce-related, albeit in a narrative fashion that does not allude to common liabilities. In 
his letter to Lorenzo, Benedetto wrote about his arrival in Sacile and asked Lorenzo to inquire 
about bonds (imprestiti) and cloth (filadi) on his behalf without alluding to any direct com-
mercial relations between Lorenzo and himself.78 His recordatio to Lorenzo and his son-in-
law Pietro Contarini, by contrast, is of greater pertinence to family-related commerce.79 In 
this document, Benedetto informed Lorenzo and Pietro about his departure to Trebizond on 
the Romania galleys, where he had been appointed to the office of bailo, and instructed them 
to settle his affairs in Venice, which mainly consisted of collecting rents on houses and inter-
est payments from the camera degli imprestiti.80 One year later, Benedetto’s death was re-
ported in a letter from Lorenzo’s brother-in-law Giovanni Morosini.81 
Of the next generation of the Gabriel family, Alvise Gabriel qd. Benedetto appears as Lo-
renzo’s most frequent correspondent. Between 1443 and 1445, Alvise wrote to Lorenzo from 
Methoni, Beirut and Acre.82 His cousins Nicolò and Angelo Gabriel qd. Andrea wrote from 
Venice in 1435 and 1436. Their letters are mostly personal, although economic matters are 
also mentioned, such as the delay of a loan that Lorenzo was supposed to receive from his fa-
 
77 Letter Gabriel, Andrea qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.12.1431, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [37].  
78 Letter Gabriel, Benedetto qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 20.02.1434, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [59]. 
79 Gabriel, Benedetto qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Recordatio, 22 July 1436.  22.07.1436, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [9].  
80 Ibid.: “Rechordaxiòn a vuy ser Lorenzo Dolfin fo de ser Antonio e a vuy ser Pietro Contarini mio zènero fazo 
my Bendeto Gabriel consòzia che me ne vada con queste galie bailo in Trabexonda e a vuy priego ch’el ve 
piaqui azetar queste mie fazende chomo qui soto e notadi et mandarle a sechuziòn fina el piaxera a Christo e sia 
tornado de qua.” 
81 Letter Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 22.11.1437, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [32]: “…ve siano ricomandati de la morte de miser Benedeto vostro Barba 
molte me ne rechresse. Priego miser domino dio habii miserricordia de l’anema soa.” 
82 There is also one undated ‘memoria’ contained in the Commissaria of Biagio Dolfin: Gabriel, Alvise qd. 
Benedetto to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (Psm 181), Commissarie miste, b. 
181, fasc. 15, int. g, f. [4]. 
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ther-in-law.83 Angelo acted as caretaker of Lorenzo’s property during Lorenzo’s residence in 
Padua.84 
Although not indicating a concrete commercial partnership, the letters of Alvise Gabriel qd. 
Benedetto nevertheless contain commerce-related information. His letter from Methoni, in-
tended to inform Lorenzo about his arrival in the Peloponnese city, provides Methoni prices 
of pepper and other goods after conveying particular regards to Giorgio Loredan qd. Marco, 
the husband of Lorenzo’s aunt Maria Loredan née Gabriel.85 In his Beirut letter, Alvise con-
veyed personal matters for the most part.86 The letter from Acre is preserved in two identical 
versions.87 Again, it does not reveal a concrete commercial relationship between Lorenzo and 
Alvise. Although Alvise evidently travelled to the Near East for commercial purposes, the 
letter mostly reads like a personal document, with Alvise informing his cousin about his arri-
val in Acre (coming from Beirut) and asking him to intervene on his behalf in a matter of per-
sonal debt. He describes his attempts to purchase cotton (gottoni), but there is no indication 
of Lorenzo’s involvement in these transactions. 
Lorenzo’s relationship to his maternal family differed from the relationship that his uncle and 
mentor Biagio had experienced with the relatives of his mother, Maria Malipiero. While Lo-
renzo also enjoyed beneficial bonds to his maternal relatives not least with respect to his mer-
cantile education, Biagio Dolfin’s commercial experiences with his maternal family were less 
positive than those of his nephew. An early gem trade compagnia operating from 1396 to 
1398 that had linked Biagio to Perazio Malipiero, then bailo in Cyprus, sold gemstones to the 
 
83 Letter Gabriel, Nicolò qd. Andrea to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 06.08.1435, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [63]: “El me dito mio barba che ve dieba avixar che de inprestedi che vostro 
suoxero ve doveva far schriver el non que a fato nienti perché le sta aveder. Anchora dixe che de la quarta 
percento de i governadori la non è sta scr<i>eta el dito sta arnievar e de tuti sani…” 
84 Letter Gabriel, Angelo qd. Andrea to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 24.07.1435, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [61].  
85 Letter Gabriel, Alvise qd. Benedetto to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 27.02.1443, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [13].  
86 Letter Gabriel, Alvise qd. Benedetto to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 18.01.1444, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [77]. 
87 Both of which bear traces of a seal and were received by Lorenzo – thus, they are two originals, not one copy 
of an original: letter Gabriel, Alvise qd. Benedetto to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 06.01445, ASVe, Procuratori 
di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [76]; letter Gabriel, Alvise qd. Benedetto to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 
06.11.1445, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [75]. 
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Lusignan king of Cyprus among others.88 After the compagnia’s dissolution, Biagio directed 
claims against Perazio Malipiero’s heirs, which they refuted. The matter eventually had to be 
settled in court.89 Lorenzo Dolfin was spared such moments of discontent, possibly because 
he chose not to deepen the commercial relationship with his maternal family during his senior 
career. While he evidently received advice and practical support from his maternal uncles 
during his early commercial activities, his relationship with the younger generation of the 
Gabriel family appears to have been intense and cordial but not generally induced by specific 
commercial matters. A possible exception was Girolamo Gabriel qd. Benedetto, whose Da-
mascus letters contain very specific information about the Syrian markets and thus document 
Lorenzo’s continued commercial activity in Syria in the 1440s in addition to the Romania 
galley route.90 Although Girolamo did not report on specific transactions, he appears as a 
market insider who could potentially be instructed by Lorenzo. Girolamo’s example buttress-
es the notion of the extended patrician family as a loose network of potential commercial 
partners who could be included into actual commercial coalitions when needed. Girolamo’s 
residence in Syria made him a valuable interlocutor for Lorenzo and other members of his 
commercial coalition, potentially creating opportunities for cooperation in both the political 
and economic spheres on the basis of sound intra-family relations.  
C. Family and Politics 
The political system of the Venetian Republic was a de facto – with the first closing of the 
Great Council ‘in 1297’ arguably de iure – self-sustaining oligarchy of patrician families.91 It 
was self-sustaining in the sense that all political decisions had to be weighed against the 
 
88 Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 97-98. 
89 Ibid. 
90 The October letter, listing in particular Syrian prices for pepper and a variety of spices, is particularly 
revealing in this respect (Gabriel, Girolamo qd. Benedetto to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 010.1442, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [81]). 
91 The Serrata of the Great Council, which according to the ‘myth’ of Venice was the last cornerstone in the 
creation of the Republic, was essentially “the product of a debate that lasted from 1286 to 1323 and […] resulted 
in a complete change in the procedures for admission to the council that clearly defined who was eligible for the 
council and thus who belonged to the Venetian nobility” (Rösch, Gerhard: "The Serrata of the Great Council 
and Venetian Society, 1286-1323", in: Martin, John Jeffries, Romano, Dennis (eds.), Venice Reconsidered - The 
History and Civilization of an Italian City-State, 1297-1797, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2000, pp. 67-88, [p. 70]). The notion of the closing of the council as a single legislative act that supposedly 
occurred in 1297 is thus misleading according to current scholarly understanding. 
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commercial interests of the patrician class, and the patriciate’s resulting monetary gains were 
used to cement the exclusivity of political access.92 With respect to the systemic links be-
tween Venetian politics, commerce, and the patrician family, some studies have downplayed 
the role of family relations especially in the political sphere by pointing to the intricate Vene-
tian system of political and economic institutions designed to limit the hegemony of single 
patrician families.93 Yet, numerous state policies were designed to further the career pro-
spects of young patricians in various ways. Lorenzo Dolfin’s experience as a commercial ap-
prentice was to a considerable degree enabled by the state, as had been the early career of his 
uncle Biagio. Both Biagio and Lorenzo, lacking the extraordinary wealth of other young pa-
tricians, likely made their first journey to Alexandria as balestriere della popa,94 an office 
that allowed young nobles to serve on the galleys in return for cargo rights.95 In all likelihood, 
Lorenzo Dolfin travelled on the galley of Nicolò Bernardo qd. Francesco in this capacity. 
Following his return to Venice, Lorenzo learned the practicalities of the civil service as a ju-
dicial trainee in the Republic’s commercial courts before being promoted to more senior ad-
ministrative positions in Vicenza and Capodistria.96 
However, it is less evident how unified the law-making class was in their economic pursues, 
and the Dolfin sources provide ambiguous evidence on this matter. Like his uncle Biagio, Lo-
renzo Dolfin held official positions during his senior years, but he also travelled less fre-
quently to the destinations of his trade. After his return from Vicenza, he continued to instruct 
his trade representatives from Venice.97 The differences between Biagio’s and Lorenzo’s 
 
92 Romano, Dennis: Patricians and Popolani: The Social Foundations of the Venetian Renaissance State, 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987, esp. pp. 41-50, 152-158. 
93 This, in return, increased intra-class solidarity among patricians, see Chojnacki, Kinship Ties; Crouzet-Pavan, 
Elisabeth: Sopra le acque salse: espaces, pouvoir et société à Venise à la fin du moyen âge, Rome: Ecole 
française de Rome, 1992. 
94 Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 96. 
95 Chojnacki, Stanley: "Measuring Adulthood: Adolescence and Gender in Renaissance Venice", in: Journal of 
Family History 17 (Oct., 1992), No. 4, pp. 371-395; Stöckly: Le système de l'incanto, p. 285; Andrea Barbarigo 
also served in this capacity, see Lane: Andrea Barbarigo, pp. 17-18. 
96 Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 98. 
97 It is not possible to date Lorenzo’s term as camerlengho in Capodistria on on the basis of the Dolfin papers, as 
the only evidence on his term as camerlengho is an undated letter: Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [64]: (verso) “Al lo nobele e savio miser Lorenzo 
Dolfin onorado chamerlongo de chanodestria detur.” Yet the registers of the Segretario Voci list him as “Conte 
di Pola” for the year 1445 (ASVe, Segretario Voci, b. 4, f. 66;  “Rulers of Venice” database, 
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long-term commercial strategies show that commercial interests could differ more or less 
strongly even among close relatives and despite similar levels of affluence and mercantile 
education. This evokes the question of whether the political oligarchy of the patriciate pro-
nounced itself as a homogenous social force in the economic sphere, which can be addressed 
by considering, first, the significance of specialisation in commerce as exemplified by de-
grees of agent specialisation within commercial networks, as well as sector specialisation; 
second, degrees of specialisation observable in the networks of Biagio and Lorenzo Dolfin 
provide a platform from which to approach the problem of the endogeneity of commercial 
law with respect to the commercial strategies of patrician merchants – that is, the extent to 
which Venetian legislation was influenced by the patrician commercial class as a whole and 
consequently should not be treated as an exogenous determinant with respect to long-distance 
commerce, but rather as a mitigating factor in the political process. By contrast, a greater de-
gree of specialisation within commercial networks would indicate a greater diversity in indi-
vidual commercial strategies and thus a greater degree of political heterogeneity within the 
commercial patriciate. The question of political heterogeneity in turn has important implica-
tions for the role of commercial law in the evolution of business units: if the political class 
was identical to the commercial class, and if the law was thus endogenous with respect to the 
transactional dispositions of long-distance trade, what, then, was the actual driver of institu-
tional change? 
The Eastern spice trade was a common element of both Biagio and Lorenzo Dolfin’s com-
mercial orientations. In Alexandria, from where Biagio and Lorenzo received the bulk of 
their goods, the pepper trade was strictly regulated by the Mamluk authorities. Official trade 
agreements between Venice and the Mamluk Sultanate contractually98 obliged the Republic 
to purchase specific quantities of pepper, which were transported on the Alexandria galleys 
and therefore open to investments from individual patrician merchants. The price of the ‘sul-
tan’s pepper’ was fixed arbitrarily above market equilibrium.99 Biagio sold pepper in Venice, 
whereas Lorenzo mostly sent his spices to Bruges and London.100 For both of them, the spice 
trade was an important means of raising revenues for their core businesses. The public-order 
institutional framework of the Venetian spice trade thus channelled business activity while 
 
http://rulersofvenice.org/main). In his senior years, Lorenzo held duties as Provveditore di Comun in Venice, as 
well as a member of the Auditori Vecchi and the Consiglio dei Rogati (ibid., also see chapter V). 
98 The agreements were technically not based on contracts, but on decrees issued by the sultan. 
99 Christ: Trading Conflicts, pp. 244-245. 
100 See lists of goods for Bruges and London in b. 282, discussed below (VI.A). 
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providing transactional security: patrician merchants chose to engage in sectors of trade that 
were strategically significant to the Republic as those in turn provided the most secure envi-
ronments in terms of information and logistics.  
Yet it remains an open question whether public-order institutions such as state-level trade 
agreements and fixed galley routes really served the interests of the commercial patriciate as 
a whole or whether patrician commercial strategies had become too diverse by the early fif-
teenth century to account for a single political category. Strategies of business diversification 
often evolved over many generations of commerce-oriented patrician families, which makes 
it difficult to assess degrees and purposes of specialisation at specific points in time. Lorenzo 
Dolfin was more specific in his commercial pursuits in comparison to his uncle Biagio, fo-
cusing on the cloth trade while Biagio maintained more diversified portfolios consisting of 
gemstones, cloth, wine and Eastern silk. This difference in commercial strategy may well 
have resulted from shifts in exogenous factors (e.g. demographic and climatic change, alter-
ing consumption patterns especially with respect to Eastern goods etc.) in which case the stra-
tegic reorientation of the Dolfin network would be representative of a general development.  
With respect to the dynamics of long-distance trade, an exogenous factor is any variable that 
cannot be directly influenced by the involved actors. Later medieval trade was not con-
strained solely by political hurdles and cultural barriers. Insufficient technological support to 
agriculture, manufacturing, and transport logistics meant that factors as diverse as droughts, 
political instabilities, and pandemics could bring about sudden shifts in demand and thus se-
verely affect overall market conditions.101 
 
Although the multidimensionality of formal institutional arrangements responded to a variety 
of patrician economic interests and thus may have occasionally impeded collective action in 
commercial affairs,102 trade policies were ultimately determined by the Venetian authorities 
(Ducal office, Senate and Council of Ten), which limited the scope of action of the Venetian 
commercial diaspora.103 Venetian consulates such as in Alexandria, which served as a politi-
 
101 Ashtor: Levant Trade, pp. 271f.; Cipolla: Before the industrial revolution, pp. 3-49; Id., Economic 
Depression. 
102 Law, John E.: "The Venetian Mainland State in the Fifteenth Century", in: Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society (Sixth Series) 2 (Dec., 1992), pp. 153-174; also Woolf, S. J.: "Venice and the Terraferma - 
Problems of the Change from Commercial to Landed Activities", in: Pullan, Brian (ed.), Crisis and Change in 
the Venetian Economy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, Abingdon: Routledge 2006, pp. 175-203. 
103 Christ: Trading Conflicts, pp. 67-77. 
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cal link to the Mamluk authorities and was mandated to intervene in favour of Venetian mer-
chants on various grounds, were financed through a specific tax levied at Venetians active 
abroad. This tax, the cottimo, was a means of generating state revenues in the interest of a 
portion of the ruling class.104 The costs of maintaining commercial links to the Mamluk Sul-
tanate were thus paid, at least officially, by the commercial elites who profited from their ex-
istence, not by the commercial class as a whole (similarly, the state galleys were to a large 
part financed by private investors besides state subsidies and the costs of construction, which 
were borne by the government).105 Similar arrangements existed in Venetian outposts along 
the Romania route.106 Yet, the consulates and their governing bodies, the Councils of Twelve, 
were answerable to (although only in rare cases directly appointed by) the Republic’s central 
authorities, and their investiture occurred in accordance with the Republic’s general econom-
ic needs for stable trade relations in strategically significant regions.107 Life in the diaspora 
sometimes necessitated a flexible interpretation of the Republican mandate, which would 
manifest itself, for instance, in the inclusion of non-patricians to the Council of Twelve108 and 
even in the deliberate circumvention of governmental directives.109 However, such deviations 
from central directives mostly remained restricted to specific circumstances. Similarly, the 
emergence of a patrician sphere of landowners amidst the fifteenth-century Venetian territo-
rial enlargement in the Veneto and Lombardy regions created new economic priorities but did 
little to diversify patrician politics as a whole.110  
 
104 Ibid., p. 77; Ashtor: Levant Trade, p. 401. 
105 For free-riding, see Christ: Passagers clandestins? 
106 Brown, Horatio F.: "The Venetians and the Venetian Quarter in Constantinople to the Close of the Twelfth 
Century", in: The Journal of Hellenic Studies 40 (1920), No. 1, pp. 68-88; Dursteler, Eric: Venetians in 
Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean, Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2006, pp. 81-87; Lane: Venice, p. 348. 
107 Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 70 etc., 317-327. 
108 Ibid., p. 70. 
109 These appear as “contra le ordene di Venezia” in the Venetian sources (see e.g. letter reproduced in appendix 
B.4).  
110 See chapter II.B; the political subjugation of the Venetian terraferma was not paralleled by a deepening of 
economic integration. Instead, the Veneto region continued to consist of separate urban economies of which 
Venice itself came first in significance and size.  Lanaro, Paola: "At the Centre of the Old World – 
Reinterpreting Venetian Economic History", in: id. (ed.), At the Center of the Old World: Trade and 
Manufacturing in Venice and the Venetian Mainland, 1400-1800, Toronto: CRRS, 2006, pp. 19-72. 
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If legal change alone cannot account for the evolution of trade institutions while exogenous 
factors are too random to explain the coherent gradual development of commercial practices 
observable in Venetian trade history, a solution is needed that takes account of both structural 
layers in a single explanatory framework. Explanations evoking endogenous institutional 
change are unsatisfactory since the incentives by which Venetian lawmakers arranged the 
trade-institutional landscape must have been related to the practical experiences of patrician 
merchants active in long-distance trade, which in turn were mostly subject to factors outside 
the Republic’s legislative control.111 The required explanatory synthesis must therefore en-
compass both the collective incentive structure of patrician lawmakers and the private-order 
institutional mechanisms that enabled patrician merchants to cope with (and to hedge against) 
exogenous factors affecting long-distance trade. This puts the analytical focus back on the pa-
trician family as the basic component of the law-making class. While the micro-historical ap-
proach provides unambiguous perspectives on individual motivations in the commercial 
sphere, our sources also contain evidence on inter-clan dynamics that derive their economic 
significance from the operational dimension of the patrician family.112 Thus, understanding 
the social manifestations of individual and family-level strategic incentives allows for extrap-
olating the collective incentive structure of the (patrician) commercial sphere and the prevail-
ing coping mechanisms beyond the legal framework. 
Lorenzo Dolfin maintained close social ties to both consanguineous and affinal kin, thus cre-
ating a network of intra- and inter-clan components. These relationships encompassed three 
main branches of Lorenzo’s maternal, paternal and affinal families. As for the maternal 
branch, Lorenzo also corresponded with the notary Francesco Querini of Candia113 in addi-
tion to his uncles Benedetto, Andrea, and Michele Gabriel and their children (Alvise Gabriel 
qd. Benedetto, Angelo and Nicolò Gabriel qd. Andrea).114 Lorenzo was linked to the Querini 
family through the marriage of his maternal aunt Aloisa (Gabriel) to Marco Querini, as stated 
 
111 There are, however, generally satisfactory theories of endogenous institutional change applicable in other 
historical contexts. See for instance Greif, A., Laitin, D.D.: "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change", in: 
American Political Science Review 98 (2004), No. 4, pp. 633-652. 
112 See chapter III.B. 
113 Francesco addressed Lorenzo as “fradello e chugnado”: letter Querini, Francesco qd. Fantino to Dolfin, 
Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 19.09.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [54]. 
114 The testament of Nicolò Gabriel mentions two daughters, Cataruccia and Aloisa, and four sons, Benedetto, 
Andrea, Michele, and Silvestro; the same Commissaria also mentions a procurator, Andrea Gabriel qd. 
Benedetto, who may have been a son of Benedetto Gabriel qd. Nicolò. 
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in the testament of Lorenzo’s maternal grandfather Nicolò Gabriel qd. Andrea.115 Yet Lo-
renzo’s links to his paternal and affinal families were of greater significance, since his per-
sonal commercial network was dominated by individuals from these branches. This eventual-
ly led to the creation of the Dolfin-Morosini trade coalition.116 Thus, the close commercial 
cooperation between Lorenzo and his agnatic and affinal kin is indicative of both the political 
dimension of individual incentives and intra-clan dynamics in long-distance trade. 
i. Consanguineous, agnatic family: Dolfin  
Francesco Dolfin was the son of Giovanni Dolfin and the grandson of Gregorio Dolfin, 
whom Marco Barbaro described as “the richest Dolfin” (“il più ricco della famiglia Dolfi-
no”).117 Both Giovanni’s and Francesco’s brothers remained childless and hence Gregorio’s 
wealth remained undiminished when inherited by Giacomo, Giorgio, Vettore, and three addi-
tional brothers, Orso, Nicolò and Giovanni (as shown in the following chapter, Nicolò also 
cooperated commercially with Lorenzo in the Romania trade as did Giovanni Dolfin, the son 
of Giacomo).118 Their wealth was an obvious motivation for commercial cooperation, but 
their precise relation to Lorenzo, and hence the foundations of their partnership in terms of a 
priori-existing mutual insurances against deviation, do not clearly emerge from Lorenzo’s 
papers.119 Yet it appears that the descendants of Gregorio Dolfin exerted greater political in-
fluence than Lorenzo Dolfin’s immediate paternal family. In 1417, Giacomo Dolfin qd. Fran-
cesco was voted into the Republic’s Great Council at a young age, and their branch of the 
Dolfin family produced significant figures such as Giorgio Dolfin, the archbishop of Corfù 
until 1428.120 By contrast, there is no evidence for Lorenzo Dolfin’s early presence in the 
Great Council, although his service in the financial administration of the Venetian Republic 
also generated a certain prestige.  
 
115 ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Ultra, b. 137, Testamento Nicolò Gabriel. 
116 See chapter V.B. 
117 ASVe, Alberi genealogici, M. Barbaro, Alberi, III.13 (Diedo-Donado), p. 291. 
118 As listed in Barbaro’s genealogical tree, see ibid.; however, since Orso and Giovanni Dolfin qd. Francesco 
do not appear in the correspondence, it is possible that they are wrongly listed as children of Francesco Dolfin in 
Barbaro’s genealogy. 
119 Barbaro’s genealogy omits Lorenzo Dolfin and his ancestors; yet their addressing of Lorenzo as “fradello” 
suggests a close consanguineous rather than an affinal link 
120 See chapter III; also: letter Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 001425, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [40]. 
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FIGURE 4: PEDIGREE DOLFIN (DA SANT’ANZOLO) 
The letters written by Giacomo Dolfin qd. Francesco – according to the surviving record Lo-
renzo’s most frequent correspondent from this branch of the Dolfin family – indicate that the 
compagnia he and his brothers maintained with Lorenzo operated within a wider network of 
personal relationships. A number of these individuals are frequently mentioned in both per-
sonal and trade-related contexts, and the fact that many of these collaborators stem from the 
Dolfin family environment supports the notion that family relations could be constitutive 
even for contractually specified forms of commercial cooperation such as a compagnia. 
Among them are Antonio Contarini qd. Marino, the husband of Lorenzo’s sister-in-law Elis-
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abetta Morosini121; one Francesco Morosini, who acted as the compagnia’s agent in Trebi-
zond122; and non-kin individuals such as a certain Polo Corner and one Polo Foscari123, as 
well as Ludovico Contarini, a ship captain who transported the compagnia’s cargo between 
the ports of Constantinople, Bursa and Trebizond.124 
 Yet regardless of the precise degree of kinship that linked the sons of Francesco 
Dolfin to Lorenzo, their branch of the Dolfin family was well-connected to Lorenzo’s affinal 
 
121 E.g. letter Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 01.08.1425, ASVe, Procuratori di 
San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [39]: “….conforta Antonio Contarini e i altri nostri per parte mia…” 
122 Letter Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 001425, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [40]: „Anchor ho mandado bale do de nostri bastardi in Trabexonda iqual 
ho dadi a ser Franzesco Morexini che va de lì con questa galie. In le dite due bale sie pani 13 de la conpagnia e 
pani 3 de raxòn de Zorzi Dolfin e fradeli.” 
123 Corner’s and Foscari’s relations to the Dolfin and Morosini families are not discussed at length in Giacomo’s 
letters; while a direct involvement in Giacomo’s and Lorenzo’s commercial affairs is not mentioned, they 
appear to have been part of a wider patrician circle of mutual commitment. Giacomo describes Polo Corner as 
his “companion”, who held an influential position in the stato da mar, possibly that of capitano of Zadar (see 
Capuzzo, E., Crevato-Selvaggi, B., Guida, F. (eds.): Per Rita Tolomeo, scritti di amici sulla Dalmazia e 
l’Europa centro-orientale, Venice: La Musa Talìa Editrice 2014, p. 155), while at one point expressing doubts 
over his standing in the signoria: “Anchor me a rechordadi die fornissa Zaneta de la sua tela vi dicho quela o 
fornida ma io che la mostra e se quela non i piaxera lasa a mi. E diteli che la re<n>grazio del suo conforto 
rendado al […] l’ofizio de mio conparo Polo Corner mi piaxe e quaxio che me despiaxe perché dubito hora lui 
ha in signoria non cura de i altri me conforto non ne non ma per tenpo voio pur me fadi una grazia che li dite 
gramarze per mia parte de le letere lui me a scrito el simele a ser Polo Foscari ben che per mia fede a fato bene 
considerando el molto scriver ho de qui a voiudo scansarmi un pocho de afano ma pur mile saluti a cadaùn de 
loro. E plui dite a Polo Corner ch’el se dia over de questo suo ofizio de avanzar tanto ch’el se possy far una 
vesta ora ch’el vien in mar. Altra resposta non mi par sia de bexogno a la vostra” (ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [40]). Polo Foscari’s only surviving letter to Lorenzo provides equally 
interesting insights into the realities of political patronage in the aftermath of the Venetian territorial expansion 
in the early fifteenth century. Foscari asks Lorenzo to consider hiring a close friend (“uno mio intimo amigo”) as 
advisor in case he will be appointed to a podesta position. While the person in question is not specified by name, 
he is described as “very honorouble” ("el dito ne avere onore"), and Foscari hints at returning the favour in the 
future: “Quello fari al lui reputerò lo fazadi a mi” (letter Foscari, Polo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 
23.04.1422, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [17]). 
124 Letter Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 001425, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [40]: „Per aver raxiòn vui possa aver denari al tenpo de nadal ve mandai 
zoxo per la nave ser Lodovigo Contarini.”  
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family, which became Lorenzo’s main platform for intra-family wealth aggregation.125 The 
interaction between this Dolfin branch, Lorenzo, and Lorenzo’s affinal family was continued 
in the next generation with the inclusion of Giacomo’s sons Dolfino, Mattia, and Giovanni 
into the Dolfin-Morosini commercial coalition. Individual incentives for creating and main-
taining this commercial arrangement on the basis of agnatic kinship were thus broadly similar 
for both sides. While the sons of Francesco Dolfin sought to enlarge the capital stock of their 
fraterna, Lorenzo himself benefited to an even larger extent from the collaboration with his 
wealthier cousins. In return, the venture was enhanced by including Lorenzo’s personal 
commercial network, as exemplified by the compagnia’s employment of Girolamo Bragadin 
qd. Andrea as their agent in London.126 Both Lorenzo and his cousins were incentivised to 
strengthen intra-family collaboration, thus creating investment opportunities for themselves 
and the following generation, and to increase the (extended) family’s reputation in the com-
mercial and ultimately the political spheres. The eventually emerging links between the com-
pagnia Dolfin and the wider Dolfin-Morosini clan may be taken as a further sign of a strate-
gic integration of agnatic kin-based commercial cooperation into a wider cross-family 
framework sustained by affinal ties. 
 
125 Giacomo Dolfin qd. Francesco is mentioned in Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. 
Antonio, 13.01.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (Reinhold C. Mueller - Christie's Collection), Citra, b. 
282-283; Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.12.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [56]. Giorgio Dolfin qd. Francesco is also mentioned in Marino Morosini’s letter 
from 10 December 1427 as well as in Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 
19.08.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [50]. The latter document demonstrates 
the significance of Lorenzo’s affinal family, and his father-in-law in particular, in constructing a family-based 
system of mutual obligations: for example, they served as a link between Lorenzo and his London agent 
Girolamo Bragadin qd. Andrea (see V.A, “chomo he vezo miser Jerolimo hi darò di danari che tu na ha gran 
bexogno”) and administered Lorenzo’s real estate in Venice (fasc. 3, f. [50]: “La caxeta non he ancora afitada ho 
mandado pluy fiade a recordarilo penso la tora el zenaro de dona Franzeschina ma la dixe che la piove tuta et 
che la voria asser coverta se la non fose coverta non la torave el marer conza como tu hordenasti l’albercheto de 
femene de la caxa granda hera molto marzio el tolse del la guama de caxa e de la calzina vechia hera in caxa et 
ha molto ben conzado per quelo el me ha dito et non ha spexo alguna cossa salvo quelo che tu festi conprar 
avanti el to partir et ha lavorado in tuto dì 3”). Giorgio Dolfin is mentioned as a debtor to Lorenzo (“da puo che 
tute de quy che non ho vezudo mai ser Ziorzi Quexini Dolfin como el vederò hi arecorderò chel me dia quei 
danari che tu me dixesti chel me darave”). 
126 See V.A. 
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ii. Affinal family: Morosini 
Lorenzo married Giovanetta Morosini in 1425, and the marriage lasted until Giovanetta’s 
death in 1444.127 The marriage remained childless, and Lorenzo did not remarry after Gio-
vanetta’s passing. The nuclear family of Giovanetta Morosini became Lorenzo Dolfin’s clos-
est family environment both personally and commercially. Lorenzo frequently corresponded 
with his father-in-law Marino Morosini qd. Giovanni in the early years of his marriage to 
Giovanetta, which coincided with his spell as camerario in Vicenza. He also corresponded 
with his brothers-in-law Michele, Pietro, and Giovanni Morosini qd. Marino, maintaining a 
particularly close commercial relationship to Giovanni, who resided in Constantinople from 
the late 1430s onwards. In addition, the spouses of Giovanetta’s sisters Elisabetta and Mo-
resina, Antonio Contarini and Polo Pisani, eventually became part of the Dolfin-Morosini 
trade coalition.128 Marino Morosini also had a brother, Andrea Morosini qd. Giovanni, whose 
name appears on a cargo list in the Commissaria Biagio Dolfin.129 Andrea’s son, Tommaso, 
later became an envoy of the Venetian Republic.130 However, there remains no evidence of 
any direct contact between Lorenzo and Andrea Morosini or his son. 
 
 
127 See letter of condolence, Giorgio qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 30.05.1444, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [79].  
128 See V.B; Antonio Contarini and his wife Elisabetta née Morosini resided in Constantinople from the 1430s: 
“El non mi resta altro piasavi confortar asai mia cugnada et a mon suosero vi ricomando Isabeta e per lo simel a 
mia cugnada son presto a vui piaseri” (Contarini, Antonio qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 
15.10.1432, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [31]). Moresina Pisani née Morosini 
is mentioned in Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin née Morosini, Zaneta: Account, 1 August 1437.  
01.08.1437, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 3, f. [8]: “…2 persone che non vol eser 
mento<n>ade contrascrite die dar a dì 7 marzo 1445 per Zaneta Dolfin xè che mi Lorenzo Dolfin quondam 
miser Antonio ho dado contadi in questo dì per nome di la dita Zaneta a Morexina Pixiani sorela di la dita 
Zaneta ducati 2…” Moresina’s marriage to Polo Pisani emerges from the letters written by Lorenzo’s brothers-
in-law, e.g. Morosini, Pietro qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 19.10.1443, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [13]: “…miser Polo Pixani nostro chugnado…” 
129 Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo: Cargo list 1418 aus Alexandria.  001418, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, 
Commissarie miste.  
130 Tommaso Morosini qd. Andrea is mentioned in a letter from Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin, 
Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 28.09.1442, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [22]. 
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FIGURE 5: PEDIGREE MOROSINI (DA SAN ZANINOVO) 
Although mainly based in Venice, the extended Morosini family that Lorenzo espoused was 
strongly present along the Romania trade route. They were active in the Black Sea trade and 
partly resided in the Venetian quarter of Constantinople.131 Lorenzo’s commissaria contains 
eighteen documents produced by Marino Morosini between 1426 and 1443.132 There are ten 
documents produced by Giovanni Morosini, written in Constantinople, Koroni, and Venice 
between 1437 and 1443,133 and four letters from Pietro Morosini, written in Constantinople, 
Bursa and Caffa in 1442 and 1443.134 Michele Morosini, who resided in London, has the 
 
131 See V.A. 
132 The first of these letters is Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.06.1426, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [93]; the last is Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to 
Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.06.1426, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [93]. 
133 First: letter Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.06.1426, ASVe, Procuratori 
di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [93]; last: letter Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. 
Antonio, 10.06.1426, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [93]. 
134 First: letter Morosini, Pietro qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 01.07.1442, ASVe, Procuratori di 
San Marco (Reinhold C. Mueller - Christie's Collection), Citra, b. 282-283; last: letter Morosini, Pietro qd. 
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greatest number of surviving letters. In total, there are twenty-seven letters, all of which were 
written in London between 1441 and 1446.135 
Lorenzo, having quickly integrated his affinal relatives into his relevant family environment, 
soon took on similar social duties vis-à-vis the Morosini as was generally common among pa-
trician peers. Their relationship thus confirms the notion of the (extended) patrician family as 
a system of socialisation in which mercantile values and skills were passed on to young patri-
cians by their more senior relatives. Mercantile education was as much a family as a state 
matter, and Lorenzo accordingly acted as a mentor to his more junior brothers-in-law. In his 
first letter from Constantinople, Giovanni Morosini, presumably the oldest son of Marino 
Morosini, addressed Lorenzo as “honorado chugnado amado quanto padre”.136 In the same 
letter, Giovanni reflected on the state of the mercantile sphere and the career opportunities of 
his adolescent brothers. While asserting that Pietro “will never become a sailor”, Giovanni 
saw greater commercial talent in his second brother Michele and asked Lorenzo to guide him 
in his mercantile education.137 
Giovanni Morosini, who was active as a merchant in Constantinople, left instructions to Lo-
renzo before embarking on the Romania galleys in 1437 and 1439.138 Marino Morosini began 
 
Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 19.10.1443, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 
4, f. [13]. 
135 First: letter Morosini, Pietro qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 19.10.1443, ASVe, Procuratori di 
San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [13]; last: letter Morosini, Michele qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. 
Antonio, 07.01.1446, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [57]. 
136 Letter Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 22.11.1437, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [32].  
137 Ibid.: “E pratiche del mondo che vedo inchieto che l'omo che volia eser merchandante s'el non son praticho. 
Infati de marchandantia el se puol spender per niente siché biato [...]. Ve priego charamente che faze che Piero 
et Michiel non se perda chome ho fato mi et che la debiate far intrar in quel per bon esertizio. Non credo che 
Piero se pora mai far in Veniexa ma Michiel si ben siché fate el navigi chome son zerto che questo ve dicho el 
cognosete melio ch'a mi. Anchor ve dicho che in que stato non debiate ... dar al dir de miser mio padre ese 
varderete al so dir Piero non navegera mai s'el no avera l'anena apresso et fate che Michiel s'el non va piui a 
schuola che l'inprenda ben l’abacho et che l'atenda a ser Antonio nostro chugnado s'el dito avera bexogno di fati 
suo. Ve arechordo que sto perché son zerto el non hi mancherà zoveni.” Also see letter Morosini, Giovanni qd. 
Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 27.12.1437, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 
2, f. [30].  
138 Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Recordatio, 8 August 1437.  08.08.1437, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [6]; Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, 
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corresponding regularly with his son-in-law during the early years of Lorenzo’s marriage. 
This correspondence depicts the Morosini family as a commerce-oriented economic entity of 
which Lorenzo quickly became an integral part. In fact, his marriage to Giovanetta was 
grounded in previous commercial and personal ties that linked his extended family to the Mo-
rosini. His uncle Biagio had acted as fattore (agent) to Marco Morosini in Damascus in 
1404.139 Lorenzo’s maternal family was also linked to the Morosini. His uncle Benedetto Ga-
briel is mentioned in eight of Marino’s letters (of a total of thirteen letters), while Benedetto’s 
brother Andrea Gabriel is mentioned once.  
The commercial interdependence between Lorenzo Dolfin and his affinal family bears traits 
of a “general partnership” or societas.140 While his brothers-in-law lived abroad and took care 
of Lorenzo’s business interests at their respective places of residence, their own commercial 
pursuits in Venice were overseen by Lorenzo. A formal contractual basis was not required, 
and consequently there are no notarised documents that bear testament to their commercial 
relationship. The economic dimension of Lorenzo Dolfin’s affinal family relations even 
reached beyond matters of trade representation, as Lorenzo’s papers also document a system 
of family-internal credit. Marino Morosini issued two debt receipts to Giovanetta and Lo-
renzo, which document a loan of twenty-two gold ducats from Lorenzo141 and eighty ducats 
from Giovanetta.142 The informality of these documents is evident in both form and content. 
Both appear to have been written by Marino himself, and no witnesses are mentioned in the 
documents as was common with official loan contracts, notarial deeds or testaments.143 Sec-
ond, the modalities of the loans specify a personal service rather than a commercial transac-
tion. The receipt issued to Lorenzo merely contains four lines that confirm the loaned sum 
 
Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Declaration, 20 June 1439.  20.06.1439, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, 
fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [10].  
139 Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 96, 100. 
140 See chapter I.E; also Trivellato, Francesca: The Familiarity of Strangers - The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, 
and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009. 
141 Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Debt contract, 3 July 1441.  03.07.1441, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [17].  
142 Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin née Morosini, Zaneta: Declaration, 9 September 1443.  09.09.1443, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 3, f. [13].  
143 The hand of the two documents is identical, although the declaration to Giovanetta is of higher calligraphic 
quality. Marino confirms that he is the author of the document (see citation in following note). 
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and the debtor’s commitment to repay the loan at the creditor’s request.144 The receipt issued 
to Giovanetta, by contrast, specifies an accumulated debt. Marino confirms to have received 
eighty ducats tra oro e monede form his daughter on 1 August 1437, hence six years before 
the document was produced. The documents then lists a number of commodity sales that Ma-
rino performed on his daughter’s behalf between October 1437 and July 1443, which add up 
to 72 ducats and five grossi, leaving seven ducats and 19 grossi as debt to Giovanetta (1 gold 
ducat = 24 grossi).145 Thus neither Lorenzo nor Giovanetta gained from the loans in any di-
rect way, as no interests or loan premiums are mentioned. While in Venice’s “informal econ-
omy” unofficial documents like these were often used to stipulate hidden interests in circum-
vention of the Republic’s usury laws, the here documented arrangement depicts the patrician 
family as an economic entity in which individuals kept separate accounts while being able to 
enlarge their personal capital stock through flexible and unconditional support from their 
peers.146 This suggests that the wealth of Venetian patricians should be seen in the context of 
a family-internal system of mutual economic obligations and benefits: as all capital owned by 
individual family members could potentially be tapped by their relatives, individual wealth 
was a composite of the aggregated wealth of the patrician family. 
Another way of interpreting the observed family relations, especially in the context of eco-
nomic interdependencies, is to understand them as a family-based commercial coalition. This 
conception of intra-family relations is advantageous as it can account for the cooperation be-
 
144 Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Debt contract, 3 July 1441.  03.07.1441, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [17]: “Mi Marin Morexini fo de miser Zane ho 
rezevudo da ser Lorenzo Dolfin quondam miser Antonio mio zenaro ducati 22 d’oro per inprestedo e deboi 
render ad ogni suo bon piaxer.” 
145 Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin née Morosini, Zaneta: Declaration, 9 September 1443.  09.09.1443, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 3, f. [13]: “In tuto lo amontar dele soradite cose 
vendude ducati 72 grossi 5. Iqual dener io abato dele soraditi ducati 80. Resta ducati 8 grossi 19. E per tanto mi 
Marin Morexini si confeso e si me chiamo debitor de la dita Zaneta mia fia dele diti ducati 7 grossi 19 iqual son 
per resto de soraditi ducati 80. Iqual ducati 7 grossi 19 io promesso de dar e pagar a la dita Zaneta a ogni suo 
bon piaxer. E per chiareza de la dita mia fia e dele cose in questo prestate scrito notade ho scrito questo de mia 
man propria in questo zorno sorascrito de dì 9 setenbrio 1443.” The transactions listed in this document are also 
documented in two accounts produced by Marino: Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. 
Antonio: Account, 1 August 1437.  01.08.1437, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. 
[47]; Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin née Morosini, Zaneta: Account, 1 August 1437.  01.08.1437, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 3, f. [8]. 
146 For the practice of informal credit, see Shaw, James E.: "The Informal Economy of Credit in Early Modern 
Venice", in: The Historical Journal 61 (September 2018), No. 3, pp. 623-642. 
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tween different extended families – which in the Venetian context was primarily visible in the 
political sphere147 – while at the same time illustrating the rationale for business cooperation 
beyond nuclear family structures. However, the coalition model also departs from the in the 
context of medieval and early modern Italy prevalent societas in that it was subject to long-
term strategic construction, in the case of the Dolfin-Morosini coalition generated through 
marriage, whereas a general partnership – a system of shared liabilities and collective deci-
sion-making – is typically understood to emerge from agnatic family structures in the case of 
family-based enterprises.148 A trade coalition among affinal relatives was of course only fea-
sible and desirable where economic interests converged to sufficient degrees. Yet the very 
fact that such forms of long-term cooperation could occur between different patrician families 
is a strong indicator of the relative economic homogeneity of the patriciate. 
D. Family and Business: Exploiting Family Loyalties for Commercial Purposes 
Public-order institutions and state policies have often been portrayed as the primary genera-
tors of Venetian trade and finance.149 Although private-order mechanisms do play a role in 
 
147 Chojnacki: Kinship Ties.  
148 Trivellato: Familiarity, p. 132; also see Brouwer, Maria: "Managing Uncertainty through Profit Sharing 
Contracts from Medieval Italy to Silicon Valley", in: Journal of Management and Governance 9 (2005), No. 3-
4, pp. 237-255 [p. 242]. 
149 The here advanced distinction between public- and private-order levels of the institutional framework follows 
Platteau’s definition, according to which public-order institutions require “external sanctions systems” that 
“presuppose the existence of an authority structure” (Platteau, Jean-Philippe: "Behind the Market Stage Where 
Real Societies Exist - Part I: The Role of Public and Private Order Institutions", in: Journal of Development 
Studies 30 (1994), No. 3, pp. 533-577, here p. 535). For discussions of public-order institutions, see for example 
Arbel: Operating Trading Networks; González de Lara: The secret; Chittolini, Giorgio: "The "Private," the 
"Public," the State", in: The Journal of Modern History 67 (Dec., 1995), Supplement: The Origins of the State in 
Italy, 1300-1600, pp. S34-S61; Muir, Edward: "The Sources of Civil Society in Italy", in: The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 29 (Winter 1999), No. 3, pp. 379-406.  For other historical contexts, the significance of 
the family as a commercial institution has been called into question in recent studies. For example, Carsten 
JAHNKE finds that, with respect to the creation of mercantile relations, the significance of the family has been 
overestimated in traditional research on Hanseatic trade (Jahnke, Carsten: "Handelsnetze im Ostseeraum", in: 
Fouquet, G., Gilomen, H.-J. (eds.), Netzwerke im europäischen Handel des Mittelalters, Ostfildern: Jan 
Thorbecke Verlag, 2010, pp. 189-212 (here p. 199). For the limits of family networks in the context of 
eighteenth-century British Caribbean trad, see Haggerty, Sheryllynne: "I could 'do for the Dickmans': When 
Family Networks Don't Work", in: Gestrich, A., Schulte Beerbühl, M. (eds.), Cosmopolitan Networks in 
Commerce and Society 1660–1914, London: German Historical Institute London, 2011, pp. 317-342. 
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rational-choice approaches to Venetian commercial history, social institutions have typically 
been considered as auxiliary spheres rather than as basic elements of the economic life.150 
Yet, in light of the Dolfin papers, three additional aspects of family relations deserve closer 
scrutiny with respect to their economic significance:  
First, family relations performed a didactical function in both Biagio Dolfin’s and Lorenzo 
Dolfin’s early commercial careers and their eventual rise to seniority: family elders acted as 
mentors to their younger relatives, and the cognatic family environment supported this pro-
cess in social and commercial affairs. Biagio Dolfin was introduced to the dynamics of long-
distance commerce from an early age and hence was well-equipped to compete even against 
potentially wealthier peers. Despite the Republic’s intention to support young nobles in their 
commercial pursuits, the effectiveness of these efforts depended on individual circumstances, 
and the additional support Biagio received from his relatives (mainly his brother Antonio and 
the galley commander Benedetto Dolfin) facilitated his progress as a merchant. Lorenzo 
Dolfin enjoyed even greater opportunities thanks to the acquired wealth of his uncle Biagio, 
yet his early integration into Biagio’s commercial environment and the organisational conti-
nuity in the development of his own arrangements were arguably even more crucial to his 
subsequent career. 
Second, family relations served as a benchmark against which the reliability of potential ex-
ternal business partners could be assessed. In addition to widening commercial expertise, the 
cross-generational continuity of family businesses also served the intended purpose of 
providing transactional security. This ultimately explains the dominance of family relations in 
the social structure of Venetian commerce and in Lorenzo Dolfin’s network of partnerships in 
particular. Both Biagio’s and Lorenzo’s commercial pursues were to a critical extent support-
ed by affinal and consanguineous kin, which facilitated their entry into the commercial sphere 
and remained constant although the composition of their networks changed over time. The 
etiquettes of mercantile correspondence further reveal that personal proximity was an invalu-
able asset in bilateral commercial relationships, and linguistic nuances such as “simel de 
fradelo”, “fradelo” and “charissimo fradelo” were frequently used to signal close personal 
bonds.  
 
150 González de Lara: Enforceability and Risk-sharing; Greif, Avner: "Political Organizations. Social structure, 
and Institutional Success: Reflections from Genoa and Venice During the Commercial Revolution", in: Journal 
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 151 (Dec., 1995), No. 4, pp. 734-740.  
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Third, family relations ensured continuity through the cross-generational character of com-
mercial networks. Biagio’s and Lorenzo’s respective commercial circles display great simi-
larity regarding the choice of affiliates and their respective functions. Yet it was the congru-
ence in terms of their non-kin components that was the true guarantor of stability, as the 
cross-generational dimension of the Dolfin network encompassed both kin and non-kin ele-
ments. Lorenzo Dolfin’s Alexandria contacts and the London experience of his uncle Biagio 
enabled him to establish trade links to London. Former partners of Biagio Dolfin such as 
Nicolò Bernardo qd. Francesco, Orso Dolfin, Antonio di Gusanieri, Gregorio Orso, and Gia-
como Zorzi qd. Giorgio were all significant to Lorenzo Dolfin’s early commercial pursues. 
Although some of them, like Orso Dolfin, had family links to Biagio, their significance to Lo-
renzo’s commercial engagements vanished over time as Lorenzo’s affinal family gradually 
became more important than his consanguineous ties and the social environment passed on to 
him by the previous generation. 
Thus, while Lorenzo’s commercial pursues clearly built on Biagio’s example, a number of 
significant affiliates of Biagio’s commercial network either did not resurface at all in his 
nephew’s business environment or did so in merely peripheral roles. Since Nicolò Dolfin qd. 
Benedetto is among these omissions, his example may provide clues as to why the cross-
generational network of partnerships also underwent specific alterations. 
As Nicolò Dolfin was merely a distant cousin of Biagio Dolfin, he likely was of the same 
generation as Biagio and thus not a major co-operator of Lorenzo Dolfin for reasons of age. 
Second, he may have remained focused on the Alexandria trade, whereas Lorenzo developed 
a primary interest in the Flanders and Romania routes. Comparing Lorenzo’s relationship 
with Nicolò to his later partnerships with other Alexandria contacts, such as Giacomo Dolfin 
qd. Francesco, it becomes clear that Giacomo had more compelling reasons to maintain his 
commercial links to Lorenzo as he and his brothers implemented a broadly similar commer-
cial strategy in the Romania trade. His example further shows that patrician mercantile net-
works provided a platform for potential commercial links from which specific enterprises 
such as (short-term) compagnie and even (long-term) coalitions could be formed.  
However, the significance of affinal families in the cross-generational Dolfin network is the 
most compelling explanation for Nicolò Dolfin’s gradual retreat from his collaboration with 
Lorenzo. Biagio Dolfin had been closely aligned to the Pasqualigo (and Morosini) families, 
and Lorenzo later cooperated very closely with his brothers-in-law. While Nicolò Dolfin was 
not involved in Lorenzo’s early commercial undertakings, it is unlikely that Nicolò and Lo-
renzo would have maintained a long-lasting commercial partnership even if they had cooper-
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ated more closely in earlier years. As can be seen from the example of the brothers Giacomo, 
Giorgio, and Vettore Dolfin qd. Francesco, whose commercial links to Lorenzo originated 
from Lorenzo’s early engagements in Alexandria151, relatives of second order could potential-
ly have a significant impact on network structure. However, as the impact of the affinal fami-
ly grew stronger, affinal ties increased in commercial significance on the expense of distant 
consanguineous links. 
Another likely factor in their separation was a difference in sector specialisation. Biagio 
Dolfin had instructed Nicolò to oversee gemstone sales in Venice on his behalf, which re-
mained Biagio’s primary business throughout his life. Lorenzo imported spices from the Near 
East to Venice, Flanders, and London and re-invested the revenues in the cloth trade, primari-
ly by acquiring English wool and selling processed cloth along the Romania galley route. 
Thus, their respective specialisations impeded further cooperation.152 There is little evidence 
for Lorenzo Dolfin’s involvement in gemstone-related transactions as a senior merchant, as 
he likely was deterred by the troublesome experiences of his uncle in this volatile and risky 
business segment.153 In addition, the gemstone business was closely related to Alexandria, a 
place Lorenzo had no incentive to return to after relations between the Republic of Venice 
and the Mamluk Sultanate gradually began worsening in the course of the 1420s and were 
eventually severed in 1436, when Venetian merchants were expelled from Egypt and Syria. 
After years of diplomatic efforts, a new trade agreement was reached only in October 
1442.154 
 
151 Bernardo, Nicolò qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Account, Alexandria 1423.  001423, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [135]; see IV.A above for a discussion of the 
accounts of Nicolò Bernardo qd. Francesco. 
152 Although specialisation in commercial networks is still a severely understudied subject, an increase in skills-
based specialisation has been identified, for instance, in the context of late medieval manufacturing (see 
Vianello, Francesco: "Rural Manufacturers and Patterns of Economic Specialization: Cases from the Venetian 
Mainland", in: Lanaro, Paola (ed.), At the Center of the Old World: Trade and Manufacturing in Venice and the 
Venetian Mainland, 1400-1800, Toronto: CRRS, 2006, pp. 343-366). For specialisations in commercial 
networks (in a slightly later period) see Fusaro, Maria: "Cooperating mercantile networks in the early modern 
Mediterranean", in: Economic History Review 65 (May 2012), No. 2, pp. 701-718. 
153 Rare mentions of gemstone sales on Lorenzo’s behalf are discussed in chapter V (B, C).  
154 Romano: The Likeness, pp. 181-182; tensions between the Mamluks and the Venetians even before the 1436 
expulsion are well-documented in the commercial correspondence of the period, an example of which is the 
long 1427 letter from Marino Morosini to Lorenzo Dolfin in which Marino reports on a trade embargo imposed 
by the Sultan after Venetian merchants failed to purchase the “sultan’s pepper” at the requested price: “De le 
nuove de Levante perché le molti ziorni le vene penso apièn tu si avixado, ma pur te ne avixerò el vene de 
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Thus, with respect to the significance of family relations in both the political and economic 
spheres, the particular significance of the affinal family in the Dolfin papers indicates a broad 
interdependence of the Venetian patriciate. Some of Lorenzo Dolfin’s partnerships with non-
kin individuals were established through his affinal relations (such as with the husband of his 
sister-in-law Elisabetta, Antonio Contarini qd. Marino), and the notion of a Venetian patrici-
ate that was homogenous in terms of economic incentives despite displaying great social het-
erogeneity remains valid in light of the cognatic patrician family structure that resulted from 
cross-family cooperation along affinal lines. Lorenzo Dolfin relied on the support of both ma-
ternal and paternal families in politics and commerce, as affinal relations came to boost inter-
family (commercial) cooperation within the patriciate, thus cementing a cognatic family 
structure across generations.  
 
 
Candia ser Marcho Bocheta con una galiota et ha dato nuove de Levanti le zonto in Candia ser Lorenzo di Poli 
elqual hando in Alesandria et non ha ditto niente. El soldan non ha voiudo lasartar niente del nostro 
d’Alesandria per raxòn chel voleva che i nostri conprase le soe speziè he perché i nostri non le ha voiudo 
conprar per questa raxòn el dito soldan non ha voiudo lasar trar niente del nostro” (Morosini, Marino qd. 
Giovanni to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 19.08.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. 
[50]). 
CHAPTER V: LONG-DISTANCE TRADE – LONDON, 
FLANDERS, CONSTANTINOPLE, TANA (1427-1443; 1474) 
The archive of Lorenzo Dolfin displays rather large gaps between its last documentation of 
long-distance trade (in the commercial letters written in 1443), its very last document (a 1467 
quaderno unrelated to trade) and eventually Lorenzo’s testament (dated 1474). Yet, the ar-
chive’s wealth in commerce-specific documentation nevertheless allows for making asser-
tions regarding the relationship between family structure and commerce in the Dolfin net-
work and its wider social surroundings. As Lorenzo likely retired from long-distance trade in 
the course of the 1440s to focus on investments on the Venetian terraferma, the contents of 
his last surviving business letters indicate a gradual decline of his intra-family commercial 
cooperations. 
This chapter examines Lorenzo’s commercial activities in London and Flanders, and along 
the Romania galley route. Section A highlights the different types of principal-agent rela-
tioships observable in the CBD sources and analyses their respective institutional founda-
tions. Section B does the same for multilateral commercial relationships, specifically the two 
operational frameworks primarily used by Lorenzo during his senior years: the Venetian 
compagnia (B.i) and the coalition (B.ii), the latter being an analytical term that does not oc-
cur in the sources. Sections C and D examine Lorenzo’s late social environment and his in-
heritance strategy as revealed in his testament. Finally, section E offers an evaluation of the 
key insights gained from the three core chapters of this study (III-V). 
A. London and Flanders 
Lorenzo Dolfin began operating on the northern markets while representing his uncle Biagio 
in Venice in the years 1418 to 1420. We do not know about Biagio Dolfin’s activities along 
the Flanders galley route, as none of his surviving correspondence originates from these ports 
(Corfu, Palermo, Lisbon, Bruges). However, the avid gemstone trader Biagio Dolfin could 
not ignore London, by many accounts the leading gemstone market of the later Middle Ages.1 
Lorenzo was frequently involved in Biagio’s gemstone deals in Venice and thus also became 
familiar with the specifics of the London market.2 Unsurprisingly, besides his early activities 
 
1 Pedani, Balas Rubies. 
2 Letter Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 01.11.1418, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (Psm 181), Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. e, f. [24]; Letter Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo to 
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in Alexandria, he therefore undertook his first independent ventures in London and along the 
Flanders route. His thriving commercial activity along the Romania galley route did not take 
off until a decade after his commercial apprenticeship in Venice and did not reach its peak 
before 1440.3 While the Romania route had remained unexplored by his mentor Biagio, it had 
been intensively frequented by the branch of the Morosini family into which Lorenzo married 
in 1425.4 
i. The Renier network: a commission agency model 
Lorenzo’s early commercial presence in Bruges and London is documented by a number of 
lists itemising the prices of typical trade goods. Of these lists, simply entitled “valuta de mer-
chandatia”, a total of six survives in Lorenzo’s archive, five from Bruges and one from Lon-
don. The earliest of the Bruges lists dates from 1422, the year in which Lorenzo hired the 
brothers Francesco and Marco Renier qd. Nicolò as his agents in the Flemish metropolis.5 
The list documenting London goods and prices dates from 1430 and is therefore less reveal-
ing with respect to Lorenzo’s early years as a merchant, as he began operating in London as 
early as 1423, when he contributed one fifth of the total capital of the compagnia Giorgio 
Dolfin.6 Yet even as his uncle’s mentee, Lorenzo had been in steady contact with London res-
idents such as Biagio’s brother-in-law Polo Pasqualigo qd. Giovanni.7 
 
Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 24.02.1419, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. 
[2]. 
3 The earliest letter written to Lorenzo from Constantinople dates from 1424: letter Dolfin, Giacomo qd. 
Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.06.1424, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, 
int. 2, f. [44]. 
4 Lorenzo’s brother-in-law Giovanni Morosini qd. Marino appears to have resided in the Venetian quarter of 
Constantinople, from where he sent eight letters to Lorenzo. 
5 Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Price list, 1 August 1422.  01.08.1422, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 
282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [7]. The Renier brother’s first letter to Lorenzo is Renier, Francesco qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, 
Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 07.08.1422, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [54]. 
6 See above, IV.A.ii (Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Account, 20 September 
1423.  20.09.1423, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [67]). 
7 Letter Pasqualigo, Polo qd. Giovanni to Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo, 09.07.1418, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM citra 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 2, int. 2, f. [1]. 
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Lorenzo’s agency partnership with the Renier brothers lasted for at least four years, with the 
last of the Renier letters sent on 17 November 1426.8 Eighteen documents survive in total. In 
his first letter to Lorenzo, Francesco Renier refers to his departure from Venice, which ap-
pears to be for the purpose of an extended stay abroad.9 Francesco’s signature appears in all 
of the letters, whereas his brother’s name is added only in seven of the later ones.10 Two of 
the Renier documents are account sheets signed by Francesco Renier “on the journey from 
Bruges” (“del viazo de Bruza”). This indicates that he may have travelled on the Flanders 
galleys at these instances, possibly with his brother taking care of their joint affairs in 
Bruges.11 
Although there is no evidence of the Renier family co-operating with Lorenzo’s uncle Biagio, 
nor of the circumstances under which their relationship to Lorenzo was initiated, the social 
foundations of the partnership were adequately strong. Francesco Renier routinely addressed 
Lorenzo as “simel de fradello”,12 in later letters even as “charissimo fradello”.13 The letters 
signed by both Renier brothers are equally indicative of a close and cordial relationship.14 
 
8 Letter Renier, Francesco qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 17.11.1426, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [38]. 
9 “Simel de fradello da puo il mio partir de Venexia nula ve o posuto scriver per non aver a i logi siamo stati 
avuto tenpo ese<r> per non aver di vostre cosse fir questo renenda seguito me par per dar precipio vinotrio 
questa con brevita ridero quanto superle se ale per tuti demare ha dantro el sta fato e prexi a preso del navigar 
nostro e prima chomo paso sapiate a dì 8 mazo partimo da Malorcha a dì 20 dito a Malcha a dì 22 a Chades a dì 
26 zugno a Casca ovier a Lisbona a dì 4 avosto a le Claze con salute.” Letter Renier, Francesco qd. Nicolò to 
Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 07.08.1422, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [54]. 
10 He is a signatory of the last letter: Renier, Francesco qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 17.11.1426, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [38]. The first letter signed by Marco Renier is 
Renier, Francesco qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 15.04.1425, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, 
Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [41]. 
11 Renier, Francesco qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Account, 1422.  20.01.1423, ASVe, Procuratori 
di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [112]; Renier, Francesco qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: 
Account, 20 December 1423.  20.12.1423, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [58]. 
12 E.g. letter Renier, Francesco qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 07.08.1422, ASVe, Procuratori di 
San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [54]. 
13 Letter Renier, Francesco qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 15.10.1424, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [43]. 
14 “A di 9 rezevi vostra de 6 pasato per laqual del vostro a conparsavi n'avixate che a sumo piaxer e chome di 
fratello n'avemo avuto e non meno che ne nostri fradeli carnali de tute vostre consolacion et honori n'avesamo 
suimo piaxer. Pregemo i dio con felizità a suo laude trami vi conservi.” Letter Renier, Francesco qd. Nicolò to 
Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 15.04.1425, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [41]. 
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Other than the Renier brothers, only one additional correspondent wrote to Lorenzo from 
Bruges. On 28 April 1424, Lorenzo received a letter from a certain Francesco Orsini.15 Orsi-
ni, whose name suggests a cittadino rather than a patrician background, addresses Lorenzo as 
“simel di fradello” and thus signals a close personal proximity.16 Orsini evidently provided 
agency services to Lorenzo. Referring to a letter from Lorenzo he had received a month earli-
er, on 15 March 1424, he reports about difficulties regarding the sale of boràso (borax, a 
mineral used in glassmaking and in household products such as soap) to a certain Giovanni 
Barbo.17 The letter further reveals that Lorenzo Dolfin cooperated with Angelo Michiel qd. 
Luca in this business, as Orsini complains about not receiving any replies from the latter de-
spite numerous attempts of making contact.18 Angelo Michiel, as seen above, was an Alexan-
dria contact of Lorenzo’s who had also partnered with Biagio Dolfin. His involvement in Lo-
renzo’s Flanders trade corroborates the cross-generational character of patrician mercantile 
networks and the highly individual character of personal commercial networks that enabled 
merchants to choose their commercial partners from a wide pool of potential links. 
The Renier brothers dealt with Francesco Orsini on Lorenzo’s behalf, as Orsini was repeated-
ly mentioned in their letters.19 Whereas Francesco Renier’s first letter to Lorenzo still report-
ed on a variety of transactions (involving similar goods as listed on the aforementioned “valu-
ta de merchandatia” lists), their correspondence eventually became more focused on the 
boràso trade. This shows that Lorenzo maintained a degree of diversification in his business, 
 
15 Letter Orsini, Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 06.04.1424, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, 
b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [46].  
16 For Francesco Orsini status, see the CIVES database for “Orsini” entries: 
http://www.civesveneciarum.net/cerca.php?txtQuery=orsini&lingua=ita&nomeCampo=nome_italiano&tipo=se
mplice&titolo=risultati 
17 For boràso and its use, see Lane, Frederic C.: "The Mediterranean Spice Trade, Further Evidence of its 
Revival in the Sixteenth Century", in: The American Historical Review XLV (April, 1940), No. 3, pp. 581-590, 
(here p. 583). 
18 Letter Orsini, Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 06.04.1424, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, 
b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [46]: “Simmel de fradelo a dì 15 del pasado rezevi una vostra de 16 fevrier per laqual me 
dite che del boràxo … ser (Giovanni) Barbo de vostra raxon ne siegua hordene che per ser Anzolo Michiel me 
sara dado e simel hordene me vede el dito ser (Giovanni). El perché ve ho avixado per molte mie el dito ser 
Anzolo mai non mene a fato resposta alguna de che tegno el dito el asifina che altro hordene avero da vui …da 
lui.” I assume that the mentioned Anzolo Michiel is the son of Luca Michiel, thus a former partner of Biagio 
Dolfin. 
19 Letter Renier, Francesco qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 06.05.1424, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [49]. 
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although he seems to have been a buyer rather than a seller on the Bruges spice market. His 
interest in boràso does not put into question the centrality of cloth and fibres in his portfolio. 
Rather, the Renier letters show that Lorenzo was first and foremost active on the Bruges cloth 
market, where the Renier brothers handled a great many of his transactions.20 
The two surviving account sheets further confirm Lorenzo Dolfin’s activity as a buyer on the 
Bruges market. The first one, created during the 1422 muda, is dated 20 January 1423 (this is 
the “messo in libro” date, recorded by Lorenzo when filing the account in his books). The 
second was received and filed by Lorenzo on 20 December 1423.21 Both use the Venetian 
moneys of account, lira/ soldi/ grossi.22 As liabilities, the double-entry documents list the ex-
penses on taxes and customs, as well as the commission salary of the agent (provisiòn). This 
payment amounts to 7 soldi and 4 grossi on the first account and to 3 soldi and 8 grossi on the 
second. 
Lorenzo’s Bruges business operated within a fixed network maintained by Francesco Renier 
as a central node. While managing Lorenzo’s sales, Francesco Renier maintained links to a 
number of clients. One of them was the aforementioned Francesco Orsini. Another was the 
Bruges merchant François Lanense, who occurs as a buyer of Lorenzo’s ginger as well as be-
ing listed on the credit side of Lorenzo’s first Bruges account.23 This network, however, was 
not buttressed by a strong social institution securing the commercial enterprise – it was based 
on commission payments from Lorenzo (the principal) and his partners (such as Angelo 
Michiel qd. Luca) to the Renier brothers (the agents), and the involved individuals had a 
transaction-specific monetary incentive for being affiliated with the network. By establishing 
links to the Renier brothers, Lorenzo was able to combine the commercial expertise present 
in his own personal network, mainly consisting of former commercial contacts of his uncle 
Biagio, with the market knowledge offered by the Renier and their commercial environment. 
Yet this arrangement was loose, purpose-specific and, as the lack of kin as network compo-
nents indicates, not grounded in a priori-existing social dispositions and thus not indended as 
 
20 Letter Renier, Francesco qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 18.08.1423, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [45]. 
21 See note 11 above. 
22 Christ: Trading Conflicts (appendix); Travaini, Lucia: "Un sistema di conto poco conosciuto: la « mano da 
quattro»", in: Revue Numismatique 153 (1998), No. 6, pp. 327-334. 
23 Letter Renier, Francesco qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.10.1422, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [53]; Renier, Francesco qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: 
Account, 1422.  20.01.1423, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [112]. 
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a long-term commercial arrangement. Instead, the commission model of commercial coopera-
tion was used when intra-family cooperation was not a viable option.  
ii. Girolamo Bragadin qd. Andrea: an intermediary solution 
In the years 1429 to 1430, Girolamo Bragadin acted as Lorenzo’s representative in London. 
Girolamo was the son of Andrea Bragadin, an affinal relative of Biagio Dolfin who had been 
one of Biagio’s closest personal and commercial allies during his second consulship.24 Simi-
lar to the aforementioned compagnia with Giorgio Dolfin qd. Francesco and his brothers, Lo-
renzo must have been a co-owner of a business as Girolamo Bragadin’s letters are addressed 
jointly to him and a certain Benedetto Bembo.25 In addition to four letters, one joint account 
provides detailed insights into this partnership.26 
Girolamo Bragadin was active in London as well as in Bruges, took care of the Dolfin-
Bembo interests on both markets, and performed both sale and acquisition transactions on 
their behalf. As in the case of the Renier, these transactions covered both spices and cloth. 
Himself of a patrician background, he addressed Lorenzo and Benedetin as “charissimi 
fradeli”, signalling a close personal bond. He clearly possessed insider expertise with respect 
to the northern markets and provided his interlocutors with detailed analyses of the business 
environments in Bruges and London.27 In modern parlance, he was a consultant rather than a 
mere recipient of instructions.  
 
24 According to Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 105, Andrea Bragadin was a brother-in-law of Biagio Dolfin. 
25 The first of these letters is Bragadin, Girolamo qd. Andrea to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 09.08.1429, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [10]. 
26 “Chonto di ser Lorenzo Dolfin e ser Beneditin Bembo asegniado per mi Jeronimo Bragadin de miser Andrea 
al viazo di Londra del 1429”; the account is Bragadin, Girolamo qd. Andrea to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: 
Account: Lorenzo Dolfin qd. Antonio, 1429.  001429, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 
282, fasc. 3, f. [132]. 
27 Letter Bragadin, Girolamo qd. Andrea to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 22.12.1429, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [12]: “Fradeli […] l’ultima mia ve scrissi fo a dì primo di questi da poi 
non ho avuto vostra siché vedero con brevità per questa dissive per la dita del finir di la lire vostra piper e di 
l’achatar di i chavezi di pani fine esei e chrixea e di sive che di la scuza per vui Lorenzo per non la trovar de 
simel ho venzo al prexio me diti hordene lo lasada star et a Veniexa s’el ve piaxera di poro aver un di quele me 
traco le per ducati 10 ½ che per dio a mi viene ducati 11 ma con vui non ne fazo conto. Anchor ve disi che del 
felzo et banchali non di podevi eser serviti per queste galie ho li hordenadi a ora et avere mio derada e mio roba. 
El conto del dito piper e di i pani ve mando troverati qui dentro […] a trovando no alguno avixamere che subito 
la conzero i diti pani sono in un bala di miser Alvise Contarini i qual a Veniexa vedera e son chaxidi in 
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According to Girolamo Bragadin’s letters, Lorenzo sold different types of spices in London, 
mainly pepper, and acquired both raw wools and processed cloth for shipment to Venice. 
Girolamo’s last remaining letter to Lorenzo, dated 7 March 1430, is the most extensive of 
these documents.28 Therein, Girolamo reports on price levels and his estimates regarding fu-
ture demand for a number of spices. These goods correspond largely to the products listed on 
the aforementioned “valuta di merchandantia” list (which, based on the handwriting, can be 
attributed to Girolamo).29 These include pepper (piper), different types of ginger (zenzero 
verde, zenzeri mecheni), cloves (garofoli), and nuts (noxe).  
In the same letter, Girolamo also reported on the range of prices to be paid on the London 
market for different types of English wool, which are named after the products’ places of 
origin. He mentioned lovesti (from Lowestoft), gilfordione (from Gilford) and chotesgualde 
(from the Cotswolds). The paragraph ends on a curious note: according to Girolamo, the Eng-
lish parliament had ordered English merchants not to sell to foreigners, although the latter 
were allowed to continue trading in London. Girolamo did not expect this situation to last for 
long.30 
The surviving account signed by Girolamo states that he received a commission payment of 
two percent of the total turnover he handled.31 The relatively short time span covered by 
Girolamo’s letters suggests that he might have been hired on a short-term basis, possibly to 
replace a previously involved agent or just to exploit suddenly emerging favourable market 
conditions in London (the higher percentage of his commission pay compared to that of the 
 
charavazo di marchadanti val piper d. 11 ¼ zenzeri verdi d. 23 in 24 garosti d. 35 chanele d. 16 et altri chosse 
avixato e per simele chosse […] sta avixato ne da novo non avemo da conto. 
Le galie me sentimo che a dì 7 di questi hora a promuda e questo avemo per le galie di fiorentini qui zionte da 
poi dele diti [...] galie nula sentano speremo in dio le sia tirade de longo i dio piazi condurle con salude. 
Non me restando per hora altro essendo a vostri piazeri presto Christo ve guardi.”  
28 Letter Bragadin, Girolamo qd. Andrea to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 07.03.1430, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [13]. 
29 Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 07.03.1430, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [3]. 
30 Note 28: „El parlamento de qui he sta hordenado che algion engleser non posse vender ad algun stranzier 
alguna chossa a tenpo ma ben po el stranier vender al inglese che non credo tal hordenanza possi durar 
lungamente siché per tal hordenande durando tegnio le nostre galie avera poche chose de so retorno perché el 
non se achatera a gran zionta chome se soleva far per non poder deliverar le marchadente vien con quele che la 
piu i parte a tenpo e tegnio che chi se trovera susso ducati contadi de qui avera de tute chosse bona derade.” 
31 Bragadin, Girolamo qd. Andrea to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Account: Lorenzo Dolfin qd. Antonio, 1429.  
001429, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [132]: „E per provixion a 2 per 
cento, soldi VIIII/ e per provixion a 2 per cento, soldi VI, denari 6.“ 
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Renier – two percent as opposed to one percent – is likely to reflect a larger than usual profit 
margin). In this case, his inclusion into Lorenzo’s commercial network stems from Lorenzo’s 
(and Benedetto Bembo’s) short-term demand for agency services in London, and the reason 
Girolamo was chosen are linked to the commercial involvement of his father with Lorenzo’s 
uncle Biagio. Hence, Girolamo’s commercial relationship with Lorenzo partly resulted from 
a family-based reputation mechanism. Girolamo thus represents an intermediary type of 
commercial associate, occupying a position between a non-kin commission agent (such as 
Francesco and Marco Renier) and a family representative that was affiliated to a trade coali-
tion. 
iii. Michele Morosini qd. Marino: a coalition agency model 
Lorenzo Dolfin’s archive does not contain documents relating to the Flanders and London 
trade for the decade between 1430 and 1440. In 1440, Giorgio Loredan qd. Marco, husband 
of Lorenzo’s maternal aunt Maria, became captain of the Flanders galleys and wrote to Lo-
renzo from the ports of Sluis32 and Antwerp, which towards the mid-fifteenth century gradu-
ally began challenging and eventually replacing Bruges as the leading transfer market of the 
Low Countries.33 Lorenzo’s extensive correspondence with his brother-in-law Michele Mo-
rosini qd. Marino began in October 1441.34 For at least five years, Michele Morosini acted as 
Lorenzo’s agent in London, with his last letter written on 7 January 1446. A whole of twenty-
seven letters document this family-internal agency relationship; however, because of the ab-
sence of any surviving account sheets, the size of Lorenzo’s London trade in this advanced 
stage of his mercantile career is difficult to establish. The lack of accounts also impedes as-
sertions regarding possible commission payments. As these are not mentioned in the corre-
spondence, we are left with two possible scenarios: Michele Morosini may have received 
transaction-specific payments, as was the case with the Renier brothers; alternatively, he may 
 
32 Letter Loredan, Giorgio qd. Marco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 04.10.1440, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [65]. 
33 Letter Loredan, Giorgio qd. Marco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 12.12.1440, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [66]. For the growing significance of Antwerp, see Munro, John H.: 
"Bruges and the Abortive Staple in English Cloth - An Incident in the Shift of Commerce from Bruges to 
Antwerp in the Late Fifteenth Century ", in: Revue belge de Philologie et d'Histoire 44 (1966), No. 4, pp. 1137-
1159. 
34 Letter Morosini, Michele qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 31.10.1441, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [14]. 
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have been affiliated to a family coalition as its London representative, investing the aggregat-
ed wealth of the coalition and retracting gains from his personal share. The latter explanation 
is more plausible in light of the surviving correspondence; in addition, it explains the disap-
pearance of the Renier brothers from Lorenzo’s personal network as a consequence of the de-
velopment of a family coalition, a long-term commercial arrangement with mutual liabilities 
and obligations such as the provision of coalition agency services. Ultimately, the family-
based commercial coalition benefited, in terms of its operational structure, from dependen-
cies, hierarchies, and reputations that arose from the social context of the patrician family. It 
thus achieved a higher degree of transactional security than a commission-based relationship 
within loose commercial networks. 
Michele Morosini was Lorenzo’s brother-in-law, yet he must have been considerably younger 
than Lorenzo. Unlike Lorenzo’s other hitherto mentioned correspondents, he addressed Lo-
renzo not as “fradello” but as “spectabile et egregio [chugnado]”35 and even as “mazor”36 and 
“spectabile ett honorado non menon di padre”.37 In this respect, his letters resemble those of 
his brothers who also reverentially looked up to Lorenzo as an almost father-like figure. 
“Egregio et honorado come padre” wrote Michele’s brother Giovanni Morosini38, whereas 
Pietro Morosini, writing from Bruges, echoed his brothers’ formal style (“egregio e honorado 
chugnado”).39 Their formal language should not, however, be understood as a display of rev-
erence towards a patriarch, a role still held by Lorenzo’s father-in-law Marino.40 Lorenzo was 
not a surrogate father to his in-laws, but a family senior who supported their commercial am-
bitions by providing opportunities of collaboration and guidance through a gradual but swift 
integration into the family coalition. His relationship to his junior in-laws reflects the same 
 
35 Ibid. 
36 Letter Morosini, Michele qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 14.06.1442, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [22]. 
37 Letter Morosini, Michele qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 21.09.1443, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [15]. 
38 Letter Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 20.05.1442, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [23]. 
39 Letter Morosini, Pietro qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 09.05.1443, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [5]. 
40 As Michele wrote in his first letter from London: “A dì 20 de questo rezevi una de miser mio padre e de miser 
Polo…”, Letter Morosini, Michele qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 31.10.1441, ASVe, Procuratori 
di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [14]. 
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family-internal process of mercantile education that he himself had received from his paternal 
and maternal uncles. 
Although writing more than a decade after Girolamo Bragadin qd. Andrea had represented 
Lorenzo in the same location, the contents of Michele Morosini’s letters are broadly similar 
to those of his predecessor. In his first letter, Michele reported on the state of the London 
spice and cloth markets, stating prices of pepper, ginger, clove (garofoli), nutmeg (mazis), 
and different types of wool.41 He ended by asking for further instructions, which would in-
volve his godfather Giacomo Corner.42 
The Venetian business practice in the London and Flanders trade – export of spices and im-
port of cloth – is also evident in Michele Morosini’s letters. All of these documents provide 
current estimates of the likely yields on the London spice market (“de marchadantie venuti 
chon le galie val de qui…”43) and the costs of specific investments (“le investiti de qui per 
Veniexia”44), i.e. English cloth. Judging by the large quantity of surviving documents and the 
structure and contents of his letters, Michele was a frequent writer. These are typically rather 
brief, yet don’t fail to mention both personal and political news in addition to market-specific 
information. He reports, for instance, on the appointment of Lorenzo Contarini to the Vene-
tian consulship in London, of which he strongly approves.45 
Michele Morosini acted as agent not exclusively to Lorenzo Dolfin, but to the Morosini-
Dolfin clan as a whole. Other members of this coalition were frequently mentioned in 
Michele’s letters, such as a cousin (of Michele’s) named Polo (Pisani)46 and the clan’s patri-
 
41 Letter Morosini, Michele qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 31.10.1441, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [14]. 
42 Ibid.: “Priegove avixame se de qui debia pagar le spexe a miser Iacomo Chorner mio patrino.” 
43 Letter Morosini, Michele qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.12.1441, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [25]. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid.: “miser Lorenzo Contarini sie sa fatto chonsolo che molto me piazer.” 
46 Letter Morosini, Michele qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 001.1442, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [24]; likely referring to Polo Pisani, also mentioned in Pietro Morosini’s 
letter: Morosini, Pietro qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 09.05.1443, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [5]. 
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arch Marino Morosini.47 The coalition operated on the basis of reciprocity, as Michele also 
sent his instructions to the Venice-based network affiliates.48 
B. Romania 
Most of Lorenzo’s correspondents along the Romania galley route resided in Constantinople, 
while only a few of the surviving letters were produced in Tana and Negroponte. A striking 
similarity to Lorenzo’s London and Flanders trade lies in the chronological order of his part-
nerships: whereas his first recorded venture was a compagnia with the brothers Giacomo and 
Giorgio Dolfin qd. Francesco, with whom he established the aforementioned partnership in 
London in 1423, he was supported by the Morosini family in his later activities. Two addi-
tional (and significant) correspondents were the Constantinople residents Antonio Contarini 
qd. Marino, of whom ten letters survive, and Giacomo Dolfin’s son Dolfino (“simel di fio”49), 
author of the last surviving Romania letter sent to Lorenzo in 1448.50 
i. The compagnia Dolfin: a contractual, family-based commercial enterprise 
Lorenzo’s partnership with Giacomo and Giorgio Dolfin qd. Francesco is not only document-
ed in their surviving correspondence. An unnotarized contract about the purchase of a ship in 
Constantinople, dated 29 April 1428, reveals the ownership structure of their compagnia.51 
According to this document, Giacomo and Giorgio Dolfin owned two thirds of the com-
pagnia’s assets while the remaining third was held by Lorenzo. The document mentions Vet-
tore Dolfin qd. Francesco, brother of Giacomo and Giorgio, as the buyer of the ship but not as 
a co-owner of the compagnia.52 Yet Vettore appears to have been involved in the business. In 
 
47 Letter Morosini, Michele qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 14.06.1442, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 1, f. [22]. 
48 Ibid.: “Anchor avixame si avette vendutto la barcha mia che mai non me avette scritto”. (More instructions in 
the following lines.) 
49 Letter Dolfin, Dolfino qd. Giacomo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 20.07.1442, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [21].  
50 Letter Dolfin, Dolfino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 08.12.1448, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 
282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [7]. 
51 Dolfin, Giorgio qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Declaration, 29 April 1428.  29.04.1428, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [8]. 
52 Ibid.: „Enzio sia che ser Vetor Dolfin fo de miser Franzescho abia conprado una nave in Constantinopoli de 
laqual el ne da apartizipar charati VIIII zoe charati 9 ala conpag<ni>a de ser Lorenzio Dolfin he Zorzi he 
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1427 and 1428, he wrote two letters to Lorenzo reporting on the compagnia’s transactions in 
Constantinople.53 By then, he had been added as an owner as he included himself in the ac-
counts of his brothers.54 
While the sons of Francesco Dolfin maintained a business with Lorenzo, they also kept their 
own separate account, presumably as a fraterna. The account sheets handed to Lorenzo dis-
tinguish between the property of their joint compagnia and that of “Zorzi Dolfin e fradelli”55 
(this may also indicate the age hierarchy of the Dolfin brothers, with Giorgio being the oldest 
and Vettore the youngest).56 Documentation of Lorenzo’s commercial involvement with the 
Dolfin brothers in the Romania trade begins with a letter written by Giacomo Dolfin on 10 
June 1424.57 According to the archival record, Giacomo was Lorenzo’s most frequent corre-
spondent with fourteen documents surviving.58 His long partnership with Lorenzo spanned 
various places: he collaborated with Lorenzo’s agent Nicolò Bernardo in Alexandria in 1422 
and later appeared as Lorenzo’s partner in London in 1423 (see above, IV.A). From 1424 
onwards, we find him residing in Constantinople, where he eventually became vice-bailo fol-
 
Iachomo Dolfin in laqual el dito ser Lorenzio ne partizipa in un terzo. Chely tocheria charati in el qual ser 
Lorenzio me a dito a mi Zorzi Dolfin chel dibita chel dito ser Vetor Dolfin non abia conprado la dita nave contra 
i ordeni de Venexia e per questo el non vorave aver in pazio algun per chaxion de la dita conpreda. E per tanto 
sia manifesto a cha’ da’ un che vedera questo scrito come mi Zorzi Dolfin per mio nome he per nome de mio 
fradeli ser Jachomo e ser Vetor Dolfin fazio seguro el dito ser Lorenzio Dolfin che la dita nave non ne conprada 
contra i ordeni de Venexia a se chaxio fosse chel fosse cognosudo che la fosse conprada contra i ordeni de 
Venexia per modo chel dito ser Lorenzio no rezevesse da no algun per la sovadita conpreda. Mi Zorzi Dolfin 
soradito per mio nome e per nome de i soradity mie fradeli so ubligemo el sia sopra de nui el dito da no vi 
aseguro el dito ser Lorenzio per la chaxion de la soradita conpreda per questa chaxion solamente. E mi Zorzi 
Dolfin li o fato questo per sua chrerezia.” 
53 These are: letter Dolfin, Vettore qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 18.08.1427, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [38]; and Dolfin, Vettore qd. Francesco to Dolfin, 
Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 20.08.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [36]. 
54 Letter Dolfin, Vettore qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 20.08.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [36]: “…che ne partizipa per vostra raxun e nostra…”  
55 See, for instance, Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 001425, ASVe, Procuratori 
di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [40].  
56 Vettore is confirmed as the youngest Dolfin brother in Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. 
Antonio, 25.01.1428, ASVe, Documenti Commerciali Riservati (1985), b. 1, 212. 
57 Letter Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.06.1424, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [44]. 
58 Three of those are not contained in the CLD but in Reinhold Mueller’s Christie’s collection. 
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lowing the bailo’s death.59 One of his letters to Lorenzo was written in Tana, where he ob-
served the detrimental effects of smuggling on Venetian investments.60 In addition to his 
brothers and collaborators Giorgio and Vettore, Francesco had a third brother, Nicolò, who is 
mentioned in several of the letters preserved in the CLD.61 
The business Lorenzo pursued with Giacomo and Giorgio Dolfin consisted of the sale of var-
ious types of European (mainly English) cloth (mainly pani) in Constantinople, which at the 
time was still the principal Venetian trade hub along the Romania route. Vettore, by contrast, 
appears to have acted as a buyer of Eastern spices in Constantinople on Lorenzo’s behalf and 
was only peripherally involved in Lorenzo’s cloth trade.62 The sales of the compagnia were 
not confined to Constantinople. Instead, they sought to serve the entirety of the Romania gal-
ley route up to the Eastern shores of the Black Sea, where the Tatar princes of the (gradually 
disintegrating) Golden Horde were still among the foremost buyers of fine cloth.63 The goods 
were transported on a ship owned directly by the compagnia, which allowed for more flexi-
bility in reacting to shifting levels of demand in the Romanian ports compared to the muda.64 
The compagnia also made use of other private vessels.65 In addition to travelling themselves 
 
59 Letter Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.10.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (Reinhold C. Mueller - Christie's Collection), Citra, b. 282-283. Giacomo also informed Lorenzo of the 
cause of the bailo’s death: “El bailo e morto perché non a posudo horinar za zorni 25, aveva un gran chila e a la 
zorneda e molto plui ingrosada tanto che a le fin he melo. I dio i perdoni.” 
60 Letter Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 31.05.1430, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [11]: “Gerolimo Bedeluto elqual a tolto una naveta de zenerii che contra i 
ordeni de Venixia pero tute robe son cargade suxo quela son contrabande a Veniexa siché vi avixo pur de qui 
non a tropo utele che algun non a voiudo dar nula per non meter el suo de per volo una solo a suo cosse et molto 
alevado per Constantinopoli elqual avesamo abudo tuto siché non voie che simel giotoni vene lui abia a 
contrafar le leze de queli da Venexia sie chon Zorzi e voio far dano a lui come a fato a nui.” 
61 E.g. letter Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 04.08.1419, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [4].  
62 See e.g. letter Dolfin, Vettore qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 18.08.1427, ASVe, Procuratori 
di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [38].  
63 See chapter II, note 15. 
64 See the aformentioned contract as well as letters Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. 
Antonio, 08.02.1431, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [34] (mentions the ship). 
Also, the ship purchase is justified in Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 
25.01.1428, ASVe, Documenti Commerciali Riservati (1985), b. 1, 212 (previous owner: the bailo of 
Constantinople).   
65 E.g. the ship of a certain Ludovico Contarini, see Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. 
Antonio, 001425, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [40].  
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to the ports of the Black Sea (of which Giacomo’s Tana letters bear evidence), the compagnia 
maintained a network of agents who would handle its sales outside Constantinople.66 This 
network also included members of the wider Morosini clan, Lorenzo’s affinal family. A cer-
tain Francesco Morosini is mentioned in three letters, while a Giovanni Morosini (presuma-
bly the brother of Francesco) is mentioned once, as is a Giacomo Morosini qd. Lorenzo. The 
latter appears in Giacomo Dolfin’s very first surviving Romanian letter to Lorenzo, in which 
Giacomo reports on his upcoming journey to Bursa during which Giacomo Morosini is in-
structed to look after the Dolfin’s cloth sales in Constantinople.67 Francesco Morosini was a 
similarly loose associate of the compagnia: active as a merchant in the Black Sea, Giacomo 
mentions him, for example, as their caretaker in Trebizond when he embarked on the journey 
on the Romania galleys in autumn of 1425.68 In a similar letter dated 3 September 1425, 
Francesco is mentioned in the same context, as Giacomo also portrays him as a victim of a 
minor credit crunch in Constantinople.69 He is further mentioned in combination with his 
brother Giovanni in a 1431 letter (with attached account) in which they appear as creditors to 
the compagnia Dolfin.70 Their permanent residence was likely in Constantinople, as was the 
case for members of Lorenzo’s affinal family, notably Giovanni Morosini qd. Marino. 
The precise family relation between Lorenzo Dolfin and the brothers Giacomo, Giorgio and 
Vettore Dolfin qd. Francesco cannot be precisely established from the CLD documents. They 
 
66 Letter Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 08.12.1432, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [2]. In this last letter, he informed Lorenzo about the death of their agent 
in Bursa, declaring his intent to travel there to recover their belongings: “La caxion de la mia ocupazion sie che 
uno mio fattor steva in Bursa he morto he per rechatar le cose notre che non son poche mi convien andar lì.” 
67 Letter Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.06.1424, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [44]. 
68 “Anchor ho mandado bale do de nostri bastardi in Trabexonda iqual ho dadi a ser Franzesco Morexini che va 
de li con questa galie in le dite due bale sie pani 13 de la conpagnia e pani 3 de raxon de Zorzi Dolfin e fradeli.” 
Letter Dolfin, Giacomoqd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 001425, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, 
Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [40]. 
69 Letter Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 03.09.1425, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco (Reinhold C. Mueller - Christie's Collection), Citra, b. 282-283: “In questi dì a ser Piero de Grezi 
avegnado chel sia longo provedera averemo e li dovereno …o serixandosse aver abudo pegio spazamento de le 
suo cosse nui non semo soli che abia induxia […] altra tenpo da suo debitoti ve avixo el simel esta in tuti ste 
marchadanti avixando [ve] che a Franzesco Morexini i resta a scuoder plui de un terzo de suo debitori se sera un 
pocho longo … ne pero da dubitarssi de proveder solizetoro plui presto poro de scuoder.” 
70 Letter Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 08.02.1431, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [34].   
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addressed Lorenzo as “fradello” (which, of course, may also signal a strong personal bond 
based on social affinity), typically expressed regards to Lorenzo’s mother and wife as well as 
to other individuals in their shared environment,71 and conveyed their affection for Lorenzo 
in powerful language.72 The surviving record of their letters is clearly incomplete and hence 
does not account for the whole duration of the partnership. Giacomo Dolfin’s oldest surviving 
letter to Lorenzo, the aforementioned document written from Constantinople on 10 June 
1424,73 was clearly not their first piece of exchange on the Romania trade. It begins by refer-
encing a previous letter to Lorenzo, followed by Giacomo’s report on the compagnia’s sales 
in Constantinople and Tana. He appears as a co-owner of a sales venture, not as a trade agent 
acting on instructions, as he writes about “our” (i.e. his and Lorenzo’s) produce and its likely 
market yields (“de pani nostri”; “de i gilfordi nostri”74). The produce Giacomo sold on the 
Romania markets correspond to those Lorenzo acquired in London, that is, primarily different 
types of English wool. In said letter, Giacomo mentions pani, bastardi, and gilfordi.  
The compagnia was both exporting to and importing from the Eastern markets. While selling 
English wool in Constantinople and Tana, Lorenzo Dolfin and his partners also acquired 
spices for sale in Venice, Flanders, and London. The letters of Vettore Dolfin document the 
compagnia’s export trade. In Constantinople, Vettore loaded the compagnia’s spices75 onto 
 
71 He frequently mentioned a certain Polo Foscari as well as a certain Polo Corner. 
72 A good example is the last sentence of Giacomo Dolfin’s second-last letter: Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to 
Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 08.02.1431, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [34]: 
“Vi prego non ve destege del mio amor se son stado tropo; anchor per uno altro anno deli beni star.” 
73 Letter Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.06.1424, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [44]. 
74 Ibid.  
75 Letter Dolfin, Vettore qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 18.08.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [38]: “Io si va d’Acho aver chargado sula nave de Piero de Belveder de 
vostra raxon e nostra pa<rte> e dezera segnadi del segno de la conpagnia chosa per 28 lira 6. Oltre è ffo abarato 
de piper aveva achatado per vostra raxon e nostra chome per altre ve disi savi raxun seguadagna del piper zircha 
per 6 ho la fati per avantazo de la zera che hora val per 29 lira 12 e plui ho chargado per vostra raxun e nostra 
chuori 441 nesuno per mita de vostra raxun e nostra l’altra mita de miser Zan Zane e conpagnia”; Letter Dolfin, 
Vettore qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 20.08.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 
282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [36]: “E qu’el nome de dio e saluamento ve dicho aver chargado sula prexenti nave patron 
Piero de Belveder chori 441 che ne partizipa per vostra raxun e nostra in la mita l’altra mita de misser Zan Zane 
e conpagni.” 
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ships fitted in cooperation with a venture led by a certain Giovanni Zani (“per mita de vostra 
raxun e nostra l’altra mita de miser Zan Zane e conpagnia”).76 
The partnership between Lorenzo and the sons of Francesco Dolfin likely ended after 1432, 
as no further correspondence survives. Yet Lorenzo’s cooperation with this branch of the 
Dolfin family continued through his collaboration with Giacomo’s son Dolfino who wrote 
from Constantinople in the 1440s.77 It is important, however, to distinguish the mode of co-
operation practiced by the compagnia Dolfin from both the commission agency and the coali-
tion agency models. Commission agency was a system of instruction generating transactional 
security through a network of reputation, whereas the compagnia enabled commercial coop-
eration based on a legal entity, much like the fraterna, which was supported by the respective 
personal networks of its owners (individuals such as the aforementioned Giacomo Morosini 
qd. Lorenzo, who would act as provisional associates or agents). The system of coalition 
agency is still different as it combines the notion of a network of reputation with the mecha-
nisms of capital agglomeration and collective liability inherent to the compagnia. Yet, unlike 
commission agency, the coalition agency model relied on social institutions such as the patri-
cian family to generate individual reputations while, in contrast to the compagnia, the ag-
glomeration of investments occurred on a broader, potentially unlimited scope. This family 
coalition model, which Lorenzo Dolfin maintained with his affinal family, was thus the insti-
tutionally most secure form of commercial cooperation. However, it was a socially highly 
complex arrangement whose successful implementation depended on both a common com-
mercial interest among a given patrician family branch as well as external factors that created 
incentives for strong intra-family cooperation – for example, by geographically channelling 
shared commercial interests towards one particular region. 
 
76 Letter Dolfin, Vettore qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 18.08.1427, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [38]. This method of pooling must be understood purely in terms of capital 
agglomeration; it does not reflect a means of hedging against risk in hazardeous environments, as suggested by 
D. Williamson on the basis of thirteenth-century data. Williamson: Transparency, p. 6: “Other types of 
contracts, recognized in this paper as ‘pooling contracts’, are not recognized by the historical literature. In these 
contracts a group of investors would outfit a vessel and staff it with a team of trading agents. Such contracts, as 
we will see, were applied in environments that featured extreme physical hazards. They seem to have been 
applied to contexts in which agents’ survival was particularly threatened. In such contexts, sending out a team of 
agents rather than a single agent promoted the likelihood of at least one agent surviving and remitting payments 
to investors.” 
77 Giacomo Dolfin’s last letter to Lorenzo is Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 
08.12.1432, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [2]. 
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ii. The Dolfin-Morosini trade coalition: a non-contractual, family-based commer-
cial venture 
In 1433, Lorenzo Dolfin began corresponding with the aforementioned Giacomo Morosini in 
Constantinople, son of a certain Lorenzo Morosini and thus not an immediate relative of Lo-
renzo’s wife. Between 1437 and 1442, he received letters from his brothers-in-law Giovanni 
and Pietro Morosini qd. Marino. The latter also wrote from Bursa and Caffa, places where 
Lorenzo had previously been commercially active during his partnership with Giacomo and 
Giorgio Dolfin. Lorenzo’s most frequent correspondent (judging by the number of surviving 
documents) was Antonio Contarini qd. Marino, the husband of Lorenzo’s sister-in-law Elis-
abetta, who addressed Lorenzo Dolfin as “chugnado”.78 Lastly, Lorenzo’s archive contains 
one letter written from his uncle Andrea Gabriel qd. Nicolò from Negroponte in 1431, where 
Andrea acted as bailo e capitano.79 The document is purely personal and shows no connec-
tion to Lorenzo’s commercial interests in the region. 
One important caveat with respect to Lorenzo Dolfin’s Romania trade is that its geographical 
focus is not limited to the main ports of the Romania galley route (Corfu, Negroponte, Con-
stantinople, Tana). Other important markets of the Ottoman Empire, such as Bursa and the 
ports of the Near East, were served by the same commercial network.80 
Giacomo Morosini qd. Lorenzo, as mentioned above, worked with Lorenzo and the sons of 
Francesco Dolfin as early as 1424, yet the earliest of his three surviving documents dates 
from 11 November 1433. This letter, in which Giacomo pledges to oversee the sale of a bal-
aso (gemstone) owned by Lorenzo, hints at the death of Giacomo Dolfin qd. Francesco.81 
Following the last document signed by Giacomo Morosini, an account dated November 1434, 
a three-year gap in the preserved record of Lorenzo’s received Romania letters obscures his 
subsequent Black Sea trade.82 From 1437 onwards, Giovanni Morosini qd. Marino appears as 
 
78 E.g. Contarini, Antonio qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 13.09.1438, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [33]. 
79 Letter Gabriel, Andrea qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.12.1431, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [37]. 
80 E.g. Caffa is mentioned in a letter from Constantinople. Letter Dolfin, Giacomo qd. Francesco to Dolfin, 
Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 10.06.1424, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [44]. 
81 Letter Morosini, Giacomo qd. Lorenzo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 11.11.1433, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [46].  
82 Morosini, Giacomo qd. Lorenzo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Account, 1434.  001434, ASVe, Procuratori 
di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [47]. 
127 
 
a frequent interlocutor, writing mostly from Constantinople, twice from Koroni, and twice 
(1437 and 1439) from Venice.83 
Despite changing partnerships and, above all, a steadily changing market environment in the 
Black Sea region amidst political uncertainties, Lorenzo maintained an intense commercial 
activity along the Romania route for more than two decades, the documentation of which 
ends with Dolfino Dolfin’s last letter in 1448.84 It was chiefly characterised by a flexible 
strategy of commercial cooperation between well-acquainted individuals. Though Lorenzo 
cooperated most intensely with members of his extended and affinal families, a system of 
commercial partnerships based on a priori existing social bonds that guaranteed mutual ac-
countability and thus provided maximum transactional security, this family-based commer-
cial coalition also maintained an extensive network of collaborators who would take care of 
their merchandise in distant locations. While some of its members were permanent residents 
of the Romanian ports from which they wrote, such as the eventual vice-bailo of Constanti-
nople Giacomo Dolfin qd. Francesco, others travelled on the muda for specific commercial 
purposes.85 The sale of cloth, which was the key export commodity from central and western 
 
83 First document: Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Recordatio, 8 August 1437.  
08.08.1437, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [6]; last: Letter Morosini, Giovanni 
qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 02.01.1443, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, 
int. 2, f. [17]; Koroni letters: Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 05.10.1438, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [29]; Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, 
Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 21.10.1438, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [41]; 1439 
Venice declaration: “Chonzo sia che mi Zan Morexini de miser Marin quondam miser Zuane del mexe d’avosto 
1437 siando per partir mi de Veniexia per andar al viazo de Constantinopoli con le gallie de Romania 
chapetanio miser Zorzi Soranzo. Io si lassi in rechomandixia per vender certe mie veste et chosse a ser Lorenzo 
Dolfin quondam miser Antonio lequal veste et chosse si fo prima due manteli de scarlato fo drade de panze de 
schilati; una pelanda da dona de zent’anni a veludado negro con manege; averte v<e>gnolla a l’antiga una 
pelanda da dona di veludo negro hugnola con le manege; averte una pelanda da dona de pano di seda biancho 
con manege...” Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Declaration, 20 June 1439.  
20.06.1439, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [10]. 
84 Letter Dolfin, Dolfino qd. Giacomo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 08.12.1448, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [7].  
85 For example, Giovanni Morosini qd. Marino was probably not a permanent resident of Constantinople, as 
revealed in a recordatio issued to Lorenzo in 1437, in which he instructed Lorenzo on transactions to be made 
on his behalf. Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Recordatio, 8 August 1437.  
08.08.1437, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [6]: “Richordaxon fazo mi Zuane 
Morexini di miser Marrin a vui miser Lorenzo Dolfin fo di miser Antonio conzosia chossa che in bona gratia io 
vada a Constantonopoli con le prexente galie chapetanio miser Zorzo Soranzo.” 
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Europe to Romania in the outgoing Middle Ages, also constituted the principal business of 
Lorenzo Dolfin and his partners. Wool was traded mainly from the British Isles and shipped 
to the ports of the Aegean and Black Seas on both muda galleys and private vessels such as 
the shipped owned by Lorenzo Dolfin and his cousins, the sons of Francesco Dolfin. With re-
spect to the cloth trade, Venetian merchants benefited from their position as middle men, 
since wool-based cloth was principally produced in Northern Europe and distributed via Ven-
ice to the south and east. At the time, the English wool industries experienced a major boom, 
which was driven by the availability of labour and a relative abundancy of key resources such 
as wood and water, and facilitated by the natural advantage of a mild climate.86 The develop-
ing Venetian textile industry was not ready to compete on the same scale and consequently 
specialised in luxury textiles such as silk, while Venetian merchants had a lot to gain as buy-
ers and retailers of woollen cloth.87 Lorenzo Dolfin’s involvement in the Eastern cloth trade 
must be understood accordingly. With the relative decline of the Venetian maritime rivals 
during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Venetian merchants rose to become the key dis-
tributors of European cloth in the Eastern Mediterranean, which was sold both as a wholesale 
produce for further processing and (more rarely) in the form of tailored items. 
Overall, this situation was rather different from the circumstances faced by Venetian mer-
chants operating in the Mamluk Sultanate a few decades ealier. It was also distinct from the 
Venetian diaspora towards the end of the fifteenth century, as will become clear from the dis-
cussion of the Malipiero sources (see chapter VI below). Venetian merchants in Romania on 
the eve of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople benefited from a political climate in 
which political authorities were either too dependent on foreign imports or too weak to levy 
restrictions on mercantile activity. The Venetian diaspora in Romania consequently devel-
oped into a network of politically relevant and economically powerful external territories 
that, with respect to their internal political structure, replicated the model of the Serenissima 
in that power rested with mercantile elites who exercised their authority in a “Council of 
Twelve”.88 Operating as a kinship-based trade coalition was thus an obvious choice for Vene-
 
86 Munro, John H.: "Medieval woollens: textiles, textile technology and industrial organisation, c. 800-1500", in: 
Jenkins, David (ed.), The Cambridge History of Western Textiles I, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003, pp. 181-227 (here pp. 186-189). 
87 Ashtor: Levant Trade, p. 152; Molà: The Silk Industry, pp. 3-19.  
88 For the functioning of a council of twelve (the governing council of a Venetian merchant community on 
foreign soil) see Christ: Trading Conflicts, pp. 67-76; for the Venetian mercantile representation in 
Constantinople, see Dursteler, Eric: "The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice’s Early Modern 
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tian merchants, and the CLD documents suggest that Lorenzo Dolfin’s co-operative strategy 
was in many ways typical for the Venetian Romania trade as a whole. The establishment of 
specific (both short-term and long-term) partnerships and the pooling of assets in shared ac-
counts; the reciprocal provision of agency services at specific request; and the fostering of 
flexible commercial cooperations founded on non-economic (i.e. kinship-based) relations, 
were practices followed by most individuals identifiable in the CLD. The culture of kinship-
based agency services, which had replaced the commenda economy of travelling merchants, 
thus gradually developed into a system with changing residences and flat hierarchies between 
commercial partners. 
The evidence for the coalition-like organisation of Lorenzo Dolfin’s Romania trade is two-
fold: first, the documentation of the coalition agency model differs structurally from the part-
nerships involving some kind of commission agency; second, there are positive indications of 
family-based commercial cooperation along the principles of coalition agency in the corre-
spondence.  
In structural terms, commission agents did not maintain joint accounts with their principals, 
and instead recorded any performed transactions on separate balance sheets (as seen above 
with the examples of the Renier brothers and Girolamo Bragadin). The same applies to tem-
porary ventures conducted within a compagnia framework. Lorenzo conducted his most ex-
tensive compagnia venture in collaboration with paternal kin, and the structure of their coop-
eration bears similarities to the Dolfin-Morosini coalition in which it was embedded. Yet, in 
contrast to commission agency and compagnia ventures, a coalition-based commercial part-
nership did not necessitate the formal separation of accounts. The transformation of individu-
al into collective or coalitional capital – which in the present context may be defined as the 
permanent pooling of large shares of individual accounts and the interest-free provision of fi-
nancial capital between coalition members – meant that coalition members were mutually li-
able. As a result, the archival documentation of Lorenzo’s interaction with members of the 
Dolfin-Morosini coalition does not account for the remuneration of mutually rendered ser-
vices such as the handling of transactions or the provision of loans. In fact, apart from two 
papers signed by the clan’s patriarch Marino Morosini qd. Giovanni the documentation does 
not feature any account sheets at all. 
 
Diplomatic Corps", in: Mediterranean Historical Review 16 (2001), No. 2, pp. 1-30 (this article deals with the 
post-1453 period, which saw the position of the Venetian diplomatic authorities in Constantinople strengthened 
to allow for a diplomatic détente with the Ottoman Empire).  
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While the debt certificates issued by Marino Morosini to his daughter Giovanetta and her 
husband Lorenzo Dolfin support the notion of coalitional capital, an account sheet signed by 
the Morosini patriarch, which lists financial obligations between Giovanetta and various 
Dolfin-Morosini family members, documents the financial interdependencies within the 
Dolfin-Morosini family coalition.89 The document clearly reveals the existence of personal 
accounts even in the case of married women: for instance, it lists a loan of 10 ducats given to 
Lorenzo Dolfin by his wife Giovanetta.90 The account lists additional financial obligations of 
Marino himself as well as, among others, Giovanetta’s brother Giovanni, her sisters Modesta 
Morosini, Elisabetta Contarini, and Moresina Pisani, and a number of unnamed individuals.91 
While some of the obligations remain unspecified, most of them relate to financial loans that 
Giovanetta had provided to or receiced from other family members.92 In neither case do the 
listed items incur interest or commission payments. 
 
 
 
 
 
89 Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin née Morosini, Zaneta: Account, 1 August 1437.  01.08.1437, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 3, f. [8]. Page 3 of this document, which documents a loan 
of 80 gold ducats from Giovanetta to her father Marino and the sales performed by Marino on Giovanetta’s 
behalf (described in chapter IV.C.ii above), also survives as a copy in the CLD: Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni 
to Dolfin née Morosini, Zaneta: Account, 1 August 1437.  01.08.1437, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, 
b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 3, f. [8].  
90 Morosini, Marino qd. Giovanni to Dolfin née Morosini, Zaneta: Account, 1 August 1437.  01.08.1437, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 3, f. [8]: “ducati 10 di raxiòn di Lorenzo Dolfin quondam 
miser Antonio contrascryti die dar a dì 25 hotubryo 1437 per Zaneta Dolfin xè che la dita Zaneta a dado contadi 
al dito Lorenzo Dolfin ducati 10…”; all financial obligations, even those referring to loans given in bullion, are 
expressed in moneys of account (lire/ soldi/ denari). 
91 Ibid.: e.g. “Zaneta Dolfin die dar per una persona che non vol eser mentoada…”/ “[Zaneta Dolfin contra 
scryta die aver] per una persona che non vol eser mentoada…” 
92 Ibid.: for instance, a loan to a certain Bianca di Priuli provided by Giovanni Morosini that was guaranteed by 
Giovanetta: “Ser Zuan Morexini de ser Maryn contra scryto die aver a dì 14 mazo 1444 per Biancha di Pryoli xè 
che Zaneta Dolfin me dise in soa vita che la dita Biancha fo chontrata de star atrior(?) dal dito ser Zuane ducati 
8 d’oro che el dito ser Zuane aveva abudo chome apar in so raxiòn e chusì instodi la dita Bianche chonfeso è 
contento e però io fazo la dita Biancha che la die dar el dito ser Zuane che el die aver per saldar la dita 
raxiòn…” 
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TABLE 1: MEMBERS, DOLFIN-MOROSINI COALITION 
NAME RELATION 
TO LO-
RENZO 
DOLFIN 
RELATION TO 
LORENZO 
DOLFIN'S AF-
FINAL FAMILY 
RESIDENCE NO. OF PRO-
DUCED DOC-
UMENTS IN 
CLD93 
TIME SPAN OF PRE-
SERVED CLD COR-
RESPONDENCE 
Contarini, 
Antonio 
qd. Marino 
Husband of 
sister-in-law 
affinal  Constantinople, 
Negroponte 
9 1432-1444 
Dolfin, 
Lorenzo 
qd. Anto-
nio 
 
affinal  Venice, Vicen-
za, Padoa 
12 
 
Gabriel,  
Benedetto 
qd. Nicolò 
Uncle affinal Venice, Sacile 3 1420-1436 
Morosini, 
Giovanni 
qd. Marino 
Brother-in-
law 
consanguineous  Venice, Con-
stantinople 
Koroni 
10 1437-1443 
Morosini, 
Michele 
qd. Marino 
Brother-in-
law 
consanguineous  London 27 1441-1446 
Morosini, 
Marino qd. 
Giovanni 
Father-in-
law 
consanguineous  Venice, Mor-
gan 
18 1426-1443 
Morosini, 
Pietro qd. 
Marino 
Brother-in-
law 
consanguineous  Constantinople, 
Bursa, Caffa 
4 1442-1443 
Pisani, Po-
lo 
Husband of 
sister-in-law 
affinal n/a n/a n/a 
 
The coalitional capital thus consisted of the aggregated assets of coalition members. In addi-
tion to the mutual provision of capital, a second crucial element of the coalition was the mu-
tual rendition of transaction services. The 1437 recordatio issued to Lorenzo Dolfin by his 
brother-in-law Giovanni Morosini exemplifies this coalitional obligation: before embarking 
on the galleys to Constantinople, Giovanni instructed Lorenzo to sell his remaining Venice 
stock of processed wool products while giving him full operational responsibility for the sale. 
Giovanni asked Lorenzo to pay 50 ducats to Giovanni’s associates Matteo and Ambrogio 
 
93 Includes documents from the Mueller-Christies collection. 
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Contarini qd. Nicolò as well as eight ducats to his sister Giovanetta, Lorenzo’s wife. Lorenzo 
was to keep the remaining revenues from the sale while awaiting further instruction.94 
The (mutual) provision of agency and accounting services – is reflected to the same extent in 
the letters that Lorenzo received from his fellow coalition members abroad. The same Gio-
vanni Morosini, upon his arrival in Constantinople, informed Lorenzo about the Romania 
markets and provided specific investment advice.95 Coalition agents like Giovanni Morosini 
would still extract commissions from the turnover they handled, yet any increase in personal 
wealth would in turn be made available for joint investments – in other words, it would be 
added to the stock of coalitional capital. In his first letter from Constantinople, Giovanni an-
nounced an extended stay, which would leave him with enough time to fulfil his obligations 
towards his peers. His brother-in-law Antonio Contarini qd. Marino had arranged for him to 
stay in the house of a certain Nicolò Giustinian for a price of 20 ducats per year in addition to 
half of the commission payments Giovanni would receive for his transactions. These com-
missions, however, appear to stem from transactions outside the coalitional arrangement, per-
formed on behalf of third parties. Antonio Contarini, who appears as a senior coalition agent 
 
94 Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Recordatio, 8 August 1437.  08.08.1437, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [6]: “Richordaxòn fazo mi Zuane Morexini di 
miser Marrin a vui miser Lorenzo Dolfin fo di miser Antonio conzosia chossa chè in bona gratia io vada a 
Constantonopoli con le prexente galie chapetanio miser Zorzo Soranzo. Per chaxòn chome vui save io sio 
algune me veste di pani sonte che sichò me apar per uno mio liberèto lequal mia intentiòn sie tute sia vendude et 
per tanto io ve priego charamente quanto a vui e posibile chel non ve sia dafano a prochura de vender le dite. Et 
chusì io ve priego debie vender tute le dite mie veste che apar per el mio liberèto lequal debie vender per el 
priexio a vui parerà et far dele dite chosse chome si vostre fosse et chome a vui parerà. In tuto e dol trato dele 
dite o de quela parte vui vendere debie darper mio nome a ser Mafio e a ser Ambruxo Contarini quondam miser 
Nicholò per ducati 50 a charlevar proximo che die vegnir. Anchora debie dar a Zaneta mia suor ducati 8 per mi 
e del resto tignere a pruovo di vui fin che altro ordene io ve daro.” 
95 Letter Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 22.11.1437, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [32]: “…del vegnir in quà alguna utilità di mie danari non de le mie 
investite per Venexia miser domino dio me dia mior ve<n>tura. Avixandove che la parso a mio chugnado ser 
Antonio io abia investido hi mie danari in piper”; Letter Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. 
Antonio, 28.05.1438, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [43]: “de conditiòn de 
marchandantia de tuto se fano pocho per eser el paexe in mala conditiòn aza de quelo reze le chosse sono pani 
fiorenze peperi 130 meziane peperi 100 et sone asai pani bastardi per 65 loesti peperi 1…” 
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and as a supervisor to the newly arrived Giovanni, would pass on specific assignments from 
third parties to his brother-in-law.96 
Whereas Giovanni mostly wrote about the textiles trade, Antonio Contarini was an insider to 
the gemstone market and also performed gemstone transactions for Lorenzo. This activity is 
documented in all of Antonio’s letters, in which he reported on transactions made on Lo-
renzo’s behalf,97 as well as in a 1442 recordatio that Lorenzo gave to Antonio upon his im-
minent journey from Venice to Constantinople, in which Antonio was instructed on the sale 
of two balasi.98 In sum, Antonio appears as Lorenzo’s more crucial mercantile contact in 
Constantinople, as Giovanni’s letters mostly highlight Lorenzo’s agency services to Giovanni 
 
96 Ibid.: “Son zerto che per ser Antonio Contarini nostro chugnado sarete apièn avixato pur non resterò 
d’avixarve de quelo me achaderà per eser zerto he ve averò con piaxesto a vui et a tuti hi altri. E per obedir el 
comandamento vostro et de mio chugnado ser Antonio io ho voiuto rimagnir de qui. El dito ser Antonio si m’a 
acordato con ser Nicolò Justinian a star in chaxa soa et io li debio pagar ducati 20 per spexe de bocha al'ano et 
apresso el dito ser Nicolò de aver la mitade de le provixiòn dele fazende ne meterà el dito ser Antonio in le man. 
Credo che per quest’ano seguirò pocha utilitade. Priego Christo me governi e si me prosperi per l’avegnir.” 
97 E.g. Contarini, Antonio qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 16.05.1443, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [15]: “…De vostri ballasi 10 ho seguito ne plui prexio de quello vi disi 
mai ho posuto avener qui le zolie molto chasati de prexio e pero he de nezesso che mi a dati ordene…”; 
Contarini, Antonio qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 02.1440, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, 
b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [19]: “Honorado chome magiore fradello, la prinzipal chaxon de questa picolla he per 
avixarvi chome scrivo a Lunardo mio fradello vi dia ducati zento e zinquanta iqual se pode induxiati fim a le 
gallie a domandarlli non possudo induxiar per vostri besogni e lui dara quanto voretti delqual balasso non ne va 
digno oltra ducati 32. […]. Se avetti ne uno ballasso forado e per lla d’ogni sortta pur che non sia fina roba vi 
conforto mand<e>rati de qui che tegno se venderà ben s’el vostro ballasso fosse stato marro se vendeva molto 
mellio per raxòn.” 
98 Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio to Contarini, Antonio qd. Marino: Recordatio, 29 July 1442.  29.07.1442, ASVe, 
Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [5]: the gemstones should either be sold for bullion or 
bartered against commodities that would yield the largest profits on the Venetian market, a task for which 
Antonio was given full operational responsibility: “…e per atrovarme balasi 2 iqual ho dexaderyo di vender e di 
mandar al dito viazo per so ventura iqual balasi 2 io ve o dadi che vui li portar con vuy al dito viazo e di i diti 
pregove prochura di vender in meterli fin ho a dener over a barato di quele chose che fazi per qui chon plui 
utilitade e mio avantazo ve sia posibel chome se i fosa vostri a rechordandove che barata deli che vui ve inpaze 
in quele chose che de qui ve parase me posi insir con mior profito...”. Antonio eventually sold them for 55 and 
48 ducats respectively: “non possando far melio i dia per ducati 103 zoè uno per ducati 55 l’altro per ducati 
48…” (Contarini, Antonio qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Letter, 22 October 1443.  22.10.1443, 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [12]). 
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rather than vice-versa.99 Although Giovanni was clearly involved with the coalition,100 the 
rarity of his performed transactions on behalf of others reveals the nature of the coalition as a 
permanent, long-term arrangement that offered a potential for transaction-specific coopera-
tion, rather than an organisation built for the purpose of a specific commercial enterprise such 
as the compagnia. As a coalition member, Lorenzo was free to use the services of his peers 
according to their specific skills and his requirements at specific points in time. From the 
mid-1430s until the mid-1440s, Lorenzo’s most significant coalition partners – in terms of 
services provided to Lorenzo – were Antonio Contarini and his brother-in-law Michele Mo-
rosini in London. 
C. Social Environment and Senior Years 
The coalition was embedded into a wider system of personal networks. Individuals who were 
part of Lorenzo’s personal network, such as his relative Dolfino Dolfin qd. Giacomo (a Con-
stantinople resident), continued to assist him in his commerce. Dolfino wrote about commer-
cial matters while also providing relevant political news.101 Yet, despite the lack of evidence 
 
99 Giovanni Morosini confirmed the services provided by Lorenzo in his letters, which illustrate their coalitional 
relationship in addition to the aforementioned recordatio and another document leaving instructions to Lorenzo 
ahead of one of Giovanni’s journeys to Constantinople (Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. 
Antonio: Declaration, 20 June 1439.  20.06.1439, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, 
f. [10]: “Chonzosia che mi Zan Morexini de miser Marin […] siando per partir mi de Venexia per andar al viazo 
de Constantinopoli […]. Io si lassi in rechomandixia per vender certe mie veste et chosse a ser Lorenzo Dolfin 
quondam miser Antonio…”). According to Giovanni’s letters, Lorenzo sold (processed) textiles on Giovanni’s 
behalf and managed Giovanni’s account with the Soranzo bank (Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, 
Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 05.10.1438, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [29]: “…Per 
quella de Mafio Conttarini et per la vostra rimagno avixato chome hi avete dato in el bancho di Soranzi ducati 
25 per mio nome et dite li son hi ducati dela vesta avete vendato lo resto m’avete servito...”). 
100 E.g. reporting the sale of brocades from Damascus, which he postponed in order to increase returns by 8 to 
10 percent (Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd.Antonio, 20.05.1442, ASVe, Procuratori di 
San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [23]: “…Come ve puol eser manifesto da ser Francesco Querini fo de 
ser Fantin me fo richomandati 3 peze de damaschini […] brochati hi dovesse vender o baratar […] onde li vendi 
a tenpo del retorno dele gallie de mar mazor per miorarli in 2 mexi piui de quelo poza far a i conttadi da 8 in 10 
per cento”); reporting prices of European textiles in Constantinople (see above, Morosini, Giovanni qd. Marino 
an Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 28.05.1438, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. 
[43]). 
101 An example of Dolfino’s description of the situation in the Byzantine empire is in Dolfin, Dolfino qd. 
Giacomo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 17.06.1442, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, 
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for his financial involvement with members of the Dolfin-Morosini coalition, his letters still 
resemble those of a family representative, maintaining a branch of the family business in a 
distant location.102 Dolfino provided information about the Constantinople spice market but 
did not explicitly report on performed transactions.103 
Although the letters sent to Lorenzo from Constantinople in the 1440s document Lorenzo’s 
continuous involvement in long-distance trade, there is no documentation for the following 
two decades. It is possible that Lorenzo retired from his trading activities during the final two 
decades of his life.104 
Unlike his uncle Biagio, who died before reaching the age of fifty, Lorenzo Dolfin lived well 
into his seventies. His life was typical in the context of the fifteenth-century patriciate in that 
he gained experience in both commerce and the Republican civil service before taking the 
lead in ambitious long-distance trade ventures. Equally typical was his long-term investment 
strategy. In terms of its economic development, Venice was primarily characterised by the 
expansion and further economic exploration of the terraferma in the first half of the fifteenth 
century. Urban mercantile elites who retreated to the rural parts of Venetia soon created a dis-
tinct social class of wealthy landowners with quite differentiated economic interests.105 Alt-
hough Lorenzo Dolfin’s life and career seem to fit this pattern of gradual retreat, he never set-
tled permanently outside the city of Venice. Rather, Lorenzo’s temporary settlements in the 
 
int. 2, f. [20]: “Nuove de qui el signor turcho con el disporti fradel de l’imperador he acordato a desfacion de 
l’imperador e de Constantinopoli sollo per far signor el dispotti che tegno non su gneia facta alla raxon e no che 
questa de lo luogo non el s’ofreria mai per dubio del turcho. Avixandovi che el predicto dispotti ogni zorno con 
el favor de turchi chare suxo le partte de qui che he gram dano a sto luocho per esser tucti i passe de Grettia 
seradi e Turchia et a vostra informattion l’imperador in sti zorni passatti mando suo ambassadori sollene al 
turcho iqual rettorno senza far nulla. Tegnando sechondo l’opinion mia la cossa antedicte starmo assai ai zonsse 
che gran dano sera alla marchadantia.” 
102 Lane, Andrea Barbarigo, p. 120; for branching, see Rubin, Jared: "Bills of Exchange, Financial Networks, 
and Quasi-Impersonal Exchange in Western Europe and the Middle East", in: Christ, G., Morche, F.-J., Zaugg, 
R., Kaiser, W., Beihammer, A., Burkhardt, S. (eds.), Union in Separation: Diasporic Groups and Identities in 
the Eastern Mediterranean, 1100-1800, Rome: Viella, 2015, pp. 545-554. 
103 Letter Dolfin, Dolfino qd. Giacomo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 13.03.1443, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [16].  
104 The last Romania letter was written by Dolfino Dolfin in December 1448 (Dolfin, Dolfino qd. Giacomo to 
Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 08.12.1448, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 2, f. [7]). 
105 Lanaro, Paola: "Flexibilité et diversification comme réponse au risque: les investissements du patriciat 
vénitien et de la « Terraferma » aux débuts de l’époque moderne", in: Working Paper, Department of 
Economics, Ca' Foscari University of Venice 22 (2008). 
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terraferma and his eventual investments in terraferma real estate should rather be seen as el-
ements of an archetypical patrician career that comprised consecutive stages as diaspora mer-
chant, the pursuit of a cursus honorum in the civil service, and the pursuit of long-distance 
trade from Venice through a network of resident agents and a family-based commercial coali-
tion. In this respect, Lorenzo’s life resembles those of other patrician contemporaries, such as 
Andrea Barbarigo and Biagio Dolfin.106 
Lorenzo Dolfin’s personal network served both social and economic purposes. The (extend-
ed) patrician family was a pool of support and mutual obligations, which served a variety of 
purposes well beyond commercial cooperation. This is particularly visible in the way state of-
fices were distributed within patrician networks and executed with the backing of the family 
environment.107 A great many of Lorenzo Dolfin’s relatives served in official capacity in the 
terraferma and the Venetian overseas territories. When ascending to state service, Venetian 
patricians could usually count on the support of their kin in conducting their office and for the 
parallel pursuit of commercial affairs. As camerario of Vicenza, Lorenzo heavily relied on his 
affinal family in Venice, where his father-in-law Marino Morosini took care of his business 
interests. In return, Lorenzo supported his relatives who held official positions. The letter by 
which Nicolò Dolfin qd. Benedetto informed his cousin Lorenzo about his appointment as 
podestà of Sacile is particularly insightful in this respect.108 Nicolò wrote to Lorenzo (then 
still residing in Vicenza) to request ornaments, flags, and trumpets that Biagio Dolfin had 
used during his service as consul.109 
Yet, the commercial dimension remained the most crucial aspect of Lorenzo’s personal net-
work during his senior years. Apart from Lorenzo’s own temporary residencies in the ter-
raferma, an account book provides a glimpse into his investment strategies as a senior. This 
 
106 Christ: Trading Conflicts; Lane: Andrea Barbarigo. 
107 O'Connell, Monique: Men of Empire: Power and Negotiation in Venice’s Maritime State, Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2009, pp. 57-74. 
108 Letter Dolfin, Nicolò qd. Benedetto to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 011.1426, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [45]. 
109 Ibid.: “Ve prego orna e bandiere da tronbeta el stendardo elqual fo de vostro barba. E se alguna arma de testa 
ve atrovese se quelo ve piari conse<g>narme e inprestarme azio che quando a vui le bexognase avanti el mio 
[…] me oferò de mandarvele. E de questo me respondar pluy presto che vuy par azio che posando fornirme per 
lo mezo vostro e posar andar al dito rezimento. Et in caxo che no me pose fornir dele sovrascritte chose [o verde 
perte dequale avexamente] perché diqua [e me ne] forniria al mio [ch'io po dar] avanti la mia partida.” 
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quaderno of 1467 is at the same time the last preserved CLD document.110 The (single-entry) 
account book, signed by Lorenzo Dolfin himself, lists the returns from Lorenzo’s real estate 
property. Unfortunately, only the (ripped-off) cover page is preserved with merely two items 
listed on the back.111 
D. Wealth and Death 
Lorenzo Dolfin was the primary heir of his uncle Biagio, who had left him his entire real es-
tate property.112 In addition, his mother Cataruccia had left him 1000 ducats in state bonds. 
No testament survives of his wife Giovanetta, who died in 1444. Like his uncle Biagio, Lo-
renzo Dolfin had no obvious heirs. In his notarised testament, dated 18 July 1474, he appoint-
 
110 Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Quaderno, 16 November 1467.  16.11.1467, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco 
(PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [14]: “Quaderno de mi Lorenzo Dolfin fo de miser Antonio in lo qual 
io scryvero le raxion de i fiti de le mie chaxe da stazio e da sizenti con le spexe per chonzar le dite chaxe con 
altre spexe per le dite con le qual quaderno si chomenza a di 16 Novembryo 1467.” 
111 Ibid.: „+ 1467 a di 16 Novembryo in Veniexe 
Raxion de resti per el saldar de un libro de fiti de chaxe  
signado numero 3 per resti terati di el dito libro e portare  
su que fito die dar a di 16 Novembro 1467 per ser Zorzi  
Dolfin fo de ser Francescho xe per resto de un raxion de  
el dito el qual resto contrato de el dito libro signado  
numero 3 chomo in el dito libro apar a lin 5 horo…….in  2 L……………….. 
Et a di dito per raxion de fiti de le mie chaxe da stazio  
condasi zente de mia raxion xe per resto de una raxion  
de la dita el qual resto contrado de el dito libro signado  
numero 3 chomo in el dito libro apar a lin 41 horo…..in    6 L…………………..xx” 
112 Bonfantin, Vittore de to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Testament, Biagio Dolfin qd. Lorenzo, 27 April 1420.  
27.04.1420, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie miste, b. 180, pergamene, p. 59 [MMDD]: “Item 
dimitto suprascripto ser Laurentio Delphino nepoti meo meum domum magnam sitam in contracta San Iustine in 
qua ad praesentem habitat vir nobilis ser Hector Bembo cum omibus suis hntiis- et pertinentiis ve aporte viri 
nobilis ser Roberti Maurozeno et mei usque ad domum meam in qua habitat ser Petrus Dolze quaternerius hac 
condictione que dicta domus ire debeat in descendentibus maschulis ipsius ser Laurentii nepotis mei et de sua 
prole per lineam maschulinam usque in infinitum. Et volo quod dicta domus numquam possit vendi dari donari 
alienari transactari seu pro anima iudicari aut pignorari. Salvo quod volo quod possit accipi dotes super 
praedictam domus. Item dimitto superscripto ser Laurentio Delphino nepoti meo illam meam domum quam 
michi dimixit mater mea que fuit de cha Telnige post mortem - suprascripta dominae sororis Cataruzie Momalis 
monasterii Sancti Iohannis de Torzello liberam et expeditam. Et omnis alias meas domos a seguentibus dimitto 
eidem ser Laurentio Delphino nepoti meo liberas et expeditas” (transcription by G. Christ). 
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ed his nephew Zaccharia Morosini as principal executor. Zaccharia, the son of his brother-in-
law Giovanni Morosini qd. Marino, was to act in collaboration with the Procurators of San 
Marco.113 The appointment of the procurator di citra suggests that Lorenzo resided in Venice 
in his home parish of Santa Giustina when compiling his will. 
The testament is unusually long and thus, as it is the only source providing a detailed account 
of Lorenzo’s possessions, of critical importance for assessing Lorenzo’s overall wealth at the 
time of his death. By contrast, since the document does not mention any relatives apart from 
the executor Zaccharia Morosini, his deceased parents Antonio and Cataruccia Dolfin and his 
deceased uncle Biagio Dolfin, for whom Lorenzo requested memorial services, his strategy of 
inheritance does not provide clues to his late intra-family relations, nor to his cross-
generational links.114 
A notable particularity is the priority given to charitable donations, which are mentioned in 
second place right after the extensive list of religious arrangements. Lorenzo asked for requi-
ems to be held in Rome as well as in Venice.115 Lorenzo also endowed several parishes for 
the construction of altars, among them the Basilica of Saint Anthony in Padua. He had distin-
guished himself as a major sponsor of ecclesiastical art in his later years and had financed the 
S. Lorenzo triptych of the Bellini school in Santa Maria della Carità,116 where he asked to be 
buried alongside his wife Giovanetta and his mother Cataruccia.117 
 
113 Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Testament, 18 July 1474.  18.07.1474, ASVe, Archivio Notarile Testamenti, b. 
1240: “MCCCCLXXIIII a dì XVIII luio in Venexia mi Lorenzo Dolphin fo de miser Antonio de la contrada de 
San Iustina a Venexia son de la mente e del corpo voio e si ordeno questo sia mio ultimo testamento. Et prima 
recomando l’amia mia al nostro signor dio. Item lasso mie conmessii i signor procurator de miser San Marco 
zoe di citra et mio nievo ser Zacharia Morexini fo de miser Zuane.” 
114 Ibid.: “Item lasso per amor de dio per l’anima de miser Antonio Dolphin mio pate e per l’anima de miser 
Blasio Dolphin mio barba et per l’anima de madonna Chararuza Dolphin mia ma<d>re ducati 200 d’oro […]. E 
tuti soraditti frari e munege sia tegnudi et obligadi in le soe oratiòn e messe e officii pregar dio per l’anime de 
tuti tre soraditti.” 
115 Ibid.: “Et simel a Roma in la giexia dove xè la perdonanza de dir una messa sagramental per l’anima mia.” 
116 Ibid.: “Item lasso di i fitti de la soraditta proprietade semper et perpetuo ogni anno ducati x d’oro al mio altar 
de San Lorenzo xè in la giexia de Santa Maria dela caritade xè in Venexia.” For a history of the Bellini triptychs 
of Santa Maria della Carità and Lorenzo Dolfin’s financial involvement, see Huse, N., Wolters, W.: The Art of 
Renaissance Venice - Architecture, Sculpture, and Painting, 1460-1590, Chicago and London: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1990, p. 182. 
117 Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Testament, 18 July 1474.  18.07.1474, ASVe, Archivio Notarile Testamenti, b. 
1240: “Item voio et ordeno el mio corpo sia seppelido e metudi(?) in la mia archa che xe a lo luogo de Santa 
Maria di la caritade xe in Venexia laqual archa xe in el dinofero(?) del ditto luogo a coverto in suxo el mirro de 
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Lorenzo’s wealth at the time of his death was considerable and the testament contains mone-
tary grants (held in bullion and state bonds) of more than 7000 ducats as well as a significant 
real estate property whose yearly yields were allocated to monasteries for charitable purpos-
es. His family property in the parish of Santa Giustina, which were divided into six com-
pounds since 1354, was to be given to the Santa Giustina monastery (“el luogo de San Iusti-
na”).118 The testament further mentions six small houses (“caxete”) in Santa Giustina which 
the executors were asked to administer and to rent out for two gold ducats per year to people 
in need.119 Since there is no mention of the monastery of Santa Giustina in this part of the 
document, the caxete presumably did not belong to the family compound. Two additional 
houses in the parish of Santa Giustina were to be rented out for the highest possible yields,120 
to be given to the monastery of Santa Maria della Carità.  
Apart from Lorenzo’s executors and his deceased relatives, the only individual mentioned in 
the testament is his servant (“schiava”) Maria who was to be freed and granted 20 gold ducats 
in addition to a yearly pension of eight gold ducats.121 The rest of Lorenzo’s wealth, which 
was mostly held in state bonds (“imprestiti della camera degli imprestiti”), was given to ec-
clesiastical institutions. Bonds worth 3000 ducats were allocated to the church and the mon-
 
la giexia messa a nerto suxo modioni.”/ “Anchora el ditto luogo de Santa Maria dela Caritade sia tegnudi et 
obligado semper e perpetuo de non meter ni far meter ne lassar meter ni ch’el sia metudo algun corpo in la ditta 
mia archa per algun muodo over integno dapoi sara metudo el mio in la ditta archa e in la ditta al prexente xè 
quello de mia ma<d>re e de mia moier e semper et perpetuo voio che sia fatto e observado chomo di sora ho 
ditto et ordenadi.” 
118 Ibid.: “Item voio e ordeno la mia proprietade messa in la contrada de Santa Iustina de Venexia laqual 
proprietade xè a pruovo la giexia e lo luogo de Santa Iustina laqual proprietade fo de miser Piero Dolphin e la 
ditta proprietade fo partida in 6 parte chomo apar per una divusiòn fatta in 1354.” 
119 Ibid.: „Item voio e ordeno semper et perpetuo per amor di dio per l’anima mia le soraditte 6 caxete sia 
affitade per ducati 2 d’oro l’una a l’anno. E per el ditto prexio de ducati 2 d’oro l’una a l’anno sia dade e darsi se 
debia a persone che sia bone over de bona fama et che tegna honesta vità zoè a quelle persone che paresse e 
fosse mazor besogna e marze.” 
120 Ibid.: „Item voio et ordeno la mia proprietadi messe in la contradi de Santa Iustina da Venexia laqual 
proprietadi xè do caxe da statio zoè una ha riva e pozo e altana e l’altra ha ortto et pozo. […]. Item voio semper 
et perpetuo la soraditta proprietade per i mie conmessery e non per altri sia affitadi per lo plui et mazor prexio se 
pora e far el meio sia possibele chomo ne ssi mie conmessery apparera. E semper et perpetuo i mie conmessery 
si debia scuoder et scuoda tuti i fitti de tuti la soraditta proprietade e tuti i dener di ditti fitti sia salvadi e salvar si 
se debia.” 
121 Ibid.: „Item lasso a Maria sorascritta ducati 8 d’oro ogni anno fin che la vuiera. Item lasso a la sorascritta 
Maria ducati 20 d’oro.” 
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astery (“giexa e luogo”) of Santa Maria della Carità, which, in return, was asked to  honour 
Lorenzo’s memory with a daily mass while displaying the Dolfin coat of arms on Lorenzo’s 
altar and inside the chapel of S. Lorenzo (“a perpetua memorie”).122 Another 500 ducats of 
imprestiti were allocated to the hospital of Santa Maria della Pietà (“hospedal de la pietade”), 
1000 ducats in bonds to the scuola of Santa Maria dell’Anima. Yet another 2000 ducats of 
state bonds were put aside partly for the maintenance of the aforementioned two houses in 
Santa Giustina,123 and partly for distribution, in amounts ranging from ten to thirty ducats, 
among several Venetian churches and monasteries, including San Francesco della Vigna and 
San Salvador.  
Given the dominance of consanguineous and affinal kin in Lorenzo’s commerce, and the con-
siderable degree to which he himself had been integrated into a comprehensive family envi-
ronment despite the early loss of his father, the absence of consanguineous heirs in Lorenzo 
Dolfin’s testament is certainly surprising. The explanation herefore, it can be supposed, pri-
marily lies in the rather long time-span of 30 years between the end of his recorded commer-
cial activities in the 1440s and his death in 1475, as the family-based commercial coalition in 
which Lorenzo conducted his long-distance trade did not remain pertinent during his retire-
ment. Furthermore, his own childlessness was of significance: the lesser relevance of the sub-
sequent generation of the Dolfin-Gabriel-Morosini clan already during his years of commer-
cial activity suggests that his bonds to his second cousins and the subsequent generation of 
his affinal Morosini family may have been weaker. Yet the appointment of Zaccharia Mo-
rosini as an executor confirms the overall importance of his affinal family.  
E. Preliminary Evaluation: The Patrician Family in the Economic Sphere 
Lorenzo Dolfin’s business relationships can be grouped into three principal categories. First, 
he maintained links with close kin, both affinal and consanguineous. This includes his uncle 
Biagio Dolfin, his cousins Giacomo, Giorgio, and Vettore Dolfin qd. Francesco, and the 
branch of the Morosini family from which his wife Giovanetta originated. Second, there are 
long-lasting relationships of trust that partly stemmed from a family relationship of second 
order (cross-generational partnerships), of which Girolamo Bragadin qd. Andrea is an exam-
 
122 Ibid.: “…e tegnir se debia semper et perpetuo le mie arme da cha’ Dolphin zoè da tre dolphini al ditto mio 
altar de S. Lorenzo e a la ditta mia capella.” 
123 Ibid.: „…do caxe da statio zoè una ha riva pozo e altane e l’altra a orto e pozo e tute do le ditte caxe xè a 
imsembre e xè a pruovo le proprietade fo da cha’ Corer…” 
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ple. Third, there are relationships without exogenous (i.e. not commerce-related) social foun-
dation, as with Francesco and Marco Renier qd. Nicolò and Francesco Orsini (commission 
agency model).  
 It was Lorenzo’s affinal family from which his most crucial arrangement of commer-
cial cooperation emerged, a family-based trade coalition. The increasing significance of his 
affinal family was rooted primarily in the overlaps between his commercial interests and 
those of his affinal kin. Lorenzo Dolfin’s core business model was predicated on re-investing 
revenues from the spice trade in Northern European textiles, and their eventual sale in Roma-
nia. The economy observed in the Dolfin sources was not an agency economy based on bilat-
eral partnerships, as trade relationships served a much broader purpose than the mere delega-
tion of authority. The environments in which the Dolfin-Morosini coalition operated were not 
particularly hazardeous.124 On the contrary, markets were framed by public-order institutional 
structures that minimised risks to individual merchants. The creation of long-term agency co-
alitions was motivated not merely by a quest for maximising short-term efficiency, but also 
by long-term economic perspectives that furthered the growth of the coalitional capital and 
thus offered secure forms of investment to individual coalition members. The patrician fami-
ly, as observed in the Dolfin sources, was thus of critical importance to the wider Venetian 
economic sphere by facilitating the creation of commercial coalitions and related personal 
commercial networks. 
 
124 The link between the delegation of authority and operational risk (with delegation an increasing function of 
risk) has been established by ROIDER, who finds that “only if the exogenous risk is sufficiently large may the 
risk-neutral principal prefer to delegate authority over decisions to the risk-averse agent”, see Roider, Andreas: 
"Delegation, Risk, and Project Scope", in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 165 (2009), No. 
2, pp. 193-209. 
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CHAPTER VI:  
THE PATRICIAN FAMILY AS AN ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTION 
This chapter provides an analysis of the institutional framework arising from the presented 
case study. Section A discusses the historiography of late medieval Venetian commerce 
against the backdrop of recent economic theories of social interaction. It will be shown, on 
the basis of a comparative discussion of the late medieval compagnia and the modern compa-
ny, that neither rational-choice approaches nor sociological theories of the market can ade-
quately account for the social and institutional structure of Venetian commerce (A.i, A.ii). In-
stead, the historical record shows that the patrician family had economic significance in addi-
tion to its various other social functions (A.iii). Section B illustrates these different roles more 
closely (B.i) before outlining a new generic model of the patrician family (B.ii). Section C 
discusses the incentives structures of commercial partnerships; most crucially, this shows 
how family bonds between commercial partners altered the incentives of individual actors 
compared to commercial relationships outside of family environments (C.ii, C.iii). Finally, 
section D introduces two addtitional historical perspectives from the early and the late fif-
teenth century respectively. A small body of sources documenting the commercial activities 
of the Venetian merchants Donato Soranzo and Ambrogio Malipiero allows for re-
contextualising the gained theoretical insights while also serving as a helpful reminder of the 
distinct complexity of commercial biographies, which can never be fully captured in abstract 
theoretical models. 
A. Private-Order Institutions 
Studies on the socio-political significance of the family have produced a wide array of con-
clusions in different contexts.1 Italian city republics, fostering quite distinct political and eco-
nomic environments, were particularly diverse in this respect.2 
 
1 Greif, Avner: The Study of Organizations; Jahnke: Handelsnetze im Ostseeraum. 
2 For the respective roles of the family in various Italian city-states during the late medieval period, see e.g. 
Crabb, Ann: The Strozzi of Florence - Widowhood & Family Solidarity in the Renaissance, Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 2000 (part. chapters 4, 5, 8); Hocquet, Jean-Claude: "Solidarités familiales et 
soldarités marchandes à Venise au XIVe siècle", in: Actes des congrès de la Société des historiens médiévistes 
de l'enseignement supérieur public. 27e congrès, Rome, 1996, pp. 227-255; Kamenaga-Anzai, Yoko: "The 
Family Consciousness in Medieval Genoa: The Case of the Lomellini", in: The Mediterranean World XIX (June 
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The Dolfin sources give grounds to assign significant social, economic, and political roles to 
the patrician family in fifteenth-century Venice. For both Biagio and Lorenzo Dolfin, their 
family environments were of pivotal importance to their careers. The Venetian context, how-
ever, does not reflect a ubiquitous pattern in late medieval and early modern Italy. Scholars of 
Renaissance Florence, for example, have emphasised a structural distinction between the 
spheres of family and commerce. Whereas family relations played a major role in the politi-
cal realm,3 commercial links in the Florentine economy were not typically formed on the ba-
sis of family bonds.4 
By contrast, family structures dominated Venetian long-distance trade in the later Middle 
Ages and beyond. Venetian business law buttressed this development by facilitating the for-
mation of business partnerships between brothers: the fraterna became the predominant eco-
nomic institution of capital generation (from which female heirs were excluded).5 Venetian 
business history knows many prominent examples of fraterna-based business ventures, a no-
table one being the partnership of Donato Soranzo with his brothers Giacomo, Lorenzo, and 
Pietro. Their cotton-import business also included non-kin agents in addition to a number of 
more distantly related family members.6 
The prominence of extended families in various types of commercial documents indicates 
that the fraterna was an important but by no means the only institutional arrangement of in-
tra-family business cooperation.7 Extended families – meaning individuals linked by consan-
guineous and affinal ties outside the nuclear family, such as cousins and brothers-in-law – 
 
2008); Klapisch-Zuber, Christiane: Women, Family, and Ritual in Renaissance Italy, Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1985 (part. Chapter 4). 
3 Padgett, John F.: "Open Elite? Social Mobility, Marriage and Family in Florence, 1282-1494", in: Political 
Networks Paper Archive Working Papers, 2009; Padgett, J.F., Ansell, C.K.: "Robust Action and the Rise of the 
Medici, 1400-1434", in: The American Journal of Sociology 98 (May, 1993), No. 6, pp. 1259-1319.  
4 Padgett, J.F., McLean, P.D.: "Economic Credit and Elite Transformation in Renaissance Florence", in: mimeo, 
May 2006; Padgett, J.F., McLean, P.D.: "Social Relations in Florentine Markets: Quantitative Evidence from 
the 1427 Catasto", in: mimeo, 1997.  
5 Pertile: Storia del diritto privato, p. 282; Mueller, Reinhold C.: The Venetian Money Market - Banks, Panics, 
and the Public Debt, 1200-1500, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, pp. 96-110.  
6 See Donato Soranzo’s correspondence with Bernardo Bembo, e.g. ASVe, Misc. di carte non app. ad alcun 
archivio, b.8, fasc. 1, f. [6]. 
7 Lane: Andrea Barbarigo; Brun: Francesco Datini of Prato. 
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served as platforms for the recruitment of business partners and trade representatives as well 
as for the creation of general partnerships and coalitions.8 
Patrician merchants to whom the fraterna was not an available option had to pool their in-
vestments in other ways. One type of arrangement that was widely used in the late twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries (and that has received considerable attention in the theoretical litera-
ture) was the commenda contract.9 For our period of interest, however, we find no evidence 
for the lasting significance of this type of contract. The archive of Lorenzo Dolfin, for exam-
ple, does not include a single document identifiable as a colleganza contract, and the mere 
word cannot be found in any of the documents supporting this study. By contrast, what we do 
find are references to commissions and compagnie with different ownership structures.10 
i. The significance of the compagnia 
The term compagnia had different meanings in the various legal contexts of late medieval Ita-
ly. In Venice, the compagnia was a legally recognised commercial institution that enabled 
merchants to combine their respective capital stocks, invest them in joined responsibility, and 
divide the returns proportionally.11 Ownership could be divided between two or more inves-
tors, not all of whom would have to contribute equally. Total capital stocks differed in size, 
yet it usually was an arrangement that brought together investors of some strength. Capital 
contribution was imperative for all participants, which was not the case with the commenda/ 
colleganza.12 
Yet not all references to compagnie in mercantile sources invoke a formal institutional 
framework. In the Florentine context, GOLDTHWAITE emphasises the temporary character of 
 
8 For definitions of “partner”, “associate”, “agent” see Greif: Reputation and Coalitions, pp. 864-865. 
9 Pryor: Origins of the Commenda Contract; also Börner: Breaking up is hard to do; for a critical assessment of 
the scholarly focus on risk-sharing in the context of the commenda, see Williamson: Transparency. 
10 In Lorenzo Dolfin’s archive, we find occasional references to commission payments, e.g. Gabriel, Benedetto 
qd. Nicolò to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Recordatio, 22 July 1436.  22.07.1436, ASVe, Procuratori di San 
Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [9]. 
11 For court recognition, see chapter III.A regarding the Giudizi di Petizion’s ruling on Biagio Dolfin’s 
“compagnia delle zoie”. 
12 However, the taker of the commenda would also bring in capital at least indirectly by virtue of his unlimited 
liability – the compagnia might thus be considered a continuation of the same concept: one partner being liable 
only for the capital he provides, the other travelling with the merchandise and being fully liable for both invest-
ments and returns.  Also see Hansmann, H., Kraakman, R., Squire, R.: "Law and the Rise of the Firm", in: Har-
vard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series 546 (2006). 
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the compagnia and distinguishes its structure from modern-day companies: “Florentines con-
ducted their business activities as a social enterprise organized by compagni and called a 
compagnia.”13 The Florentine compagnia combined capital from different contributors for a 
contractually agreed temporary venture, which in Goldthwaite’s estimate typically lasted up 
to five years.14 In these and other respects (e.g. contracts did not have to be notarised15), Flor-
entine and Venetian compagnie were similar in outlook. According to ASTUTI, the Venetian 
compagnia was derived from the bilateral commenda/ colleganza, which (with the unilateral 
commenda/ colleganza) was one of two forms of the commenda/ colleganza contract in Ven-
ice.16 Whereas the unilateral commenda/ colleganza allowed for capital shares between stans 
and tractator of up to three quarters to one, the bilateral version asked the tractator to con-
tribute a more significant share of up to one third. As noted above, this resembled the com-
pagnia structure where all owners had to contribute a significant share of the capital stock. 
The compagnia thus combined the entrepreneurial flexibility of the commenda/ colleganza 
with the institutional security of the fraterna while also extending the scope of potential part-
nerships, which no longer had to be based on nuclear family structures.  
In the course of his commercial career, Lorenzo Dolfin participated in numerous trade part-
nerships of various durations and for various purposes. Although his commercial network 
was partly based on the commercial links previously established by his uncle Biagio and 
hence was to a certain degree cross-generational, this continuity did not apply to his specific 
commercial pursuits. His achievement lay in creating and augmenting wealth through the pi-
oneering of a new social sphere of Venice- and terraferma-based corresponding merchants, 
not in establishing a lasting firm.  
Given the difficulty of categorising medieval business units according in modern terminolo-
gy, the institutional analysis of the compagnia presents a major theoretical challenge. In par-
ticular, its functioning within finite horizons and under the simultaneous direction of several 
partners (who may otherwise have divergent economic interests) raises important questions 
regarding incentives, contractual enforcement, and strategic behaviour. These particularities 
 
13 Goldthwaite, Richard A.: The Economy of Renaissance Florence, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2009, p. 64 (first italics mine, second and third his). 
14 Ibid. p. 65. 
15 Ibid.; the surviving partnership contracts setting up compagnie are not notarised documents. 
16 Astuti, Guido: "Le forme giuridiche della attvità mercantile nel libro dei conti di Giacomo Badoer (1436-40)", 
in: Annali di storia del diritto 12-13 (1968-69), pp. 65-130 (here especially pp. 69-70ff.). 
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can be highlighted by using our contemporary understanding of a commercial firm as a refer-
ence point. 
ii. The compagnia in theoretical perspective 
The first and foremost characteristic of modern-day companies is their recognition as a dis-
tinct legal entity. Second, the ownership structure of a modern firm can change without alter-
ing its general dispositions. Third, it operates within infinite time horizons. Finally, it com-
prises a much larger set of organisations, established for various purposes, whereas medieval 
compagnie were formed primarily for trade.  
(1) Economic theories of the firm make an institutional distinction between a compa-
ny and the market in which it operates. The transaction costs approach, pioneered 
by COASE, postulates the necessity of the firm as a consequence of the costs in-
volved in market exchange.17 According to this, all costs incurred in transactions – 
from the costs of gathering information to the costs of enforcement – can be re-
duced or even avoided through internalisation.  
(2) From the recognition of the firm as a legal entity results the possibility of a chang-
ing ownership structure. That is, ownership can be transferred from one person to 
another without altering the characteristics and/ or the general purpose and opera-
tional framework of the organisation. It operates within infinite time horizons, in 
contrast to the medieval Venetian compagnia, which was meant to exist for an a 
priori determined finite period. A transfer of ownership would therefore not have 
been a sensible or desirable option in any circumstances. Consequently, the com-
pagnia and its owners were not legally distinguishable.   
(3) The time factor has a direct impact on commercial cooperation, as strategic deci-
sions depend to a significant extent on the time horizons under which they are tak-
en. Game-theoretic modelling demonstrates that strategic behaviour changes in 
time-restricted games, where opportunism typically increases with time.18 In infi-
nite-horizon games, by contrast, players are contiuously incentivised to demon-
strate commitment. (One would expect the medieval compagnia to have faced se-
vere commitment problems during the final stages of cooperation. Awareness of 
 
17 Coase: The Nature of the Firm. Also, Coase, Ronald H.: "The Nature of the Firm: Influence", in: Journal of 
Law, Economics, & Organization 4 (Spring, 1988), No. 1, pp. 33-47. 
18 Farrell, J., Maskin, E.: "Renegotiation in repeated games", in: Games and Economic Behavior 1 (Dec., 1989), 
No. 4, pp. 327–360; Gibbons, Robert: "Trust in Social Structures: Hobbes and Coase Meet Repeated Games", 
in: Cook, Karen S. (ed.), Trust in Society - Volume II in the Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust, New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001, pp. 332-353. 
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this problem might therefore have been a cause of the emergence of private-order 
institutions based on exogenous social factors, such as kinship-based coalitions.) 
(4) The compagnia in (late) medieval sources was thus a partnership created for the 
purpose of augmenting a given capital stock through trade. Outside long-distance 
trade, these entities were also formed in lending and even by petty Rialto mer-
chants to diversify their sales.19 While the practice of creating economies of scale 
by pooling capital was thus also applied in other sectors, the medieval compagnia 
was less universal a phenomenon than its modern counterpart, which is the default 
commercial entity in all domains of business. Most crucially, the modern firm is 
not based on short-term contracts. 
Our analysis indicates that a dichotomical understanding of institutions, separating them in 
formal and informal social phenomena respectively, does not fit the contexts of medieval 
trade and the gradual evolution of the firm. The Venetian compagnia, as it appears in com-
mercial correspondence and court files, encompasses both formal and informal elements. As 
we have seen, partnerships were not typically formed between strangers. Both Biagio and Lo-
renzo Dolfin primarily worked with relatives and specifically-selected non-kin individuals. 
These cooperations thus relied on a priori- existing systems of trust that were exogenous to 
contractual dispositions, i.e. they existed independently of the commercial sphere. In addi-
tion, partners mutually assured their commitment in unnotarised documents that amounted to 
nothing substantially more than a handshake (but could nevertheless serve as valid proofs in 
court). These are the informal dimensions of the medieval trade company. 
There are, however, formal dimensions that impede the compagnia’s classification in a 
Northian framework. These have to be understood in the specific context of the Venetian le-
gal system, which in itself presents a challenge to institutional analysis. The Giudici di Pe-
tizion, the Republic’s litigations tribunal, frequently admitted informal documents as evi-
dence (such as letters or unnotarised contracts). An informal partnership agreement could 
thus be elevated to the status of a legally recognised organisation, that is, the state could, if 
necessary, act as a third-party enforcer of both contractual and informal agreements.  
The Venetian compagnia was thus neither a formal nor an informal institution. It was a com-
mercial arrangement enabled to a crucial extent by exogenous social forces and supported by 
 
19 The Rialto pharmacist Agostino Altucci, whose account books provide insights into the integration of 
foreigners to the Venetian marketplace, formed such a partnership with the Venetian merchant Pietro de Bezzi. 
See Mozzato, Andrea: "Die Gewürze eines Fremden - ökonomische Integration und kommerzielle Tätigkeit 
eines Aretiner Apothekers im Venedig des Spätmittelalters", mimeo, 2011. 
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public-order means of enforcement. Hence our context requires a less categorical framework, 
one that allows for a broader set of parameters to determine the characteristics of social and 
political institutions. Here again, GREIF’s notion of institutions offers a first means of system-
atisation.20 Greif’s approach is inclusive in the sense that it attempts to classify all dimensions 
of social cooperation within a single, continuous framework without discriminating between 
incrementally emerged or suddenly created institutional phenomena. The distinction between 
private-order and public-order institutions (i.e. those structuring interaction between non-state 
actors and those established by political authority21) is nevertheless recognised. Greif’s own 
use of this framework to establish a rational-choice cultural theory of economic development 
in the context of medieval Mediterranean trade also provides an important link to the litera-
ture on economic embeddedness, which is often seen as a theoretical antagonism. 
iii. The institutional role of the family 
The idea that all economic exchange is embedded in collective social systems that are exoge-
nous to individual agency does not seem far-fetched. Yet it presents an obvious challenge to 
rational-choice approaches, which regard economic outcomes as resulting primarily from in-
dividual preferences. GRANOVETTER regards economic behaviour as being channelled by so-
cial systems.22 BECKER has shown how individual behaviour aggregated by systemic forces 
can give rise to collective institutions such as markets.23 The context of late medieval Vene-
tian long-distance trade fits these propositions, since the case study of Lorenzo Dolfin high-
lights the economic significance of family relations. Family ties frequently correlated with 
economic links, to the extent that the Venetian economy can be said to have been structured 
by personal as opposed to anonymous markets. Yet the increasing diversification of individu-
al commercial strategies over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries raises ques-
tions regarding the significance of individual decisions. Merchants indeed formed links for 
specifically economic purposes, yet the social range of these relations overlapped with the 
confines of other spheres, such as the family.  
 
20 See above, chapter I.A. 
21 Greif: Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, pp. 29-55.  
22 Granovetter, Mark: "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness", in: The 
American Journal of Sociology 91 (Nov., 1985), No. 3, pp. 481-510; also Nee, Victor, Ingram, Paul: 
"Embeddedness and Beyond: Institutions, Exchange, and Social Structure", in: Brinton, M.C., Nee, V. (eds.), 
The New Institutionalism in Sociology, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, pp. 19-45. 
23 Beckert, Jens: "Die soziale Ordnung von Märkten", in: MPIfG Discussion Paper 07 (May, 2007), No. 6. 
149 
 
In the way of a schematic model, we can describe the operational structure of fifteenth-
century Venetian long-distance trade in the following way: Venetian merchants operated on 
well-integrated markets. The dynamics of Venetian society were channelled, through institu-
tional design, to serve the economic interests of the Republic and the patriciate in particular. 
As the mercantile sphere was essentially congruent with the political sphere, economic insti-
tutions were politically not difficult to create. This form of endogenous institutional change 
was fundamental to the creation of both public- and private-order institutions.24 On the mac-
ro-level, commerce was enabled to a significant extent through the muda system, which in 
turn was boosted through intricate institutions of capital generation such as the public auc-
tioning of galleys. Micro-institutional arrangements, such as the types of legally prescribed 
partnerships examined above, served as a legally enforceable means to establish and termi-
nate commercial relations. Yet, in addition, private-order institutions were used to prevent 
opportunistic behaviour. Merchants made use of the family not only as a source of additional 
capital; it also served as a system of enforcement. The organisation of long-distance com-
merce as cross-generational enterprises, and the resulting individual advantages of being part 
of this arrangement, meant that there existed a system of institutional enforcement that was 
independent of the state. Lorenzo Dolfin – lacking a strong nuclear family surrounding – built 
a strategic network of family relations that eventually developed into a commercial coalition. 
He made extensive use of it during his early undertakings in London and Flanders, and later 
along the Romania galley route. 
B. Which Model of the Family? 
Lorenzo Dolfin’s commercial career and personal surroundings were supported by a family 
environment with flexible boundaries. Since Lorenzo was a half-orphan from an early age 
and without siblings, the most common Venetian family-based commercial arrangement, the 
fraterna, was not available to him. Instead, he had to rely on a more lose family-based net-
work, which, at the beginning, was deduced from the commercial surroundings of his uncle 
Biagio, thus entailing distantly consanguineous, affinal and selected external ties. Eventually, 
the family of his wife Giovanetta Morosini became a crucial source of support to his com-
mercial ambitions, while the advice of his maternal uncles Benedetto, Andrea, and Michele 
Gabriel qd. Nicolò were critical during the years preceding his marriage. Other members of 
the wider Dolfin clan, like the brothers Giorgio, Giacomo, and Vettore Dolfin qd. Francesco 
 
24 Greif and Laitin: Endogenous Institutional Change. 
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were included into Lorenzo’s personal commercial network. By contrast, the lack of non-kin 
components of the network is remarkable. In fact, it is the most crucial difference between 
the commercial surroundings of Lorenzo Dolfin and those of his uncle and mentor Biagio. 
While a number of individuals in Biagio’s commercial network can be categorised as non-
kin, hardly anyone (the aforementioned exceptions notwithstanding) in Lorenzo’s circles can 
be said to have had no kinship links to Lorenzo.  
iv. Social functions: the personal and the public 
The example of Lorenzo Dolfin shows that existing social-scientific categories of family 
structure and systems of descent do not satisfactorily describe the fifteenth-century Venetian 
patriciate. Sociological concepts such as “nuclear”, “extended” and “affinal” families, alt-
hough visible components of the patrician family, fail to account for the observable realities 
of patrician family life. The mere need to invoke such a large variety of types suggests that an 
entirely new model may be required, one that is specific to the given context.  
One way in which to illuminate the fundamental difference between contemporary (Western) 
understandings of the family and those prevalent in the patriciate of late medieval and early 
modern Venice is to look more closely at the social functions of the family. This necessitates 
a recognition of the personal (or private) spheres that gradually emerged with the beginning 
of the early modern period. The family as a bastion of the personal life that is distinct from 
professional/public activities (e.g. commerce and state service in the present context) devel-
oped amidst long-term shifts in social organisation, intellectual environments, and not least 
spatial dispositions in urban structure and architecture.25 
The notions of the public sphere and the “private versus public” dichotomy, however, are of 
limited use in the present context, as many of their implications specifically regarding the 
emergence of a public sphere out of a sphere of representation place a too heavy emphasis on 
the western- and central-European revolutionary age and fail to account for similar yet much 
earlier processes in the European periphery. In the Venetian patriciate in particular, the rela-
tionship between the “personal sphere” or “the family” and the “sphere of representation” 
was an ambiguous one, as the representation of the family necessarily had a political connota-
tion. Hence, the social functions of the family were both personal and professional/ public, 
 
25 Habermas: Strukturwandel, pp. 90-107 (emergence of a discursive public), 109 (architectural ramifications of 
the developing public sphere). For public functions of the patrician casa, see Fortini Brown, Patricia: Private 
Lives in Renaissance Venice, New Haven (Conn.): Yale University Press, 2004, pp. 23-52. 
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i.e. commercial. The Venetian patrician family, as exemplified by Lorenzo Dolfin and his 
personal environment, consisted of three core elements:  
 
(1) first, it gave room to a personal sphere, an environment of trust and affection, and 
transmitter of values and traditions across generations;  
(2) second, it was a tool of social representation;  
(3) finally, it was an economic entity, a basis for commercial enterprise with respect 
to generating of skills, personnel, and capital.  
This particular combination of social functions was specific to Venice and cannot easily be 
extended to other Italian city states. In Florence, a Venetian ally and likewise a patrician-
dominated society, only the first two were determinants of patrician family structures. The 
characteristics of the Venetian family as a social, political, and economic institution, howev-
er, are not pertinent to the Florentine context. As discussed above, Florentine merchants, in 
contrast to their Venetian counterparts, tended to separate their personal and commercial en-
vironments.26 A similar case can be made with respect to Milan and, to a lesser extent, Gen-
oa.27 Yet most importantly, only element (1) survives in the contemporary understandings of 
the family that give rise to prevailing sociological categories. The historical analysis of (fami-
ly-based) Venetian long-distance trade thus requires a reconsideration of both the institution 
of the family and the social-scientific tools to approach it.  
v. A new model: the comprehensive family 
Although it seems uncontroversial to assert that modern sociological categories of the family 
(such as the nuclear family, the extended family etc.) do not accurately fit the late medieval 
Venetian patriciate, this research shows that various existing concepts can be used to describe 
different sub-structures of the patrician family. Ultimately, the patrician family must be iden-
tified as a “clan” or, in its extended form, as a “comprehensive family”. These two models, 
however, consist of various sub-categories, each of which may have been relevant at specific 
stages of a patrician mercantile life (some of them more than others, and of course not all of 
them were pertinent to the patriciate as a whole). Specifically, this study has identified the 
 
26 Padgett and McLean: Social Relations; Weissen: Machtkämpfe und Geschäftsbeziehungen.  
27 Hughes: Urban Growth; Kamenaga-Anzai: The Family Consciousness. Also see Greif, Avner: "On the 
Political Foundations of the Late Medieval Commercial Revolution: Genoa During theTwelfth and Thirteenth 
Centuries", in: The Journal of Economic History 54 (Jun., 1994), No. 2, pp. 271-287. 
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following layers of family structure, which, building upon each other, eventually result in a 
structure that may be called the comphrehensive family: 
 
➢ Nuclear family – this is defined as the basic bi-generational unit of family organisa-
tion, consisting of parents and their direct descendants. Although not identifiable as a 
relevant family unit in Venetian society in the period under investigation and beyond 
(indeed, the nuclear family as a dominant form of family structure is a very recent 
phenomenon that gradually occurred in affluent societies over the course of the twen-
tieth century) the nuclear family is relevant to Venetian business history as the basis 
of the fraterna. The fraternal was a legal arrangement allowing brothers to commonly 
administer their inheritance and to invest their shared capital as a joint enterprise. As 
shown below, Donato Soranzo cooperated with his brothers on the basis of a fraterna 
compagnia throughout his mercantile career. In Lorenzo Dolfin’s case, however, the 
nuclear family is not a relevant category. In order to enlarge his capital stock and 
broaden his commercial expertise, he had to establish links within an extended family 
environment. 
➢ Extended family – this (cognatic) family structure is defined as a generational exten-
sion of the nuclear family, that is, the descendants of the nuclear family’s second gen-
eration interact with each other along both patrilineal and matrilineal lines. The result-
ing co-operative arrangement is at least tri-generational (grandparents, children, and 
grandchildren who interact as cousins) and potentially even larger if it involves cous-
ins of second, third etc. order. In the case of Lorenzo Dolfin, the extended family was 
predominant in providing initial social and economic links. During his years as a 
commercial apprentice, Lorenzo was mentored by his uncle Biagio and also received 
support from his maternal family (the Gabriel). In his early years as an independent 
merchant, he cooperated closely with both maternal and paternal cousins. Yet Lo-
renzo’s early interaction with his extended family environment was by no means un-
typical for young Venetian patricians of his time. Lorenzo may have used his extend-
ed family more intensively for the purpose of capital accumulation than other con-
temporaries; however, patrician cooperation beyond the nuclear family was a ubiqui-
tous phenomenon. For this reason, the extended family model dominates scholarly 
discussions of Venetian patrician family relations. 
➢ Affinal family – identifying the “marital family” as “affinal family” is particularly 
meaningful in the Venetian context, as marital links were often formed in considera-
tion of both family history and political and economic strategy (see below for “strate-
gic coalitions”). This led to marrital links between patrician families being repeated 
and thus reinforced in subsequent generations. Previously established inter-family 
contacts, including contacts of a purely commercial nature, were also potential factors 
on which marital links were formed. The Morosini clan into which Lorenzo Dolfin 
married in 1425 had maintained prior relations to Lorenzo’s branch of the Dolfin fam-
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ily, as Lorenzo’s uncle Biagio had represented members of the Morosini family as 
trade agent in Damascus in 1404.28 Lorenzo’s marriage can thus be seen as resulting 
(partly) from inter-family politics. In addition, marrying Giovanetta Morosini also 
brought significant economic and strategic advantages, as Giovanetta’s wealthy fami-
ly vested Lorenzo and his wife with a considerable dowry.29 More importantly, the 
Morosini family had vast expertise in the Black Sea trade along the Romania galley 
route, which benefited Lorenzo’s own cloth and spice trade. Thus, the commercial 
orientation of his affinal family, some of whose members resided in the Venetian 
quarter of Constantinople, both influenced Lorenzo regarding his future investments 
and enabled him to trade in a more secure environment. The economic significance of 
the affinal family should not be overestimated on the basis of this individual example; 
however, the intensity with which Lorenzo cooperated with his marital relatives 
strongly suggests that economic considerations were constitutive to the marital link. 
In other words, the Dolfin-Morosini cooperation was a means of expanding the (ex-
tended) family, adding a strategic dimension to family politics. 
➢ Family cluster – in combination, the extended and affinal families created a family 
cluster in which consanguineous and affinal ties were maintained or formed along 
ambilineal, matrilineal, and patrilineal lines. The practice of widening inter-family 
cooperation beyond the extended family is particularly visible in the case of Lorenzo 
Dolfin, resulting from the broad similarity of his commercial pursuits and those of his 
affinal family. However, family clustering was a common phenomenon in the Vene-
tian patriciate; it was not restricted to the commercial sphere, as marital links between 
families frequently were exploited for political and social causes as well.30 The extent 
to which Lorenzo’s extended and marital families were intertwined is nevertheless 
remarkable, as it is a direct consequence of his status as an orphan. Members of his 
extended family supported Lorenzo not only in his early commercial undertakings, 
but also appeared as his legal sponsors in the context of his marriage, where his ma-
ternal uncles Andrea and Benedetto Gabriel qd. Nicolò acted as his guarantors.31 
➢ Strategic cross-generational family coalition – the example of Lorenzo Dolfin 
poignantly reveals the strategic character of patrician family clustering. Marital links 
were not formed at random, but usually extended prior inter-family links. Lorenzo 
Dolfin’s marriage contract, as a case in point, not only documents procedural stipula-
 
28 Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 104. 
29 da Pozo, Benedetto qd. Domenico to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio: Marriage contract between Giovanetta 
Morosini and Lorenzo Dolfin qd. Antonio.  29.01.1425, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, 
int. 4, f. [46]. 
30 E.g. during Balla d’oro applications (see Chojnacki: Kinship Ties) or in processes of social cooperation in the 
Venetian scuole grande (Mackenney: Tradesmen and Traders, pp. 44-77). 
31 Note 29. 
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tions such as the payment of dowries; it also highlights the role of Lorenzo’s nuclear 
and extended families (referencing Lorenzo’s mother Cataruccia and her brother 
Benedetto Gabriel qd. Nicolò). Yet the inclusion of marital relatives as equal mem-
bers of the family environment was by no means the only strategic aspect of patrician 
family politics. Family-based cooperation in the economic sphere was neither una-
voidable nor compulsory; instead, such partnerships were formed for specific purpos-
es and often for a finite period. Yet, contrary to cooperations between families, they 
were constantly available, subject to fewer institutional constraints, and thus compara-
tively easy to establish. Purposes of cooperation could be educational (training of 
young patricians, e.g. Lorenzo acting as Biagio Dolfin’s agent in Venice during 
Biagio’s consulship in Alexandria), transaction-specific (e.g. the forming of a com-
pagnia for the purpose of capital accumulation and risk-sharing for a single venture), 
or long-term (e.g. forming of commercial bonds for the cross-generational transmis-
sion of wealth and market skills). The option of forming intra-family commercial 
links within the extended family was available at all times, yet actual cooperation typ-
ically occurred as a result of strategic choices. The family cluster acted as a sphere of 
internal order and regulation on the basis of which strategic coalitions could be 
formed. In their most robust version, these were cross-generational bonds that ensured 
continuity in a family’s commercial orientation.  
➢ Clan – this study defines “clan” as the entirety of the hitherto listed layers of family 
structure: nuclear family, extended family, affinal family, family cluster, strategic 
family coalitions. This definition is more comprehensive than others that tend to iden-
tify a patrician clan as an “extended family” in the above sense, typically with matri-
lineal and patrilineal inputs on equal terms. However, the present context provides 
grounds for extending existing definitions, as the family-based economic cooperations 
of both Biagio and Lorenzo Dolfin also included their extended and marital families. 
Lorenzo Dolfin’s particular situation as an orphan explains his greater need to cluster 
different kin relations that remained separate in other cases. For example, the strategic 
choices of Donato Soranzo focused more exclusively on his extended (and nuclear) 
families (see below). The potential for wider family-based cooperation, however, was 
not confined to the Dolfin and Morosini families; it was an option to be used whenev-
er cooperation with closer kin was not possible or less efficient. 
➢ Constructed family – an additional layer of family interaction is given by the inclu-
sion of outside individuals to the family (cluster) on the basis of social affinity, a simi-
larity of names, or as a result of strategic commercial alliances. The inclusion of out-
siders to family-based commercial networks often was essentially akin to an elevation 
to family status. Biagio Dolfin’s commercial partners Nicolò and Pietro Bernardo qd. 
Francesco, for example, continued to interact with Lorenzo Dolfin after Biagio’s 
death; Biagio’s partnership with Leonardo Dolfin in Crete exemplifies inclusion on a 
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namesake basis.32 The constructed family captures the linkages between family and 
commerce, or, more specifically, between family relations and economic networks. It 
explains the composition of family-based mercantile networks and the re-occurrence 
of the same non-kin individuals (or their descendants) across mercantile generations.  
➢ Comprehensive family – as an extension of the (redefined) patrician clan, the com-
prehensive family shall be proposed as a new integrative model of family structure. It 
shifts the focus to the systemic structure of Venetian mercantile networks, which were 
composed of kin (individuals belonging to the clan) and non-kin (skilled agents who 
were integrated to the family structure on the basis of social affinity). The economic 
dimension of the patrician family (as reflected in the structure of trade networks) and 
its social foundations conditioned each other. Understanding the composition of Ve-
netian mercantile networks, i.e. the rationale behind the selection of partners and 
agents, thus requires an appreciation of how the patrician family was perceived, prac-
ticed, and socially constructed. 
This multi-layered model of the Venetian patrician family is intended to account for different 
stages of a patrician mercantile career. The relative significance of each layer depended on 
personal circumstances and, more generally, on life stages. Nuclear and extended families 
were of particular importance during a young patrician’s mercantile education and for sup-
porting their early political aspirations. By the same token, a clan that included the marital 
family, and a comprehensive family that included non-kin, were a basis of support during a 
patrician merchant’s rise to seniority, as they provided additional opportunities for invest-
ments, cooperation, and the transmission of knowledge and skills. The comprehensive family 
in particular allowed patrician merchants to establish flexible links with their peers and to de-
vise forms of mercantile cooperation according to their specific commercial needs. As all of 
the components of a comprehensive family structure were subject to an internal hierarchical 
order, the pre-determined structure of social cooperation could be directly transferred to the 
commercial sphere, thus providing a basis of security and trust on which economic coopera-
tion could thrive. There thus existed a straightforward rationale behind the establishment of 
family-based mercantile coalitions: to exploit the social enforcement of a hierarchical family 
structure for minimising the costs of economic transactions. The enforcement mechanisms 
provided by social institutions such as the patrician family, combined with the individual ad-
vantages of being part of a comprehensive patrician family, added a degree of transactional 
efficiency to long-distance trade that likely could not be matched by formal legal stipulations. 
Family-based mercantile coalitions thus exemplify possible efficiency gains through internal 
 
32 Christ: Trading Conflicts, p. 98. 
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transactions rather than market transactions (in this case, the market of external agency ser-
vices through which links were formed with no relation to pre-existing social structures).  
C. Analysis: Commission Agency vs. Family Representation 
The unique structure of the Venetian patrician family generates a particular interest in its dy-
namics in the commercial sphere. Following descriptions of the layers of a patrician family, 
the degrees of solidarity between its various branches, and the forms of commercial coopera-
tion between different degrees of kin, we can add an analytical perspective to inquire into in-
dividual incentives within the proposed model of family structure.  
i. The role of incentives 
Thus far, a number of factors have emerged to explain the significant economic role of the 
Venetian patrician family: the decline of the travelling merchant and the rise of capital mar-
kets; the social consolidation of the patriciate, unrivalled in Europe for the volume and geo-
graphical spread of its long-distance trade; the interwovenness of political and economic in-
terests resulting from the role of the largely (but not exclusively) trade-oriented patrician 
class as political elite. 
However, the question about individual incentives is yet a different matter, for it primarily 
concerns the social equilibrium of intra-family cooperation. Modelling intra-family dynamics 
from an individual perspective can help determine the conditions under which the observed 
family structure was stable. This, in turn, can shed light on the potential benefits of cross-clan 
cooperation and the possible need for a restructuring of mercantile networks, including the 
switch from kin to non-kin agents and vice versa. The above model of the patrician family – 
which spans across the aforementioned three elements of a personal sphere, a sphere of social 
representation, and an economic entity – is a dynamic rather than a static proposition: coop-
eration within the family was intensified or reduced in line with individual needs, and indi-
vidual actors were added or excluded accordingly. The “chosen” component of the family 
structure was not peripheral, but a critical tool particularly with respect to the family’s eco-
nomic dimension.  
Individual incentives within the given family model can be examined by looking at how deci-
sions of intra-family (intra-clan) economic cooperation were made. Economic cooperation 
within the patrician family may have differed from cultural/ traditional factors or political in-
centives that were foundational to family solidarity in other spheres. Explaining the economic 
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significance of the patrician family first requires comparing family-based networks to alterna-
tive arrangements, thus determining the conditions that favoured the family as an operational 
framework. Hence, we ask 
(1) why the commercial careers of young patricians started within family structures; 
(2) why these structures typically remained intact for the duration of a patrician com-
mercial career; and 
(3) which specific benefits this system of cooperation yielded to the individual actor 
in a commercial coalition. 
As Lorenzo Dolfin maintained business ties almost exclusively with relatives, the distinction 
between kin and non-kin incentives is less obvious in his commercial network. His uncle 
Biagio, by contrast, had commercial links with both kin and non-kin partners. For this reason, 
we shall first derive a model of individual incentives on the basis of Biagio’s commercial 
network, before discussing its applicability in the case of Lorenzo Dolfin. It will then be pos-
sible to explain the prominence of Lorenzo’s affinal family in his commercial environment. 
Though Lorenzo may well have maintained a greater variety of commercial contacts also out-
side his family, his affinal family in particular was undoubtedly a critical base of support in 
his Romania trade during his senior years.  
ii. Monetary and non-monetary payoffs 
Biagio Dolfin’s correspondence with his family representatives and his non-kin agents re-
veals two distinct types of principal-agent relationships.33 The different underlying incentive 
structures result from the respective economic characteristics of the agents. Non-kin agents 
were not part of a family enterprise and thus had separate economic interests in a given trans-
action. They were market experts, sought for their market-specific skills in monitoring prices, 
exploiting price optimums, or judging the quality of goods. By contrast, family representa-
tives were part of the family venture, and their incentives are not separable from those of the 
principal. They were entrusted with supervising transactions because of their kin relation to 
the principal and their thence assumed trustworthiness. Their involvement in the venture, alt-
hough based on prior social ties, can thus nevertheless be explained economically.  
 
33 Richter and Furubotn: Neue Institutionenökonomik, p. 173. 
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In a standard network formation game, links between nodes are established or deleted accord-
ing to the decisions taken by the respective agents (represented by nodes).34 Agents establish 
links to other nodes in a network if these are likely to increase their payoffs. They delete links 
if the costs of maintaining them exceed the expected economic benefits. For example, a prin-
cipal establishes a link (a partnership) with a trade representative in a distant location if the 
expected gains (e.g. from reduced transaction costs) exceed the agent’s commission pay (or 
the opportunity costs of providing similar services to the agent).35 Similarly, they delete this 
link if these conditions are not met or if the agent turns out to be a cheater. 
How, then, do the two types of agents maximise their payoffs? As this study has shown, non-
kin agents maintained transaction-specific links to the principal. They had a reputation for 
market-specific skills and reliability. Thus, their expected utility is the value of their commis-
sion pay, which can be represented as a generic function such as  
 
(1) 
 
 
where the left-hand side of the equation is the agent’s expected utility of wealth, 
tp  is the 
time-dependent stream of commissions, ar  is the agent’s individual reputation, and hk  is hu-
man capital, i.e. the agent’s market skills. The agent’s goal is to maximise 
tp  given the 
budgetary constraints of the principal.  
As the link between the principal and the family representative exists ex ante through their 
consanguineous or affinal ties, the economic aspect of their relationship is but one additional 
layer of interrelation. The lines between economic incentives, social relations, and legal obli-
gations initially appear blurred. The family representative’s (r)generic payoff function states 
that  
 
(2) 
 
where fr  is the collective reputation of the family, which includes access to, and gains from, 
joint family capital. As the family representative’s economic benefit is not transaction-
specific, other parameters need to be considered in order to explain their commitment to the 
enterprise.  
 
34 Schweitzer, F., Fagiolo, G., Sornette, D., Vega-Redondo, F., Vespignani, A., White, D.R.: "Economic 
Networks: The New Challenges", in: Science 325 (2009), pp. 422-425. 
35 Greif: Contract Enforceability.  
),()]([ hata krpwU =
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The case study on Lorenzo Dolfin shows that partnerships between members of the Dolfin 
family and its external partners were potentially cross-generational, that is, junior agents such 
as Lorenzo and Nicolò Dolfin made use of their principal’s trade contacts even after Biagio 
Dolfin’s death. Thus, the merchant family was potentially equivalent to a traders’ coalition in 
that it provided access to constant capital streams as well as opportunities to invest at low risk 
and costs. It provided a platform from which long-term commercial coalitions could be 
formed on the basis of permanent mutual accountability. In order to benefit from a family 
business network in the long-run, family agents had a clear incentive to keep the network 
functioning by signalling reliability to the network’s external components. Deviation on the 
part of one family agent could significantly damage the reputation of the family as a whole 
and thus reduce the trade and investment opportunities of individual family members. Family 
agents strove for maximising fr  as their own individual reputation was internalised by the 
family in a system of collective liability. 
Yet equation (2) captures family-based commercial cooperation in non-permanent ventures 
rather than a coalitional arrangement. It may therefore serve as a description of the incentive 
structures of junior agents undergoing mercantile education in family-based commercial ar-
rangements, or of family agents co-operating loosely within personal commercial networks. 
In order to capture the incentive structure of agents operating within a family-based commer-
cial coalition, it needs to be extended to include the costs of coalition maintenance incurring 
to each coalition member. 
iii. Incentives in Lorenzo Dolfin’s network 
In the commercial environment of Lorenzo Dolfin, the same intuitions apply in principle, yet 
we need to account for the employment of family agents as a dominant strategy. Also, Lo-
renzo Dolfin’s surviving account sheets indicate that commission payments were not con-
fined to non-kin agents, but were also granted to family agents (as in the case of Girolamo 
Bragadin qd. Andrea). Hence, equation (2) needs to be amended accordingly as agents repre-
senting the intermediary solution (V.A.ii) had to consider the value of the family relation that 
linked them to their principal. Although employed for reasons of specific market skills and a 
personal reputation for reliability, this type of agent was indirectly selected on the basis of a 
family reputation mechanism – by virtue of a distant consanguineous or affinal family rela-
tionship. The intermediary agent’s (i) generic payoff function states that 
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(3)     ),,()]([ fiti rrpfwU =  
where ir is the individual repuation of the intermediary agent and fr  is the collective reputa-
tion of the family (which in this context is of weaker significance than in equation (2), captur-
ing the fact that the intermediary agent does not belong to a family coalition but derives their 
connection to the principal from a family relation of second order). By contrast, the family 
coalition agent (ca) has a generic payoff function such as that  
(4)     tfca crfwU −= )()]([  
 
where tc  is the time-dependent (individual) cost of coalition membership (e.g. opportunity 
costs on foregone commission earnings) and fr  is the collective reputation of the family, 
which in this case includes access to family-based coalitional capital. 
 A merchant opts for the family-based coalition as their primary form of business co-
operation if  
a. the gains from being affiliated to the coalition exceed the cost of coalition mem-
bership (condition for coalition being stable), i.e. tf crf )( . 
b. the cost of employing commission or intermediary agents is greater than the (indi-
vidual) cost of maintaining a commercial coalition, i.e. tt cp  . 
Again, both conditions were met in the case of Lorenzo Dolfin. Membership of the Dolfin-
Morosini trade coalition allowed Lorenzo to expand his commercial activities along the Ro-
mania trade route within a secure long-term partnership between (affinal) kin, thus benefiting 
from a long-term decrease in per-unit transaction costs. In addition, his own cost of coalition 
maintenance was comparatively low since he did not act as a commission agent to external 
partners. Thus, the provision of Venice-based agency services to his peers did not incur sig-
nificant opportunity costs to Lorenzo and, judging by the number of instructions in his pre-
served correspondence, was a rare occurrence in any case. The maintenance of a family-
based commercial coalition, in turn, explains the dominance of kin-related individuals in Lo-
renzo’s personal commercial network. 
The functioning of the respective commercial networks of Biagio and Lorenzo Dolfin can 
thus be described in a similar fashion despite minor differences. By virtue of exemplification, 
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they provide a concrete historical model of how Venetian patrician families operated in the 
economic sphere. This can be illustrated further with reference to additional sources on fami-
ly-based commerce coming from other personal archives. The following two sections evalu-
ate, in a summarising fashion, parts of the commercial correspondence of the patrician mer-
chants Donato Soranzo and Ambrogio Malipiero.  
D. Two Referential Cases: Malipiero and Soranzo 
In order to contextualise the findings on Lorenzo Dolfin within the broader historiography of 
the fifteenth-century Venetian patriciate, this section offers a brief discussion of two compa-
rable cases. This is by no means intended to provide a complete account of the commercial 
and official careers of Donato Soranzo and Ambrogio Malipiero; in fact, the body of docu-
ments on which this discussion is based does not represent the complete archival record.36 
However, the here presented evidence, alongside the existing scholarly output, offers a point 
of reference by revealing the types of commercial organisation used by two contemporaries 
of Lorenzo Dolfin. The primary focus lies on the commercial relationships as well as the 
(personal) statuses of correspondents and commercial partners. 
i. Donato Soranzo: a fraterna merchant 
The archival legacy of the Venetian merchant Donato Soranzo is preserved at the ASVe.37 
The complete set of papers, which mostly comprises the correspondence between Donato So-
ranzo, his brothers, and other business partners as well as account books, is not among the 
ASVe’s large private collections in that it is not contained in a single personal archive. How-
ever, it has gained historical prominence due to its use in Lane’s “Andrea Barbarigo”, Ash-
tor’s “Levant Trade” and a number of other significant studies.38 In this section, I limit the 
 
36 To my knowledge, a complete account of all available Malipiero and Soranzo sources has thus far not been 
created. Especially the bequest of A. Malipiero is dispersed across a large number of archival collections in the 
ASVe. 
37 ASVe, Miscellanea di documenti non appartanenti a nessun archivio, b. 8; ASVe, Miscellanea di documenti 
non appartanenti a nessun archivio, b. 15. 
38 Ashtor, Eliyahu: "Profits from Trade with the Levant in the Fifteenth Century", in: Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies 38 (June 1975), No. 2, pp. 250-275; id.: "Spice Prices in the Near East in the 15th 
Century", in: Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 108 (January 1976), No. 1, pp. 26-41; Martinelli, Alvaro: 
"Notes on the Origin of Double Entry Bookkeeping", in: Abacus 13 (June 1977), No. 1, pp. 3-27; Nam: Le 
commerce du coton, pp. 107-123. 
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analysis to a collection of letters that, to my knowledge, has not been discussed in previous 
studies, namely busta 15 of Miscellanea di documenti non appartanenti a nessun archivio 
(busta 15 hereafter; Ashtor used the Soranzo letters contained in busta 8 of the same collec-
tion39). This is a collection of thirty documents, mostly letters, written between 1402 and 
1416 by individuals associated with the business of the fraterna Soranzo. It is but a tiny frac-
tion of the entirety of the known surviving documents, included here for the purpose of 
showcasing hitherto neglected documents. A discussion of other known Soranzo sources can 
be found in Lane’s book.40 As Lane rightly pointed out, the remaining series of letters are in-
complete and at times difficult to match with the information provided in the account 
books.41 Hence this discussion is not intended to give a full account of specific transactions 
performed by the compagnia Soranzo; instead, it looks at the general dynamics of a family-
based long-distance trade firm. The focus lies on the hierarchical structures within the ven-
ture, the internal incentives of cooperation, and the nature of the firm’s relationship to exter-
nal agents (i.e. the firm’s network), as well as on the duration of partnerships and degrees of 
individual autonomy within a family business.42 The main comparative interest with respect 
to the CLD stems from the nature of the compagnia Soranzo as a fraterna-based venture and 
the biographical differences between Donato Soranzo and Lorenzo Dolfin, who developed his 
own commercial network and (family-based) coalition. 
 
TABLE 2: ASVE, MISC. DI CARTE NON APP. AD ALCUN ARCHIVIO, B. 15, LETTERE DONATO SORANZO 
Arch. 
Ref. 
Type of 
doc. 
Author Recipient Location 
(written) 
Location 
(received) 
Date (writ.) Date (rec.) 
f. [1] Letter n/a Donato 
Soranzo 
Venice n/a 29.08.1407 n/a 
f. [2] Letter n/a Donato 
Soranzo 
Venice n/a 15.07.1407 n/a 
f. [3] Letter Pietro Bembo 
qd. Andrea 
Donato 
Soranzo 
Alexandria Damascus 09.09.1414 29.09.1414 
f. [4] Letter Luca Mo-
rosini qd. 
Giovanni 
Filippo 
Morosini 
qd. Nicolò 
Damascus Hama 09.04.1415 16.04.1415 
 
39 Ashtor: Levant Trade, p. 563. 
40 Lane: Andrea Barbarigo, p. 145. 
41 Ibid., p. 146. 
42 Lane claims that Donato kept his personal accounts in addition to those of the family business. Ibid., p. 145. 
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f. [5] Letter Alvise 
Mancadelli 
Donato 
Soranzo 
Latakia Damascus 04.09.1402 28.09.1402 
f. [6] Letter Pietro Donato 
Soranzo 
Tripoli n/a 15.09(?).14
03 
n/a 
f. [7] Account n/a Marco Po-
lo 
Hama n/a 1403/1404 1403/1404 
f. [8] Letter Bartolomeo 
Soranzo 
Donato 
Soranzo 
Foa Hama 11.03.1404 13.03.1404 
f. [9] Letter n/a Donato 
Soranzo 
Damascus Hama 03.03.1404 07.03.1404 
f. [10] Letter Bartolomeo 
Soranzo 
Donato 
Soranzo 
Foa n/a 1404 n/a 
f. [11] Letter n/a n/a Tripoli n/a 1407 n/a 
f. [12] Letter Stefano Sto-
lero(?) 
 Tripoli Hama 08.03.1408 n/a 
f. [13] Note     1407  
f. [14] Letter Stefano Sto-
lero(?) 
Donato 
Soranzo 
Tripoli Damascus 11.03.1408 20.03.1408 
f. [15] Letter Pietro So-
ranzo 
Donato 
Soranzo 
Damascus Hama 03.07.1415(
?) 
n/a 
f. [16] Letter Giacomo 
Contarini qd. 
Pietro 
Donato 
Soranzo 
Foa Hama 15.05.1409 19.05.1409 
f. [17] Letter  Donato 
Soranzo 
Damascus  1414(?)  
f. [18] Letter Domenico   Damascus 29.08.1414 04.09.1414 
f. [19] Letter Luca Mo-
rosini qd. 
Giovanni 
Donato 
Soranzo 
Damascus Hama 14.01.1415 19.01.1415 
f. [20] Letter Giovanni 
Venier qd. 
Francesco 
Donato 
Soranzo 
 Hama 16.03.1415 18.03.1415 
f. [21] Letter Luca Mo-
rosini qd. 
Giovanni 
Donato 
Soranzo 
Damascus n/a 10.05.1415 n/a 
f. [22] Letter Pietro So-
ranzo 
Donato 
Soranzo 
Hama n/a 02.10.1415 n/a 
f. [23] Letter Giacomo Pe-
saro 
Donado 
Soranzo 
“ett sozi-
is” 
Damascus Baalbek 05.12.1415 n/a 
f. [24] Letter Alessandro 
Marin 
Donato 
Soranzo 
 Hama 03.02.1416 05.02.1416 
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f. [25] Letter Andrea Do-
nado qd. 
Nicolò 
Donato 
Soranzo 
 n/a 09.06.1416 n/a 
f. [26] Letter Andrea Do-
nado qd. 
Nicolò 
Donato 
Soranzo 
 Hama 10.07.1416 16.07.1416 
f. [27] Letter Giacomo Pe-
saro 
Donato 
Soranzo 
Damascus Hama 27.08.1416 01.09.1416 
f. [28] Account Bernaba Do-
togo(?) qd. 
Andrea 
Donato 
Soranzo 
Tripoli Hama 1416 05.04.1416 
f. [29] Envelope n/a Donato 
Soranzo 
Damascus Hama n/a 26.05.1415 
f. [30] List of 
goods 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
Donato Soranzo and his family-based personal commercial network lend themselves well to 
comparison not just because Donato was a contemporary of Biagio and Lorenzo Dolfin, but 
also because he was, like Lorenzo and (to an extent) Biagio, active in the textiles trade. The 
starting conditions of the commercial careers of Lorenzo and Donato, by contrast, could not 
have been more different. Unlike the half-orphan Lorenzo Dolfin, Donato Soranzo was born 
into a sizable nuclear family, and we know of several brothers who played important roles in 
his commercial life. Consequently, his first commercial undertakings were pursued within a 
fraterna. 
The core period of Donato Soranzo’s documented commercial activity are the years between 
1402 and 1416, when he resided in Syria.43 The family firm of Donato Soranzo and his broth-
ers was mainly active in Syria, where the Soranzos traded their own capital while also acting 
as commission agents to fellow Venetians such as Andrea Barbarigo.44 As a commission 
agent, Donato was a rival of Biagio Dolfin, whose residence in Syria is documented at least 
for the year 1414 when he handled the Morosini accounts in Damascus. At the beginning of 
the fifteenth century, the European cloth trade with its related industries still depended to a 
 
43 Nam: Le commerce du coton, p. 119; Nam identifies Donato’s residence in Syria as lasting from 1403 until 
1416. However, letter f. [5] of busta 15, which was received in Damascus, suggests that Donato was resident in 
Syria as early as September 1402. 
44 Lane: Andrea Barbarigo, p. 88. 
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large extent on cotton imports from Egypt and Syria while Venice retained its position as a 
leading retailer of Eastern cotton.45 
As an reputable commission agent, Donato maintained links to a number of non-kin individu-
als, and his papers also include letters from merchants outside his own family. This is particu-
larly the case for the letters contained in busta 15. However, studies based on a more exten-
sive record of letters show that the fraterna Soranzo operated within a family-dominated 
commercial network in which a majority of correspondents had family links to the Soranzo 
brothers.46 Thus, when reconstructing Donato’s personal commercial network, it is important 
to distinguish between his own business circle and his commission clients. As there is no evi-
dence for Lorenzo Dolfin having acted as commission agent, this difficulty does not arise 
with respect to the CLD. 
Table 2 above lists the documents contained in busta 15. Only three of the identifiable au-
thors were members of Donato’s family-based business environment. These individuals are 
his brother Pietro Soranzo, writing from Hama and Damascus in 1415;47 and Bartolomeo So-
ranzo, a cousin, writing twice from Foa in 1404.48 Pietro was, with Donato and their brothers 
Giacomo and Lorenzo, a co-owner of the fraterna compagnia that was the initial centre of 
Donato’s family-based business activities.49 Bartolomeo was linked to their business as a 
family representative.50 His style of writing and the contents of the letter resemble the reports 
sent to Lorenzo Dolfin by his family partners (see, for instance, the letters written by Antonio 
Contarini and Dolfino Dolfin from Constantinople, II.D, V.C), conveying information on 
 
45 Mazzaoui, Maureen Fennell: The Italian Cotton Industry in the Later Middle Ages 1100-1600, Cambridge 
etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 87-104. 
46 Nam: Le commerce du coton, p. 122. 
47 Letter Soranzo, Pietro to Soranzo, Donato, 03.07.1415, ASVe, Miscellanea di carte non appartenenti a nessun 
archivio, b. 15, f. [15]; Letter Soranzo, Pietro to Soranzo, Donato, 02.10.1415, ASVe, Miscellanea di carte non 
appartenenti a nessun archivio, b. 15, f. [22]. 
48 Unlike MELIS, NAM identifies “Foa” as a Syrian town: “F. Melis assimile cette dernière à Phocée, port 
principal d’embarquement pour le coton turc au XVe siècle. Mais il s’agit en réalité d’une ville syrienne, comme 
l’atteste la correspondance de la fraterna Soranzo […]. On peut donc déduire que Foa ne se situait pas très loin 
de Hama, à la distance d’une journée environ” (Nam: Le commerce du coton, p. 107; Nam’s reference is Melis, 
F., Cecchi Aste, E.: Documenti per la storia economica dei secoli XIII-XVI, Florence: Olschki, 1972, p. 302). 
49 Lane: Andrea Barbarigo, p. 145; Nam: Le commerce du coton, p. 119.  
50 Letter Soranzo, Bartolomeo to Soranzo, Donato, 11.03.1404, ASVe, Miscellanea di carte non appartenenti a 
nessun archivio, b. 15, f. [8]; Letter Soranzo, Bartolomeo to Soranzo, Donato, 001404, ASVe, Miscellanea di 
carte non appartenenti a nessun archivio, b. 15, f. [10]. 
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market developments and on performed transactions.51 On behalf of the compagnia, Bar-
tolomeo maintained links to fellow family representatives such as Marco Corner who also 
had a consanguineous relation to the Soranzo brothers.52 
Pietro Soranzo, by contrast, clearly appears as a long-term partner in a joint venture. He re-
fers to jointly-owned accounts and mutual creditors due to be paid, and asks Donato to send 
him additional processed cloth for sale.53 Their joint accounts reveal that Pietro and Donato 
did not operate on behalf of each other, but were part of a long-term joint enterprise. As the 
foundation of their partnership was a fraterna and thus a legally enforced entity, their cooper-
ation was even closer than the coalitional partnerships maintained by Lorenzo Dolfin and his 
family peers, and their joint capital was a single unit rather than several parts of coalitional 
capital as in the case of the Dolfin coalition. All of their operations were conducted in joint 
liability, which thus represents a major difference to the coalitional model of mutual financial 
solidarity with simultaneous operational independence of individual coalition members.  
The main structural similarity between the fraterna and the trade coalition is the maintenance 
of a lose network of partners and agents operating on the periphery of the enterprise. Yet, 
whereas the trade coalition is supported by various personal networks maintained by the re-
spective coalition members, fraterna partners typically shared the entirety of their commer-
cial connections. Their operational periphery was thus substantially more integrated to the 
joint business – that is, network affiliates were typically known to each other, integrating the 
fraterna Soranzo into a broad environment of mutually known individuals (who in turn may 
also have been linked to each other by closer commercial bonds such as a family coalition or 
indeed another fraterna). For instance, the fraterna’s creditor Filippo Morosini, who is men-
 
51 Ibid., f. [8]: “…ve digo che in questi paixi a ora non se atroveria gotoni a mancho di d(ucati) 1150 in 1200, 
ma in Alepo zia fa ziorni 12 valeva d(ucati) 900 in 850…” 
52 Ibid.: “…et anchor de quelli [gotoni] manda ser Marcho Corner et ser Bernardo Negro”; Nam: Le commerce 
du coton, p. 122, identifies Marco Corner as a cousin of the Soranzo brothers. 
53 Letter Soranzo, Pietro to Soranzo, Donato, 02.10.1415, ASVe, Miscellanea di carte non appartenenti a nessun 
archivio, b. 15, f. [22]: “Et prima vedo vo<l> se achatare per nostra raxiòn p(ani) 120 greze e che faze i sia boni 
[…]. Romagnio avixado vui ave scritto a ser Fellipo Morexini ch’el non me manda d(ucati) 300 e scrieve el me 
dovera mandar che ve digo son contento. E abie scritto se vuy me mandere moneda per i ganbeliery ad’utomo 
ultimamente [i bocharin zorovia?] non me mando nientte tig<n>erò modo de mandary a pagar a Damascho a vui 
e non siando llì che non m’el chredo i manderò a pagar a ser Felippo Morexini perché a le fiade de qui se atrovo 
chanbio per Damascho. […]. Chome ho ve scritto […] de mandarme algune chose de pani ne de sarze manda 
me ll<o> presto. E voria me avera me avera (sic) mandalo per ritorno de i ganbeliery perché de qui i vièn molto 
domandadi e spezialmente pany e che prima ne aduro i vendeva molto ben…” 
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tioned in Pietro Soranzo’s letters to his brothers, was related to Luca Morosini qd. Giovanni, 
the author of three letters contained in busta 15. One of these is addressed to Donato So-
ranzo,54 while another is directly addressed to Filippo (as “simel di fratello”, which suggests a 
more distant rather than a direct consanguineous family relationship).55 Luca, in turn, is re-
peatedly mentioned in a letter by Andrea Donado qd. Nicolò, himself a crucial business con-
tact of the Soranzo brothers, who maintained links to the Barbarigo and Priuli families.56 
This personal network of the Soranzo brothers also relied on the services of commission 
agents (fattore) such as a certain Troilo Malipiero who is mentioned in Alvise Marcadelli’s 
letter57 as well as in the letters written by Stefano Stolero.58 The network was partially but not 
exclusively family-based. Apart from the aforementioned Corner family branch, the clan of 
Donato Soranzo also entailed affinal links to a branch of the Ca’ Pesaro,59 the family of his 
correspondent Giacomo Pesaro (author of two letters preserved in busta 15). 
 
 
54 Letter Morosini, Luca qd. Giovanni to Soranzo, Donato, 14.01.1415, ASVe, Miscellanea di carte non 
appartenenti a nessun archivio, b. 15, f. [19]. 
55 Letter Morosini, Luca qd. Giovanni to Morosini, Filippo qd. Nicolò, 09.04.1415, ASVe, Miscellanea di carte 
non appartenenti a nessun archivio, b. 15, f. [4]. 
56 Letter Donado, Andrea qd. Nicolò to Soranzo, Donato, 09.06.1416, ASVe, Miscellanea di carte non 
appartenenti a nessun archivio, b. 15, f. [25]: “Vedo che per lo ditto vollette io ve mandi gottoni per ducati 500 
de raxòn de ser Zuane di Priolli e fradelli perché ve avixo che atrovandome in Damascho como ve scrisi l’altro 
zorno per finir el mal averme lien delì e vinimene di conpagnia con ser Lucha Morexini a Sardenaia. La mia 
cassa con l’aver iera dentro et tute altre mie anze e debitori lasi a ser Piero Barbarigo. Et a dirve il vero me avra 
timenado de lassarli tuti denari me atrovava a vostre ordene. Ma da posa me dubiti che el non tollese promixion 
desi como za ano fato di altri in Damascho. E per questa raxòn i lasi nela mia chassa con i altri me atrovava mie 
e di altre raxòn. E la chiave ho comeso mite la cassa e nela camera di ser Piero Barbarigo. Avixandovi che io ho 
scrito al dito a Damascho che ve mandi ducati 500 d’oro in gottoni e che quelli el bolla di sainbarlo e signa 
quelli del segno di ser Zuan di Priolli e fradelli. E cusì e son zertto el faza. Avixandovi che ser Lucha Morexini 
me lì fa dar a ser Piero dito de lì de denari else atrova di trato di algune so merze el a vendude. E tuto questo ho 
fato per non mandar le chiave dela mia chaxa a Damascho per i tenpi sospetti che ocora. E priego i dio che 
quelli conduga delì con salvamento che a saver i siano zonti ne averò grande piaxèr.” 
57 Letter Marcadelli, Alvise to Soranzo, Donato, 04.09.1402, ASVe, Miscellanea di carte non appartenenti a 
nessun archivio, b. 15, f. [5]. 
58 Letter Stolero, Stefano to Soranzo, Donato, 08.03.1408, ASVe, Miscellanea di carte non appartenenti a nessun 
archivio, b. 15, f. [12]. 
59 Letter Soranzo, Bartolomeo to Soranzo, Donato, 001404, ASVe, Miscellanea di carte non appartenenti a 
nessun archivio, b. 15, f. [10]: “…...ser Felipo da Pesaro nostro barba...”.  
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The structure of the Soranzo business was that of a fraterna compagnia surrounded by an in-
tricate commercial network of agents and long-term associates. Some of its affiliates were 
relatives of the Soranzo brothers, others were linked to their business as commission-based 
associates. The letters of busta 15 provide evidence for a direct involvement of family in 
commercial operations, as the documents produced by relatives also provide business-related 
content. This evidence thus corroborates the critical significance attached to the patrician 
family as a main provider of organisational support in Venetian long-distance trade in the ear-
ly fifteenth century. Even in the context of a fraterna compagnia, the extended family seems 
to have played a critical role in providing a social basis for additional commercial partner-
ships, allowing for greater operational flexibility while at the same time augmenting the 
scope of the venture.  
ii. Ambrogio Malipiero: a diaspora merchant 
The papers of Ambrogio Malipiero are less well-known than the Soranzo archive, yet the 
sheer size his surviving body of documents warrants a recommendation for further study. 
Rendering a complete account of Ambrogio’s life would face the initial challenge of assem-
bling the entirety of available sources, which are spread across several collections in the 
ASVe and other archives.60 To my knowledge, no systematic account has thus far been at-
tempted, and this short introductory summary for comparative purposes is not intended to 
remedy this shortcoming. The following evaluation is confined to the documents known to 
me: a number of letters are kept in the same busta 15 as the majority of the aforementioned 
Soranzo letters in ASVe, Miscellanea di documenti non appartanenti a nessun archivio, 
while others are part of the larger collection ASVe, Miscellanea Gregolin.61 I admit to a lim-
ited reading of the sources, as perusing the entirety of the Miscellanea Gregolin in the search 
of additional documents would have been beyond the scope of this study. However, the mate-
rial presented here already comprises a fairly large number of documents, which promise to 
provide an adequate overview of Ambrogio Malipiero’s career as a merchant.  
ARBEL has summarised the current state of research on the documents relating to Ambrigio 
Malipiero.62 According to this, LANE (in Andrea Barbarigo) and VALLET are thus far the only 
two studies to have used parts of Malipiero’s archival legacy, basing their analysis on the 
 
60 Arbel: Venetian Letters, pp. 40-41. 
61 ASVe, Miscellanea di documenti non appartanenti a nessun archivio, b. 15; ASVe, Misc. Gregolin, b. 8.  
62 Arbel: Venetian Letters, p. 40.  
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documents contained in Miscellanea Gregolin.63 I therefore assume that the letters contained 
in Miscellanea di documenti non appartanenti a nessun archivio, b. 15 have thus far not been 
analysed. Thus, as with the Soranzo sources contained in the same busta, this brief discussion 
is partly intended to introduce this material to the scholarly community.  
The letters cover the final years of Malipiero’s life, during which time he resided in Tripoli 
and served as Venetian vice-consul. He died there presumably in 1487.64 According to Arbel, 
he was a second cousin to the brothers Pietro Malipiero, a Cyprus-based merchant, and 
Marco Malipiero, who served as Grand Commander of the Hospitallers in Cyprus.65 There 
are 31 documents in said busta relating to Ambrogio Malipiero, mostly letters written by dif-
ferent correspondents, received in Tripoli between 1482 and 1487. Some of the documents 
are badly preserved and no longer reveal a date or sender. According to this record, Ambro-
gio corresponded with a certain “di Mafio” in Bruges; Francesco Morosini, Bernardo Pisani, 
Almoro Donado (vice-consul66), Giacomo Donado, Daniel da Zegnarato, Pietro Rizo, France-
sco Zorzi in Aleppo; Giacomo Dolfin, Giacomo Gabriel, Dario Malipiero in Beirut; and Gio-
vanni Mocenigo, the consul of Damascus. There are also two letters written by Ambrogio 
Malipiero from Venice to Girolamo Malipiero in Tripoli, both dated 1482; a number of small 
notes, accounts, and inventories (not all of which are addressed to Ambrogio); a copy of a 
piece of correspondence between two members of the Barbaro family; one piece of corre-
spondence addressed to Ambrogio Malipiero whose sender remains unclear; and two letters 
to the brothers Marco and Lorenzo Bembo qd. Girolamo, written from Bruges and London by 
Alberto Contarini and Polo Tiepolo respectively. The documents not addressed to (or written 
by) Ambrogio Malipiero bear no relation to him. 
 
TABLE 3: ASVE, MISC. DI CARTE NON APP. AD ALCUN ARCHIVIO, B. 15, LETTERE AMBROGIO MALIPIERO 
Arch. 
ref. 
Type of 
doc. 
Author Recipient Location 
(writ.) 
Loca-
tion 
(rec.) 
Date (writ.) Date (rec.) 
f. [32] List of 
goods 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
f. [33] Letter Giacomo Zacharia Lepanto n/a 18.12.1471 May 1472 
 
63 Lane: Andrea Barbarigo, p. 150; Vallet: Marchands vénitiens.   
64 Arbel: Venetian Letters, p. 40; Vallet: Marchands vénitiens, p. 319. 
65 Arbel: Venetian letters, p. 41. 
66 Vallet: Marchand vénitiens, p. 317. 
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(copy, 
excerpt) 
Barbaro Barbaro 
f. [34] Letter Polo Tiepo-
lo 
Marco 
Bembo qd. 
Girolamo 
London n/a 01.04.1482 1482 
f. [35] Letter Alberto 
Contarini 
Lorenzo 
Bembo qd. 
Girolamo 
Bruges n/a 08.08.1480 05.09.1480 
f. [36] Letter di Mafio Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Bruges Tripoli 01.11.1484 n/a 
f. [37] Note Giacomo 
Dolfin 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 02.11.1484 n/a 
f. [38] Note  Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
f. [39] Invento-
ry 
  Aleppo n/a 19.09.1485 n/a 
f. [40] Letter Dario 
Malipiero 
qd. Giaco-
mo 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 30.10.1484 n/a 
f. [41] Letter Francesco 
Morosini 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 20.02.1486  
f. [42] Letter Bernardo 
Pisani 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 19.09.1485 23.09.1485 
f. [43] Invento-
ry 
      
f. [44] Letter Bernardo 
Pisani 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 19.09.1485 n/a 
f. [45] Letter “Mercan-
toris 
Maone” 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 06.08.1485 26.08.1485 
f. [46] Letter Almoro 
Donado 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 16.08.1485 02.09.1485 
f. [47] Letter Giacomo 
Donado 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 04.06.1482 18.06.1482 
f. [48] Letter Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Girolamo 
Malipiero 
Venice Tripoli 04.06.1482 n/a 
f. [49] Note Giacomo 
Dolfin 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 04.04.1482 06.04.1482 
f. [50] Letter  Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 25.04.1485 30.04.1485 
f. [51] Account Pietro 
Malipiero 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Bafo  1485  
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f. [52] Letter prob.  
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
 Venice  1482  
f. [53] Letter Daniel da 
Zegnarato 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 06.04.1487 n/a 
f. [54] Letter Giovanni 
Mocenigo 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Damascus Tripoli 21.06.1487 n/a 
f. [55] Note Marco Se-
guro 
Giacomo 
Seguro 
    
f. [56] Letter Almoro 
Donado 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 18.11.1484 29.11.1484 
f. [57] Letter Pietro Rizo Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 06.11.1484 13.11.1484 
f. [58] Letter Giacomo 
Gabriel 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 03.11.1484 13.11.1484 
f. [59] Letter Francesco 
Zorzi 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 18.11.1484 29.11.1484 
f. [60] Letter Pietro Rizo Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 18.11.1484 29.11.1484 
f. [61] Letter Giacomo 
Gabriel 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli November 
1484 
26.12.1484 
f. [62] Letter   Pora  July 1480  
 
The bulk of Ambrogio’s correspondence from this sample was written from Aleppo, a signif-
icant centre of the Eastern cotton and silk trades in the late medieval period. As the final des-
tination of the caravan route from Persia via Baghdad, a Venetian outpost had emerged over 
the course of the second half of the fifteenth century, overseen by a Venetian vice-consul.67 
The letter written by Ambrogio in Venice to Girolamo Malipiero in Tripoli shows that Am-
brogio must have been residing in the Serenissima as late as 1482 and risen to his position in 
Tripoli only thereafter. Girolamo appears to have acted as agent to Ambrogio, who was active 
in the cotton trade even before his deployment to Syria. The first letter sent to Ambrogio in 
Tripoli was written by the (vice)-consul of Aleppo, Giacomo Donado, and received on 18 
June 1482.68 Giacomo Donado partnered with Ambrogio and took care of their common af-
 
67 Ashtor: Levant Trade, p. 397. 
68 Although technically a vice-consulate and not a consulate, Venetian vice-consuls “sometimes went by the title 
of consul” (Ashtor: Levant Trade, p. 325), as does Giacomo Donado in this letter. 
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fairs in Aleppo. He referred to a joint account and mentioned a number of third persons with 
whom the pair interacted commercially, among them Giovanni Alvise Morosini.69 
This first schematic information on Ambrogio’s commerce already illustrates two interesting 
distinctions Lorenzo Dolfin and, to an extent, Donato Soranzo. First, an obvious yet meaning-
ful observation, Ambrogio resided at his main place of business himself, whereas Lorenzo 
Dolfin conducted his Eastern commerce primarily from Venice and its surroundings. Second, 
Ambrogio evidently did not recruit his commercial partners and agents from his family sur-
roundings, but relied on the services of fellow members of the Venetian community in Syria, 
who quite often had resided in Aleppo, Damascus, and the Syrian ports for many years, were 
well-versed in the particularities of the Syrian cotton trade and thoroughly interlinked among 
each other. Both observations partly relate to personal circumstances and may thus be – to 
some extent – incidental. Yet they also reflect wider historical developments that altered the 
circumstances of Venetian long-distance trade in the Eastern Mediterranean in the second 
half of the fifteenth century. 
Ambrogio Malipiero’s rise to Venetian consul in Tripoli is, of course, first a matter of per-
sonal achievement. In the case of Lorenzo Dolfin, members of his trade coalition took care of 
his business interests in the Venetian outposts, and as such he had no compelling reason to 
settle there himself. If a similarly extensive archival record was available for Giovanni Mo-
rosini qd. Marino, Lorenzo’s representative in Constantinople, it might display a degree of 
interaction with non-relatives comparable to Ambrogio Malipiero. Yet other factors suggest 
that Ambrogio’s strategy of interacting within the (not kin-based) Venetian commercial net-
works of Syria may have been driven by gradual systemic shifts. These resulted from politi-
cal developments and are perhaps best illustrated by comparing the respective commercial 
surroundings of Ambrogio Malipiero and Biagio Dolfin.  
While Biagio Dolfin’s experiences as a merchant in Mamluk Egypt illustrate the particular 
challenges faced by Venetians operating in restricted foreign markets, which required close 
cooperation within stable networks of specialist traders, Biagio nevertheless worked within a 
family-dominated mercantile coalition whose members acted on his behalf both in Venice 
and on foreign soil. Ambrogio Malipiero also kept commercial contacts to his home market 
(although surprisingly few letters from Venice survive in his collection, see also table 6 in 
 
69 Letter Donado, Giacomo to Malipiero, Ambrogio qd. Francesco, 04.06.1482, ASVe, Misc. di carte non app. 
ad alcun archivio, b. 15, fasc. 3, f. [47]. The latter appears as “Zuan Alvise Morosini” in Vallet: Marchand 
vénitiens, p. 318. 
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appendix D), yet the vast majority of the available letters originated from fellow diaspora 
traders. Ambrogio was informed about developments in Venice through his correspondence 
with relatives and Venice-based commercial partners. The collection of letters contained in 
Miscellanea Gregolin, b. 9 includes two letters from his mother, Suordamor, and one from 
his brother Alvise.70 Further Venice-based correspondents included members of the Priuli 
family that had gained prominence in the Venetian community in Aleppo. The northern-
Syrian metropolis was the origin of a vast number of letters sent to Ambrogio while he resid-
ed in Tripoli, but the collection also contains letters from Beirut and Damascus. An important 
Aleppo-based correspondent was Domenico Capelan, whose name may derive from a reli-
gious function.71 
Ambrogio’s much deeper commercial interconnection within the Venetian diaspora – com-
pared to his predecessor Biagio Dolfin – also derives from the steadily improving macro-
political integration of Venetian commerce in the Near East. The vast expansion of Venetian 
trade towards the mid-fifteenth century was principally driven by rising trade volumes in Syr-
ian cotton, and the commercial expansion soon triggered geopolitical ramifications with a 
rapid growth of the Venetian diaspora in Syria, leading to the establishment of permanent set-
tlements in Hama, Aleppo, Latakia, Beirut, Acre and Damascus, as well as the establishment 
of a consulate in Tripoli in 1442.72 These outposts were highly interlinked, both commercial-
ly and informationally, through regular land trade routes, good access to the ports and thriv-
ing networks of written communication. As a result, the Venetian commercial diaspora be-
came a market of its own, large enough to allow its members to make independent choices of 
whom to trade with and under which conditions, yet small enough to not require external reg-
ulation. In fact – and although the consulate system represented a “formal” regulatory author-
ity with the ability to mediate between merchants – the Venetian commercial diaspora in late 
fifteenth-century Syria was largely self-regulatory. The cooperation between merchants and 
the enforcement of agreements were enabled through a mechanism of reputation similar to 
the mechanisms of commitment generated by the system of family-internal trade representa-
tion. The political and social interdependence of diaspora merchants created a community of 
fellows in which mutual trust was a binding principle. The Malipiero letters illustrate the 
deep interwoveness of the Venetian community in Syria – with many of the correspondents 
 
70 See table of documents in appendix D. 
71 Vallet: Marchand vénitiens, p. 317. 
72 Ibid, p. 235; Ashtor: Levant Trade, p. 324 ; also  Pedani, Maria Pia (Fabris): "Consoli veneziani nei porti del 
mediterraneo in età moderna",http://www.storiamediterranea.it/public/md1_dir/b687.pdf 
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also mentioned in letters written by others, thus indicating a large degree of interconnection – 
as well as providing insights into the daily routine of diaspora merchants. The vast majority 
of the letters were written to the merchant rather than the consul Ambrogio Malipiero and 
thus contain information on business proceedings rather than consulate affairs.
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CHAPTER VII:  
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK – TOWARDS A 
PROSOPOGRAPHY OF LONG-DISTANCE TRADE? 
The life and career of Lorenzo Dolfin symptomatically reflect the territorial growth of the 
Venetian Republic, the economic integration of its overseas territories and outposts into its 
long-distance trade, and the increasing significance of the family as a commercial unit. A 
more global, i.e. not geographically confined significance of these developments is the grad-
ual emergence of the corporation economy, an economic system in which transactions are 
performed within long-term partnerships. As these partnerships were mostly family-based in 
the Venetian context, either in the form of direct consanguineous and affinal ties or as cross-
generational alliances between non-kin individuals, their constitution was independent of 
economic interests and thus did not necessitate trade-specific contracts. The decline of the 
Venetian contract (or commenda) economy must be seen against this background. 
Indeed, the Commissaria Lorenzo Dolfin contains very few contractual elements, and the few 
contracts that it does contain mostly relate to personal matters such as Lorenzo’s marriage. 
Commercial contracts are almost non-existent, which, from a source-critical perspective, is 
especially revealing given the nature of the source. Since the procurators kept the archives of 
deceased merchants mainly for the purpose of evaluating potential claims from third parties, 
they were adamant on the completeness of the records with respect to any commerce-specific 
documentation. As a result, much of Lorenzo Dolfin’s commercial correspondence survives 
in the collection, alongside many accounts, ricordanze, and receipts. By contrast, the collec-
tion does not contain a single colleganza contract. In fifteenth-century Venetian long-distance 
trade along the established galley routes, the colleganza ceased to be practical as a result of 
the increasing economic and political integration of the Eastern Mediterranean region, and 
was thus replaced by alternative arrangements of capital agglomeration and shared invest-
ments. In the context of Venetian political and economic expansion in the region, family coa-
litions established permanent branches in the former commenda ports and thus developed a 
system of family-internal economic agency.  
The corporation economy did not, of course, become fully developed during Lorenzo’s life-
time. The collection also contains evidence of intermediary forms of contracting, such as the 
documentation of a compagnia. Furthermore, the corporation economy was not an economic 
system in which contracting was entirely obsolete. It subsumes a range of contracting meth-
ods (compagnia, bilateral partnerships, commission agency) that were not based on a distinc-
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tion between suppliers of capital and labour. The resulting means of cooperation were struc-
turally hierarchical and distinguished between an internal order of the partnership and the ex-
ternal level of the market. 
In the following, I summarise the key propositions of the study. Following a recount of the 
historical narrative, I assess the significance of this new evidence with respect to Venetian 
long-distance trade more generally. Third, I highlight the extent to which the findings diverge 
from established considerations, and outline a few perspectives for further research. Finally, I 
set out concrete proposals for a wider micro-historic research agenda with respect to late me-
dieval Venetian trade. 
A. Historical Narrative: Another Merchant of Venice 
The example of Lorenzo Dolfin qd. Antonio and his rise to commercial success highlight the 
importance of family solidarity and cross-generational cooperation within the Venetian patri-
ciate. Although a half-orphan from early age, and despite growing up without the benefit of a 
strong nuclear family, Lorenzo received the attention and support of relatives in his adoles-
cence and during his education and professional training. His uncle Biagio Dolfin qd. Lo-
renzo, the brother of his deceased father Antonio, was a key figure from whom he inherited 
not only financial and material allocations but also a number of useful commercial connec-
tions. When Biagio Dolfin took up residence in Alexandria in 1418 for a second term as Ve-
netian consul, Lorenzo became the primary caretaker of his uncle’s affairs in Venice, over-
seeing mostly the sale of gemstones. He thus acquired and mastered skills that proved highly 
beneficial in his subsequent commercial career: an insider knowledge of the Rialto, crucial 
European markets such as London and Bruges, and the Venetian outposts in the East; an 
awareness of the increasing integration of European and Eastern Mediterranean markets; an 
understanding of the interdependencies of different players within commercial networks and 
coalitions, and of the advantages and pitfalls of business cooperation; and the ability to react 
to exogenous shifts in business environments by choosing a business model in accordance 
with personal abilities. 
Lorenzo also travelled on Biagio’s behalf. He was present in Egypt when Biagio died during 
an official mission to the Sultan in Cairo, originally for the purpose of transporting gemstones 
from Cairo to Alexandria and eventually back to Venice. As Biagio’s main heir, he was soon 
confronted with claims on his inheritance, mostly from members of Biagio’s maternal family, 
the Malipiero. Lorenzo learned from this episode that an assumed family solidarity would not 
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necessarily lead to uncompromising mutual loyalty, and that trust and reliability within a 
family-based commercial partnership would need to be backed by exogenous social incen-
tives. Yet he also witnessed much more positive examples of functioning loyalties in Biagio’s 
partnerships with Orso Dolfin and with non-kin partners such as Nicolò Bernardo qd. France-
sco, Antonio di Gusanieri qd. Marco, Matteo di Sori, and Giacomo de Zorzi qd. Giorgio, with 
whom Lorenzo would correspond further after Biagio’s death.  
Lorenzo returned to Venice after Biagio’s death and remained in the Veneto region, apart 
from a brief spell as camerlengho of Koper (Capodistria), for the rest of his life. He took resi-
dence in Chioggia (1423), Venice, and eventually in Vicenza, where he began his service as 
camerario in 1426. One year earlier, on 29 January 1425, he had married Giovanetta Mo-
rosini, daughter of Marino Morosini qd. Giovanni. Between 1422 and 1426, he corresponded 
commercially with the brothers Francesco and Marco Renier qd. Nicolò in Bruges, who acted 
as his agents and purchased (primarily) English wool on his behalf. At the same time, Lo-
renzo traded cloth and spices in London in collaboration with Giacomo Dolfin qd. Francesco 
and his brothers Giorgio and Vettore, a partnership that would last until Giacomo’s death in 
1433. 
Soon thereafter, Lorenzo began exploring the markets of South-East Europe, which were 
linked to Venice through the Romania galley route that served, among others, Corfu, Negro-
ponte, Constantinople, and Tana until 1452. With the brothers Giacomo, Giorgio, and Vettore 
Dolfin qd. Francesco, presumably distant cousins of considerable wealth, he maintained a 
compagnia, an institution of combined capital ownership and specialised labour, which ap-
plied a business model that he would maintain for the entirety of his mercantile career. The 
compagnia Dolfin purchased different types of fibres (mostly wool) on the London and Flan-
ders markets and exported the value-added products, processed cloth, to Constantinople. It 
was dissolved in an orderly manner after 1432. 
After concluding his partnership with his cousins, Lorenzo turned to his affinal family for 
support. Until 1448, the last year in which his commercial activity remains documented, he 
worked with his brothers-in-law Michele, Giovanni, and Pietro Morosini qd. Marino. Michele 
was resident in London, while Giovanni resided in Constantinople. Pietro wrote to Lorenzo 
from Constantinople, Bursa, and Caffa. 
Lorenzo Dolfin invested his gains from long-distance trade in the Venetian property market. 
The last document of the CLD is the front page of a 1467 quaderno in which Lorenzo listed 
the rental income from his estate. 
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B. Evaluation: A family Coalition as Business Framework 
In comparison to his uncle Biagio, two observations from Lorenzo’s commercial biography 
are particularly remarkable: first, Lorenzo’s commercial activities were a lot less diversified 
than those of his uncle. While Biagio traded with a variety of commodities (cloth, gemstones, 
wine), Lorenzo significantly reduced his engagement in the gem trade (although never aban-
doning it entirely) early in his senior career to focus mostly on textiles. This allowed him to 
lead a quiet life on the Venetian mainland without much need for changes in locations or 
travel. Second, Lorenzo built his principal commercial partnerships with members of his ex-
tended and affinal families. There is comparatively little exchange with non-kin correspond-
ents, and even large parts of his family environment remained irrelevant in commercial terms. 
Lorenzo maintained close links to his maternal uncles Michele, Andrea, and Benedetto Ga-
briel qd. Nicolò and to their children Alvise qd. Benedetto, Angelo qd. Andrea, and Nicolò 
qd. Andrea, but the surviving correspondence is mostly personal. Unlike Biagio Dolfin, Lo-
renzo did not have major conflicts with commercial partners, and his personal commercial 
network generally cooperated smoothly. There are no indications of legal disputes at any 
stage of his commercial career, not counting the settlements he had to reach on behalf of his 
deceased uncle Biagio.  
The greater diversity of Biagio Dolfin’s commercial network in terms of the inclusion of non-
kin agents primarily underlines that his core business, the gem trade, implied much greater 
levels of risk and thus required greater degrees of specialist market knowledge that frequently 
had to be sought outside the boundaries of the family. Biagio’s own experience as a trade 
agent in Syria had equipped him with the necessary intercultural business skills to embark on 
a career in the risky but profitable gem trade whose geographical core was the Mamluk Sul-
tanate, specifically Alexandria and Cairo. His frequent change of residence reflected a range 
of available business opportunities. Specifically, his two terms as Venetian consul in Alexan-
dria allowed him to closely monitor the Egyptian market for his own purposes and to influ-
ence Mamluk-Venetian trade relations, thus improving the general situation for Venetian spe-
cialist traders like himself.  
The difficulties Biagio faced during most of his mercantile career likely persuaded Lorenzo 
to follow a different path. Yet, despite the differences between their business models and 
strategies of cooperation, both Biagio and Lorenzo operated in family-based commercial coa-
litions and maintained personal networks that included selected non-kin individuals. Both 
Biagio and Lorenzo acquired their business skills at an early age with the guidance of family 
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elders, and both extended their family environment for business purposes. Given that Biagio 
and Lorenzo Dolfin pursued quite different commercial strategies, their common business 
culture especially regarding the generation of stable inter-personal business links is striking. 
In the way of a general observation, the examples of Biagio and Lorenzo – as well as those of 
their contemporaries Donato Soranzo and Ambrogio Malipiero – suggest that patrician mer-
chants typically began their mercantile careers within commercial networks closely aligned to 
their family environments. They altered these cross-generational enterprises through their 
own input and eventually handed them on to the next generation. Yet, over the course of a 
mercantile career, a merchant’s business environment did not remain confined to his family. 
It included kin and non-kin alike, yet to different degrees and for different purposes. Under-
standing Venetian business units as private-order coalitions and networks (rather than focus-
ing on closed operational units, such as compagnie, fraterne)1 therefore seems a better way to 
account for the entirety of a merchant’s commercial links, thus also assessing the relative sig-
nificance of both inter- and extra-family connections. 
The economic significance of the family thus manifests itself in the composition of Venetian 
trade networks. In this context, a trade network is a system of regular, but not formally insti-
tutionalised exchange of information, services, and goods between individuals for commer-
cial purposes. Links between individual network components differ in strength, while differ-
ent components differ in centrality. That is, the relationships maintained by individual com-
ponents differ in their intensities, and some members of the network maintain more links than 
others. Venetian trade thus consisted of a family-based core that maintained links to external, 
i.e. non-kin components. The evolution of this business structure is closely linked to the 
broader social significance of the patrician family, as it mirrors the complex relationships be-
tween different patrician clans as well as between the patriciate and the cittadini. The case 
study of Lorenzo Dolfin exemplifies the systemic structure behind these linkages. 
C. Further Hypotheses 
While one should not overstate the hermeneutic significance of a micro-historical case study, 
a few broader historical and theoretical insights can nevertheless be proposed – not as definite 
conclusions, but as informed deductive hypotheses. These relate to the contractuality of 
 
1 These business units, however, were not typically based on a priori determined legal dispositions. The juridi-
cal practice of the Giudizi di Petizion shows that the legal frameworks of liable commercial partnerships were 
often established ad hoc on the basis of available documentation. 
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commercial networks; the role of the family in generating commercial links; the historical 
conceptualisation of the Venetian patrician family; the incentive-structure yielding stable 
means of cooperation within commercial networks, which included direct monetary and long-
term non-monetary payoffs; and the difference between internal hierarchies and the external 
market environment. To summarise: 
5. Venetian Patrician commercial networks were not primarily contract-based. Instead, 
they were constituted of (cross-generational) interpersonal links based on kin rela-
tions. Our evidence suggests that a Northian institutional framework – one of formal 
vs. informal business relations – is nevertheless difficult to apply to patrician business 
organisation in fifteenth-century Venice. Non-contractual business links were still 
based on hierarchies derived from social contexts such as family. 
6. The patrician family acted as an operational unit in the commercial sphere. This oc-
curred mainly through the employment of family agents, the cross-generational 
transmission of business skills, and the cross-generational composition of commercial 
networks and trade coalitions. In the latter case, the agglomerated wealth of individual 
family-coalition members would be transformed into coalitional capital, that is, the 
wealth of any coalition member could be tapped by his peers as a source of additional 
capital for joint commercial ventures. 
7. The Venetian patrician family combined elements of a personal sphere, a sphere of 
representation, and an economic unit. An adequate historical model should combine 
existing sociological concepts such as the nuclear family, the extended family, and the 
affinal (marital) family. By identifying the “chosen family” as an additional layer (i.e. 
non-kin individuals who become elevated to family-status through social affinity), we 
can observe a family structure that may be referred to as “comprehensive family”. 
8. The comprehensive family served as a social basis from which mercantile networks 
and coaltions were created. In fact, commercial coalitions often were identical with 
(parts of) a comprehensive family structure. They typically revolved around a central 
node that created and maintained the coalition’s periphery, consisting mostly of kin 
and, where necessary, of non-kin agents who were part of a coalition member’s per-
sonal network (i.e. individuals that did not belong to the comprehensive family from 
which the coalition was established). The incentives of external agents differed from 
those of coalition members, as the latter were primarily concerned with their long-
term income streams resulting from coalition-based rather than the payoffs from mar-
ginal transactions. An individual’s role within a patrician commercial coalition 
changed as they became more senior. A coalition’s long-term operation displayed el-
ements of both general and limited partnerships. Different types of contracts were 
used, and coalition members performed agency services to each other. In preliminary 
forms of intra-family business cooperation, such as a family-based compagnia, part-
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ners received commission payments for the transactions they oversaw. Thus, agents 
were either paid directly (by commission) or benefited long-term from reduced trans-
action costs. 
9. Hence, there emerged distinct operational dependencies between coalitional partners 
on the one hand – subject to internal hierarchies derived from family dynamics – and 
the external market environment on the other. This is consistent with theoretical re-
search on the development of firms from markets.2 The increasing significance of in-
ternal hierarchies provided a strong impetus for the emerging corporation economy. 
Thus, in the given historical context, family structure had a direct impact on economic 
development through its role in the formation of commercial partnerships. 
D. Outlook: Prosopography as a Complementary Method 
This micro-historical research on the life of Lorenzo Dolfin qd. Antonio, alongside similar 
studies on patrician individuals (I.A.i), can be used to develop further hypotheses on bio-
graphical constants of Venetian patricians. For instance, the initial integration into a family-
based commercial enterprise is independently observable (albeit under different circumstanc-
es) in the cases of Biagio and Lorenzo Dolfin, Donato Soranzo, Andrea Barbarigo, and Ber-
nardo Giustiniani. Biographical parallels of this sort should ideally be examined with refer-
ence to larger data sets. 
Thus, further substantiation of the here presented evidence could be achieved, for example, 
by means of a large-N prosopographical study of the Venetian commercial patriciate. The 
prosopographical method, as “the inquiry into the common characteristics of a group of his-
torical actors by means of a collective study of their lives”,3 is a meaningful extension of the 
business biography in that it allows for assessing the relative pertinence of biographical de-
tails against the background of more general biographical characteristics of wider social 
spheres. The commercial correspondence and account books of merchants active roughly be-
tween 1344 and 1501 – which are available in some abundance, albeit rarely as extensive as 
the archive of Lorenzo Dolfin – could be subjected to a questionnaire inquiring into the rele-
vance of a set of core variables of commercial biographies such as  
➢ dates of birth and death; 
➢ means of mercantile education; 
 
2 Williamson, Oliver E.: "Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations", in: The American 
Economic Review 63 (May, 1973), No. 2, pp. 316-325. 
3 Stone, Lawrence: "Prosopography", in: Daedalus 100 (Winter, 1971), No. 1, pp. 46-79 (here p. 46). 
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➢ age when first participating in a commercial enterprise; 
➢ membership in a fraterna; 
➢ age at marriage; 
➢ business focus as a junior merchant (sector, geographical area); 
➢ business focus as senior merchant; 
➢ (number and types of) positions held in the Venetian civil service; 
➢ principal forms of intra-family commercial cooperation (matrinilineal, patrilineal, af-
final); 
➢ observable means of commercial cooperation (commission agency, family agency, 
fraterna, compagnia); 
➢ estimated value of inheritance; 
➢ estimated wealth at time of death; 
Such a study could also include individuals without a major archival legacy of their own; in 
fact, most of the above variables can be constructed for individuals occurring in Lorenzo 
Dolfin’s correspondence, such as his brother-in-law Michele Morosini qd. Marino. The po-
tential of such an endeavour is twofold: first, it would allow determining the degree to which 
career development differed between sectors of trade and geographical areas of commercial 
activity. Second, it would be possible to further explore the link between family structure and 
economic development by considering the macro-dynamics of the Venetian trading-post sys-
tem, thus examining possible divergences in family interaction between different locations of 
the Venetian diaspora. Both aspects would address some of the methodical limitations of the 
present study relating to the micro-historical focus on a single individual. A large-scale pros-
opographical data set could explain, in greater detail, the differences in the composition of the 
respective personal commercial networks of Biagio and Lorenzo Dolfin as a consequence of 
shifts in transactional security, operational risk (stemming, for example, from financial, logis-
tical, climatical, or cultural dispositions) and political uncertainties. 
Yet, as I hope to have shown, the business biography remains an important prerequisite for 
macro-historical research on the commercial patriciate. Larger-scale statistical analyses must 
be seen as complementary to, rather than as a replacement of, micro-focused historical source 
work, since the biographical variables in prosopographical studies must emerge from real ob-
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servations on individual careers. Additional micro-histories of individual merchants are there-
fore to be encouraged. 
APPENDIX 
A. Chronology 
c.1399: Birth of Lorenzo Dolfin qd. Antonio. 
 
1399: Death of Lorenzo’s father Antonio Dolfin qd. Lorenzo. 
 
1404: Venetian annexation of Padua. 
 
1408: Begin of Biagio Dolfin’s first consulship in Alexandria. 
 
1417: Martin V (Oddone Colonna of Rome) elected pope during the Council of Constance; 
end of the Western Schism. 
 
1418: First correspondence between Biagio and Lorenzo Dolfin; Biagio Dolfin begins second 
consulship in Alexandria. 
 
1420: Death of Biagio Dolfin qd. Lorenzo (26 April). Carlo Contarini appointed his successor 
as interim consul in Alexandria.  
 
1423: Francesco Foscari elected Doge of Venice; Lorenzo Dolfin resident in Chioggia. 
 
1425: Lorenzo Dolfin marries Giovanetta Morosini qd. Marino. 
 
1431: Death of Martin V. The Venetian Gabriele Condulmer elected Pope Eugene IV. 
 
1435: Lorenzo Dolfin resident in Padua. 
 
1447: Death of Pope Eugene IV. Tommaso Parentucelli of Genoa elected Pope Nicholas V. 
 
1450: Francesco Sforza elected Duke of Milan by Milanese senate. 
 
1453: Ottoman conquest of Constantinople. 
 
1454: Peace of Lodi. 
 
1455: Alfonso de Borgia elected Pope Callixtus III following the death of Nicholas V. 
 
1458: Death of Callixtus III., Silvio Piccolomini of Siena elected Pope Pius II. 
 
1464: Death of Pius II, Pietro Barbo of Venice (nephew of Eugene IV) elected Pope Paul II. 
 
1467: Last document of the Commissaria Lorenzo Dolfin. 
 
1470: Fall of Negroponte. 
 
1471: Death of Paul II. Francesco della Rovere of Genoa elected Pope Sixtus IV. 
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1475: Death of Lorenzo Dolfin (7 February). 
B. Selected Documents 
i. Letter, Biagio Dolfin qd. Lorenzo, Venetian consul in Alexandria, to Lorenzo 
Dolfin qd. Antonio in Venice 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (PSM 282), Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [3]: 
 
 
In Christo nomine 1419 in Alexandria 
 
Fio charisimo, 
per questa to fazo asavèr chomo io deliberando de far che in Zepro el sia chargado suso la 
prezentia nave patròn ser Iachomo Chaxopin zerta quantetade de sal zoè che la dita nave sia 
chargada tuta in laqual sal partizipo per 1/3. Et in pero quando con dio avanty la sera zonta a 
Veniexa fa che tu sie con ser Nicholò Dolfin in senba et deschargade che lavera el dito sal si 
prochura ch’el me sia sento a la chamera del sal el mio terzo. Et aviseramie de questo el sera 
fa zoè quanta meza et contado che mantera el dito mio terzo. 
Apreso te avixo che de nostro el dito patròn sì die tute in tuto ducati 200 diqual me tocha a 
pagar 1/3 che se L. 6 s. 13 d. 450 iqual sise de pagar per tuto el mexe de hotubro prosimo che 
vostro siche sonta el dito pagamento. Te dato ordene per ser Iachomelio de Vaga chomo el se 
debia far et si provendito de la moneda tuta fiada ar<e>chordandite che sa soleziso aschuoder 
li ducati X de Marcho Dolfin et anchor le ducati 32 ch’io die aver da li provededari de cho-
mun in chaso che li se tendese anchor li dener che me resta a dar mio suoxero per la raxiòn da 
Sibenicho. Arechadatio a Pasqualiga che de prochura avexandite che provenderò ben si che 
avanty el partir to’ una de le galere el sera dele mie dener tanty dela che non schondando li 
sovradite si se para ben far el dito pagamento aleso. Non ho per questa a dirte salvo che prego 
Christo te conser<v>a con sanitade quando my proprio et diame grazia che con sanitade et 
alegaza se posemo veder. Io non samo per questa nave a Pasqualiga perché per Iachomelo de 
Vaga li samo elqual parte fin zorni 4 ma confortala per mia parte a sar che Christo ve guardi 
tuty et simel digo di mia suor 
Per Blaxio Dolfin fo de miser Lorenzo to padre, chusa dì 18 avril per ser Iachomo Chaxepin  
 
Verso: Nobli domino Laurenzio Delphino quondam domini Antoni filio charisimo Venetiis 
detur. 
Rezevudo del 1419 a dì 4 setembry per Iachmo Chaxopin. 
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ii. Letter, Nicolò Dolfin qd. Benedetto, podestà of Sacile, to Lorenzo Dolfin qd. An-
tonio, camerario of Vicenza 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. [45]: 
 
 
+ a nome de dio in 1426 a dì 11 de Novembrio in Veniexa 
 
Charisimo fradelo, 
e no ve ò scrito da puo la vostra partida alguna mia per no eser sende bexogno. E per questa 
ve avixo chomo e son stà fato podestà e capitano a Sazele siò azetado per conseio e conforto 
de tuti i mie. E pero venerendo informado perché e son zerto de rezever apiasèr de ogni dese-
ro e honor io avese como e faria de ogno vostro desero e ben como de fradelo ch'io ve reputo 
che prego dio che me lase andar con laude de dio e honor de la nostra signoria e ben [carabi-
mento] del dito luoego. 
Perché è […] 2 mexi de andar al dito rezimento e molte cose me sta de bexogno lequal male 
le ponia far far e pero se algune de quelo ve atrovese lequal no ve fose de bexogno ve prego 
orna e bandiere da tronbeta el stendardo elqual fo de vostro barba. E se alguna arma de testa 
ve atrovese se quelo ve piari conse<g>narme e inprestarme azio che quando a vui le bexo-
gnase avanti el mio […] me oferò de mandarvele. E de questo me respondar pluy presto che 
vuy par azio che posando fornirme per lo mezo vostro e posar andar al dito rezimento. Et in 
caxo che no me pose fornir dele sovrascritte chose [o verde perte dequale avexamente] perché 
diqua [e me ne] forniria al mio [ch'io po dar] avanti la mia partida. 
Ne altro per questa me resta salvo [a orferirme senper apariado] la dove [e mesia] al vostro 
desero e onor como de caro fradelo che ve reputo. Che dio ve guardi. 
Inprestede val ben L[ire]57 p[iccoli]2 e b[isanti]0 
per Nicolò Dolfin simel de fradelo 
con amor ve saluda a dì dito 
 
Verso: per Egregio et Nobili omo domino Laurenzio Delphino honorabile camerario Vicen-
ziis detur. 
Rezevudo 1426 a dì 15 Novembryo. 
iii. Letter, Giacomo Dolfin qd. Francesco, vice-bailo of Constantinople, to Lorenzo 
Dolfin qd. Antonio 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco (Reinhold C. Mueller - Christie's Collection), Citra, b. 282-
283: 
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Per ser Lorenzo Dolfin 
 
In Christi nomine MCCCCXXVII in Constantinopoli 
 
Caro fradelo, 
da poi la mie pertida da Venixia nula mia ve ho scrito per non eser sia de bexogna. Et mi zora 
conto zerto non sener asido a Venexia ben chech’i<o> rende zertisimo de mio fradelo Zorzi 
senti sta avixa de tenpo de mia salude hore zonto de qui per far il mio dover et a chaxiòn el 
simel fadi verso de ni ho ve vorado servier questo avixandovi del mio ben star dexiderando 
simel saver de vui i den che prego l’altisimo dio che conservi se poxamo veder con salude. 
 
Nui zonso steno de qui a dì 18 setenbrio avemo abudo pegeo savegar non torna dano a nui qui 
ma he de darion a le galie verle Tane che da posa nui zonzesemomai non ne stado ben zentio 
che […] per tolse le galie non a posudo desbachar anchore che dì 3 […] dubito non andra al 
porto de la Tana. 
 
Io voria aver trovado questo luogo mol<t>o in eseto non […] de gran contrarii prione lì ne 
raport[o] de pese non poro elon(?) verso le nostre abitazion ne muori mi conforto el pon del’ 
inverno a dì per respeton de algune nuove e sta levade za mexi 4 ch’el ne hongarie pasa su la 
Grezia per eser contra turchi. Questi marchadanti de la Grezia non hose conprar dubitanto de 
non eser robado […] sula fosse. Et anchor queli de la Turchia siché per questa le pamine sta 
in vel prexio ne conforto ne poche quantità e non porie vegare si pocha dimanda le cosse 
reinsiave meio iquel non fa. Ma pur son molto contento io non mi trovo aver tropo pani de 
nostre raxion perché avemo spieno se fare pur qualche bene e spezialmente disonanti ben che 
son pochi i nostri per eserboni e ben acholoradi soie sera prima spazadi e quei d’altri non me 
che ne trovi. 
 
Per la vegnuda nostra ne iere pur alguni volontenaxi achonime me zonsse di nuovo subito zar 
pasadi el ne a bel grado che de qui sule greze sula […] ano fato star i Armeni molto sospesi e 
nu fide. Anchora questi botogieri non conpra nula perché non par algun Turcho tuti e andari 
in hoste et posa questi Catelani anno tanto forni de suo pani e zenaxi de vervi e de suo stex a 
gran tade eser i nostri non vuol vervi deve valove pp. 15 or val pp. 52 stex valove pp. 
b[isanti] 7 or val b. 15. I Chatelany de suo grosse soplisse a i nostri brisani e iustavini conpra 
quei con plui vantazie de nostri pp. 10 e son una bota ra nostri non ne hase altra el b. 300 de 
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pani e non mi nesia suol eser altri [..] plui de 500 sulse sparza a steguive b. 200 non ne stirize 
b. 30 mi piaxe non ne altramia se par aver abudo qualche bastarde per eser ne manchamento 
starie insido et destaga ne noria aver abudo fin miete 5 se ne quando piarie asai bene per ve-
gnir […] qual ani afar vui piede delì quel mi piaxine [..] a Zorzi par fanie de tuto. 
 
Io non ho posudo anchor veder le nostre raxion de le chonpagnie avemo converto per eser io 
stado achuzando pese da le galie. Ma segondo lui me a dito per sie nave pasade ve amando 
plui cosse e parmi sta astuoder anchor de le beteri vechi non se a posudo per zerte garbui e 
stadi investisse far adasio per seguir pezo. Ma per la dio gran spiero per el retorno de ste galie 
se pueder che de la raxion vechia ne restera pocho de qui non resta in vender altro che pani i 
bastardi per eser destoloradi non si ne puo inverso pensava i ne aveste duro me par. Spiero de 
parti in su deli merze fo manda i arzenti vivi ben vendudi e fasse gran guadagno e dio voleste 
ne avede frai uno aver duo man subito per l’avie de [..] over per l’avie. De anchorne avixo 
Zorzi de [..] zinabri ne avemo pari vi o rize male e itri fo bendudi per modo se ne guade gran 
non troppo tuto l’arzento su le man resta e ne tropo [..] de qui puochi denari de i pani ho dato 
chon mi ve avixo ne vendudi pani 8 loesti app. 1 li 3 app. a nostri [..]. La moneda [..] he meio 
che averla venduda l[ira] 1 plui [..] perché [..] [..] pasa plui de avanti si la moneda spiero ali-
zion l’avamo se an dele inchiete se sare bene. Anchor i spazo dez(?) 30 de nostra [..] al 13 per 
i suo colori son de quely le dasie a 12 a dicho […] fasa el ver al tropo de le nave. Speremo 
daro vie el resto et anchor i loesti de i pani fini nula ho fato aver abudi avanti altri [..] sine 
cognasse la bontade non pero che se perda ma pocha utilità sala far de si meio vi […] dir tuto 
de quei da dialze ne ho comienza a spazar parte spiero se ne far. 
 
Io ve avixo che questo anno non poso eser in Veniexia perché per la morte del nostro bailo 
che fo a dì 30 setenbrio io son sta fato vize bailo siché non vegno romagnir de qui. Et anchor 
me convieni tegnir Vetor per ise..(?) de la marchidantia. Avixandovi che avera salario non vi 
sodia la quantità sue die eser provisto per […] siro di dodixi servi fati avanti el […] con la di-
ta condizion questa mi sera de utilità et a la marchandatia me zovera asai. El bailo è morto 
perché non a posudo horinar za zorni 25 aveva un gran chila e a la zorneda e molto plui in-
grosada tanto che a le fin he morto. I dio i perdoni. 
 
Altro per questa non mi resta presto per vui rechomandami a vostra madre salude Zanetaper 
mia parte le vostre fiane(?) son apariade [farole meta sita] la vesta e manderovele per le galie 
i dio vi conservi in salutà. 
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Per Jacomo Dolfin vize bailo 
In Constantinopoli saluti dì 10 hotubrie 
iv. Contract concerning the purchase of a ship in constantinople, issued by Giorgio 
Dolfin qd. Francesco 
ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 1, int. 4, f. [8]: 
 
 
+ 1428 a dì29 avril in Venexia 
 
Enzio sia che ser Vetor Dolfin fo de miser Franzescho abia conprado una nave in Constanti-
nopoli de laqual el ne da apartizipar charati VIIII zoe charati 9 ala conpag<ni>a de ser Loren-
zio Dolfin he Zorzi he Iachomo Dolfin in laqual el dito ser Lorenzio ne partizipa in un terzo. 
Chely tocheria charati in el qual ser Lorenzio me a dito a mi Zorzi Dolfin chel dibita ch’el di-
to ser Vetor Dolfin non abia conprado la dita nave contra i ordeni de Venexia e per questo el 
non vorave aver in pazio algun per chaxion de la dita conpreda. E per tanto sia manifesto a 
cha’ da’ un che vedera questo scrito come mi Zorzi Dolfin per mio nome he per nome de mio 
fradeli ser Jachomo e ser Vetor Dolfin fazio seguro el dito ser Lorenzio Dolfin che la dita na-
ve non ne conprada contra i ordeni de Venexia a se chaxio fosse chel fosse cognosudo che la 
fosse conprada contra i ordeni de Venexia per modo chel dito ser Lorenzio no rezevesse da 
no algun per la sovadita conpreda. Mi Zorzi Dolfin soradito per mio nome e per nome de i so-
radity mie fradeli so ubligemo el sia sopra de nui el dito da no vi aseguro el dito ser Lorenzio 
per la chaxion de la soradita conpreda per questa chaxion solamente. E mi Zorzi Dolfin li o 
fato questo per sua chrerezia. 
 
Verso: 
Scryto di ser Z. Dolfin che fo di ser Francescho  
C. List of Correspondence, Biagio and Lorenzo Dolfin 
TABLE 4: CORRESPONDENCE BIAGIO AND LORENZO DOLFIN, ASVE, B. 181, FASC. 15 
Arch. 
ref. 
Type of 
doc. 
Author Recipient Location 
(written) 
Location 
(received) 
Date 
(writ.) 
Date (rec.) 
int. d, f. 
[44] 
Letter Lorenzo 
Dolfin 
Biagio 
Dolfin 
Venice Alexandria 20.06.1419 14.08.1419 
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int. d, f. 
[50] 
Letter Lorenzo 
Dolfin 
Biagio 
Dolfin 
Rosetta Cairo 31.03.1420 02.04.1420 
int. d, f. 
[57] 
Letter Lorenzo 
Dolfin 
Biagio 
Dolfin 
Venice Alexandria 30.05.1419 29.07.1419 
int. e, f. 
[4] 
Letter 
(copy) 
Biagio 
Dolfin 
Lorenzo 
Dolfin 
Alexandria Venice 22.01.1419 n/a 
int. e, f. 
[13] 
Letter 
(copy) 
Biagio 
Dolfin 
Lorenzo 
Dolfin 
Alexandria Venice 18.04.1419 n/a 
int. e, f. 
[24] 
Letter Biagio 
Dolfin 
Lorenzo 
Dolfin 
Alexandria Venice 01.11.1418 23.11.1418 
int. f, f. 
[5] 
Letter 
(copy) 
Biagio 
Dolfin 
Lorenzo 
Dolfin 
Alexandria Venice 24.03.1419 n/a 
int. g, f. 
[4] 
Letter n/a Lorenzo 
Dolfin 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
TABLE 5: LETTERS BIAGIO TO LORENZO DOLFIN, ASVE, B. 282 
Arch. ref. Type of 
doc. 
Author Recipient Location 
(written) 
Location 
(received) 
Date 
(writ.) 
Date (rec.) 
fasc. 1, 
int. 2, f. 
[1] 
Letter Biagio 
Dolfin 
Lorenzo 
Dolfin 
Alexandria Venice 18.04.1419 04.09.1419 
fasc. 3, f. 
[2] 
Letter Biagio 
Dolfin 
Lorenzo 
Dolfin 
Alexandria Venice 24.02.1419 27.05.1419 
fasc. 3, f. 
[3]1 
Letter Biagio 
Dolfin 
Lorenzo 
Dolfin 
Alexandria Venice 24.04.1419 15.06.1419 
fasc. 3, f. 
[4] 
Letter Biagio 
Dolfin 
Lorenzo 
Dolfin 
Alexandria Venice 04.08.1419 11.11.1419 
fasc. 3, f. 
[5] 
Letter Biagio 
Dolfin 
Lorenzo 
Dolfin 
Alexandria Venice 24.04.1419 16.06.1419 
D. Letters to Ambrogio Malipiero 
TABLE 6: ASVE, MISC. GREGOLIN, B. 9 
Arch. 
ref. 
Type of 
doc. 
Author Recipient Location 
(written) 
Location 
(received) 
Date (writ.) Date (rec.) 
Fasc. 1, 
f. [1] 
Letter Daniel de 
Inzegnarati 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 1480s n/a 
 
1 Letters f. [3] and f. [5] are of almost identical content, reflecting the practice of sending several copies of the 
same letter to a given destination to increase the chance of reception. 
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Fasc. 2 Letter       
Fasc. 3 Account     1484  
Fasc. 4, 
int. 1 
Letter Giorgio Marco 
Bembo 
  1483 1483 
int. 2, f. 
[1] 
Letter Michiel 
Barbaro 
Marco 
Bembo 
qd. Ieron-
imo 
Rhodes(?) Venice  02.09.1483 
int. 3  Letter Antonio Ne-
go 
Marco 
Bembo 
 Venice 31.10.1483 09.01.1484 
int. 4 Letter Pietro 
Malipiero 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Famagusta Tripoli 02.03.1483 n/a 
int. 5 Letter Giacomo 
Querini 
Marino 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 09.09.1483 n/a 
int. 6 Letter Antonio Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 1483 27.09.1483 
int. 7 Letter Gianpietro Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
 Tripoli  02.01.1484 n/a 
int. 8 Note Pietro 
Malipiero 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Famagusta Tripoli 30.01.1484 n/a 
int. 9 Letter Suordamor 
Malipiero 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
qd. Fran-
cesco 
Venice Tripoli 14.02.1484 03.04.1484 
int. 10 Letter Giovanni 
Valaresso 
qd. 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
qd. Fran-
cesco 
Venice Tripoli 20.02.1484 26.x.1484 
int. 11 Letter Chiara de 
Prioli 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Venice Tripoli 19.02.1484 03.04.1484 
int. 12 Letter Suordamor 
Malipiero 
(“tua ma-
dre”) 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Venice Tripoli 20.02.1484 03.04.1484 
int. 13 Letter Francesco 
Anzelini 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Damascus Tripoli 28.02.1484 06.05.1484 
int. 14 Letter Giacomo 
Dolfin 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
qd. Fran-
cesco 
Venice Tripoli February 
1484 
03.04.1484 
int. 15 Letter Alvise 
Dolfin 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 29.02.1484 03.03.1484 
int. 16 Letter Domenico Ambrogio Aleppo  Tripoli 04.04.1483 11.03.1484 
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Capelan
  
Malipiero (sic) 
int. 17 Letter       
int. 18 Letter  Michele 
Foscari 
qd. Filip-
po 
 Venice 20.10.1483 n/a 
  
int. 19 Letter  Pietro Sa-
lamono 
qd. Gio-
vanni 
(di Santa 
Maria 
Formosa) 
 Venice 29.10.1483  
int. 20 Letter Jacobo Andrea Venice  09.02.1484 n/a 
Fasc. 5, 
int. 1, f. 
[1] 
Letter Alvise 
Dolfin 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 03.03.1484 04.05.1484 
f. [2] Letter Bernardo 
Sarabini 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 03.03.1484 11.03.1484 
int. 2 Letter Ieronimo 
Contarini 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 03.03.1484 11.03.1484 
int. 3 Letter Almoro Do-
nado 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
(“vice 
con.”) 
Aleppo Tripoli 04.03.1484 11.03.1484 
int. 4 Letter Ieronimo 
Contarini 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 04.03.1484 11.03.1484 
int. 5 Letter Giacomo 
Gabriel 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut(?) Tripoli 24(?).03.1484 26.03.1484 
int. 6 Letter Alessandro 
 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Damascus Tripoli 27.02.1484 06.03.1484 
int. 7 Letter Polo Capello Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Damascus Tripoli 07.03.1484 21.03.1484 
int. 8 Letter Pietro 
Malipiero 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Famagusta Tripoli 16.03.1484 09.04.1484 
int. 9 Letter Francesco 
Zorzi 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 17.03.1484 26.03.1484 
int. 10 Letter Almoro Do-
nado 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 17.03.1484 28.03.1484 
int. 11 Letter 
(no en-
velope or 
Domenico 
Capelan 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo prob. 
Tripoli 
17.03.1484 n/a 
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seal) 
int. 12 Letter n/a n/a Nicosia n/a 31.03.1484 n/a 
int. 13 Letter Pietro Rizo Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 22.03.1484 29.03.1484 
int. 14 Letter Girolamo 
Canpanato 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero  
Beirut prob.  
Tripoli 
24.03.1484 28.03.1484 
int. 15 Letter Girolamo 
Canpanato 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut prob. 
Tripoli 
28.03.1484 29.03.1484 
int. 16 Letter Alvise 
Dolfin 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 26.03.1484 29.03.1484 
int. 17 Letter Bernardo 
Tiepolo 
(consul?) 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Nicosia Tripoli 30.03.1484 03.04.1484 
int. 18 Letter Pietro 
Malipiero 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
 Tripoli 30.03.1484 03.04.1484 
int. 19 Letter Girolamo 
Canpanato 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli  01.04.1484 02.04.1484 
int. 20 Letter Marino 
Malipiero 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Nicosia Tripoli 01.04.1484 09.04.1484 
int. 21 Letter Giacomo 
Gabriel 
(vice-
consul?) 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 01.04.1484 02.04.1484 
int. 22 Letter Giacomo 
Dolfin 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 1484 03.04.1484 
int. 23 Letter Giacomo 
Gabriel 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 02.04.1484 03.04.1484 
int. 24 Letter Giacomo 
Gabriel 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 03.04.1484 n/a 
int. 25 Letter Giovanni 
Gafaro 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 02.04.1484 03.04.1484 
int. 26 Letter Alvise 
Dolfin 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 07.04.1484 09.04.1484 
int. 27 Letter Giovanni 
Corner 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 14.04.1484 26.04.1484 
int. 28 Letter/ 
Account 
Almoro Do-
nado 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 01.09.1484 07.09.1484 
int. 29 Letter Almoro Do-
nado 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 18.04.1484 26.04.1484 
int. 30 Letter Marino 
Malipiero 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Nicosia Tripoli 22.04.1484 09.05.1484 
int. 31 Letter Marino 
Malipiero 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Nicosia Tripoli 26.04.1484 09.05.1484 
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int. 32 Letter Marino 
Malipiero 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Nicosia Tripoli 22.04.1484 09.05.1484 
int. 33 Letter  Almoro Do-
nado 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 26.04.1484 May 1484 
int. 34 Letter pro. Marino 
Malipiero. 
Also men-
tions Anto-
nio Loredan 
and Antonio 
Gradenigo 
(recycled 
envelope). 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero  
Nicosia Tripoli 28.04.1484 08.05.1484 
int. 35 Letter Pietro Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Nicosia Tripoli 08.04.1484 
(?) 
09.05.1484 
int. 36 Letter Alvise 
Dolfin 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 26.04.1484 03.05.1484 
int. 37 Letter Uv-lamp re-
quired 
   13.04. 09.05 
int. 38 Letter Federigo 
Corner 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
 Tripoli 21.05.1484 09.06.1484 
int. 39 Letter Benetin Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Famagusta Tripoli 02.05.1484 09.05.1484 
int. 40 Letter Angelo Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Famagosta Tripoli 02.05.1484 09.05.1484 
int. 41 Letter Marino 
Malipiero 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Nicosia Tripoli 04.05.1484 
(or March?) 
17.05.1484 
int. 42 Letter Giovanni 
Corner 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 04.03.1484 11.03.1484 
int. 43 Letter Giovanni 
Corner 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli  05.05.1484 13.05.1484 
int. 44 Letter Toma Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Damascus Tripoli 06.05.1484 16.05.1484 
int. 45 Letter Ieronimo 
Querini 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 07.05.1484 13.05.1484 
int. 46 Letter Almoro Do-
nado 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 02.05.1484 13.05.1484 
int. 47 Letter Almoro Do-
nado 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 09.05.1484 14.05.1484 
int. 48 Letter Giovanni 
“schiavino” 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
 Tripoli 09.04.1484 13.04.1484 
int. 49 Letter Alvise 
Dolfin 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 13.05.1484 16.05.1484 
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int. 50 Letter Giacomo 
Gabriel 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 18.05.1484 21.05.1484 
int. 51 Letter Giacomo 
Gabriel 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 19.05.1484 24.05.1484 
int. 52 Letter Nicolò Vi-
ziatti(?) 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Nicosia(?) Tripoli 19.05.1484 n/a 
int. 52 Letter Marino 
Malpiero 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Famagusta Tripoli 22.05.1484 02.06.1484 
int. 53 Letter Giacomo 
Dolfin 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 29.05.1484 02.06.1484 
int. 54 Letter Francesco 
Zorzi 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 07.05.1484 13.05.1484 
int. 55 Letter Marino 
Malipiero 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Cyprus Tripoli 22.05.1484 02.06.1484 
int. 56 Letter Marino 
Malipiero 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Nicosia Tripoli 31.07.1484 30.08.1484 
int. 57 Letter Almoro Do-
nado 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 01.08.1484 08.08.1484 
(?) 
int. 58 Letter Ieronimo 
Contarini 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo  Tripoli 30.07.1484/ 
01.08.1484 
08.08.1484 
(?) 
int. 59 Letter Pietro Rizo Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Damascus Tripoli 04.08.1484 20.08.1484 
int. 60 Letter Ieronimo 
Contarini 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Damascus Tripoli 09.08.1484 20.08.1484 
int. 61 Letter Toma Marin Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Damascus Tripoli 09.08.1484 20.08.1484 
int. 61 Letter Toma Marin Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Damascus
  
Tripoli 08.08.1484 28.08.1484 
int. 62 Letter Giovanni 
Alvise Mo-
rosini 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 09.08.1484 19.08.1484 
int. 63 Letter Giovanni de 
Prioli qd. 
Pietro 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 09.08.1484 August 
1484 
int. 64 Letter Almoro Do-
nado 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 10.08.1484 15.08.1484 
int. 65 Letter Giovanni 
Corner 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Famagusta Tripoli 16.08.1484 30.08.1484 
int. 66 Letter Toma Marin Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Damascus Tripoli 18.08.1484 30.08.1484 
Fasc. 6 Letter Antonio 
Negno(?) 
Marco 
Bembo 
qd. Ieron-
Damascus Venice 21.08.1484 05.12.1484 
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imo 
int. 68 Letter Toma Marin Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Damascus Tripoli August 1484 30.08.1484 
int. 69 Letter Toma Marin Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Damascus Tripoli 23.08.1484 23.08.1484 
int. 70 Letter Ieronimo 
Contarini 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 29.08.1484 31.08.1484 
int. 71 Letter Alvise 
Dolfin 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 29.08.1484 30.08.1484 
int. 72 Letter Domenico 
Capelan 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 31.08.1484 07.09.1484 
int. 73 Letter Girolamo 
Contarini 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 31.08.1484 07.09.1484 
int. 74 Letter Francesco 
Zorzi 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 31.08.1484 07.09.1484 
int. 75 Letter Girolamo 
Querini 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 31.08.1484 n/a 
int. 76 Letter Girolamo 
Querini 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 31.08.1484 07.09.1484 
int. 77 Letter Bernardo 
Donado/ 
Almoro Do-
nado 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli n/a 10.08.1484 
int. 78 Letter Giovanni de 
Prioli 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 01.09.1484 07.09.1484 
int. 79 Letter Domenico 
Capelan 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 06.10.1484 n/a 
int. 80 Letter Girolamo 
Contarini 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 06.10.1484 n/a 
int. 81 Letter Giovanni de 
Prioli qd. 
Pietro 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 07.10.1484 n/a 
int. 82 Letter Angelo 
Malipiero( ?) 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Beirut Tripoli 08.10.1484 n/a 
int. 83 Letter Domenico 
Capelan 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli November 
1484 
Requ. UV 
lamp 
int. 84 Letter Domenico 
Capelan 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 23.12.1484 31.12.1484 
int. 85 Letter Alvise 
Malipiero 
(“tuo 
fradello”) 
Marino 
Malipiero 
Scan 437 439 13.01.1486 n/a 
int. 86 Letter Francesco Ambrogio Damascus Tripoli 14.02.1484 03.03.1484 
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Marzello Malipiero (no more ve-
neto ?) 
int. 87 Letter Alessandro 
de Martini 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Venice Tripoli n/a 22.04.1485 
int. 88 Envelope  Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli n/a 28.03.1484 
int. 89 Letter n/a n/a Famagusta n/a n/a n/a 
int. 90 Letter n/a Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Damascus n/a 1484 n/a 
int. 91 Letter Almoro Do-
nado 
Ambrogio 
Malipiero 
Aleppo Tripoli 01.09.1484 n/a 
E. Network and Coalition Structure: A Formal Approach 
This section presents a formal representation of the terminology of networks applied in this 
study. The following model of network formation is that of JACKSON and WOLINSKY, adapted 
to fit a trade-historical context.2 In addition, this section draws upon adaptations of the Jack-
son and Wolinsky model by BLOCH, GOYAL, and VEGA-RODONDO.3 
In economic network theory, cooperatively-formed coalitions, coalitions resulting from non-
cooperative games, and networks represent a structural progression of increasing complexity. 
In the context of trade theory, we consider cooperative games and random networks, thus 
modelling coalitions and markets respectively. Let  be a network of finite size with 
= nN ,...,3,2,1  nodes. This network defines a market with N  participating agents. Let 
}1,0{ij  denote a link between nodes i  and j ( 1=ij  if there is a link, 0=ij  if there is 
none). The network   is determined by the number of links. The set of all possible networks 
in = nN ,...,3,2,1  is denoted by  , which includes the empty network where 0
1
=
=
n
x
ij . 
In the network   connections are two-sided, i.e. players (nodes) form connections based on 
mutual agreement. A decay factor ]1,0[  captures the fact that the value 0ijw  that i  de-
 
2 Jackson, M.O., Wolinsky, A.: "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks", in: Journal of 
Ecomomic Theory 71 (Oct., 1996), No. 1, pp. 44-74. 
3 Bloch, Francis: "Coalitions and Networks in Economic Analysis", in: Bourgine, P., Nadal, J.-P. (eds.), 
Cognitive Economics - An Interdisciplinary Approach, Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer, 2004, pp. 417-428; 
Goyal, Sanjeev: Connections - An Introduction to the Economics of Networks, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2007, pp. 143-162; Vega-Redondo, Fernando: Complex Social Networks, Cambridge etc.: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 195-214. 
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rives from being connected to j  depends on the geodesic distance d  between i  and j , i.e. is 
proportional to the proximity of j to i . The utility of each player i  from the network   can 
thus be written as  
 
(i)  
 
−+=
ij ijj
ijij
jid
iii cwwu


:
);,()( , 
 
where 0ijc  is the cost incurred by i  for being linked to j .  
As the network   describes a market, it cannot take the form of an empty network as this 
would impede market activity. Yet the empty network is a Nash equilibrium for any network 
formation game.4 Hence players in   are assumed to have incentives to maintain links so that 
the conditions of pairwise-stability hold: 
 
(ii) 1
1

=
n
x
ij  
(iii) for every ,1=ij )()( ijii uu  −  and  )()( ijjj uu  −  
(iv) for every ,0=ij )()(  iiji uu +  and )()(  jijj uu +  
 
Similarly, it is assumed that no player profits from deleting their links. There is a pairwise 
equilibrium if the formation game defined by the set of strategies },...,,,{ 321 nssssS =  
 
(v) has a Nash equilibrium *S  that yields   
(vi) for any ,0)(
* =sij ))(())((
** susu iiji  +  and ))(())((
** susu jijj  +  
 
The market described by the network   is thus profitable for all participants. The market 
network is decentralised and no player is assumed to be dominant, i.e. no player’s behaviour 
can influence other players’ strategies outside the bilateral link.  
 
4 Goyal: Connections, pp. 150-153. 
199 
 
There may be a subset of N , nnkjiNs −= ,...,,, , which decides to form a group 
within  . This group shall be called a coalition. The formation of coalition   differs 
from the formation of network   in the following ways: first, there is one player (node) i  
who is central in the sense that they initiate the coalition. This player shall be called the prin-
cipal. Second, the principal i  forms links with other nodes in sN  and these form links be-
tween each other only if they posses a link to i , i.e. 1, =kj  if and only if 1, =ji  and 1, =ki . 
In other words, the principal is the owner of the coalition and coalition members do not freely 
form links within sN . Third, coalition members may freely form links with any node Na  
that is not part of the subset sN . This results in a sub-network    containing the coalition 
  and all nodes outside   to which nodes of sN  maintain links. The sub-network   is a 
core-periphery network consisting of two types of nodes, NNs  and NNl  . The nodes 
lN  constitute the periphery and each have a link to at least one node in sN . Nodes in sN  
constitute the core and may be fully linked with each other. The utility of each node 
 lNl  
derived from forming a link with a node in sN  is assumed to be the same as in equation (i), 
and vice versa. The utility of each node sNj  derived from being a member of coalition   
is given by 
 
(vii)  
 
−=
ji jii
jiji
ijd
j cu


:
*);,()( , 
 
where 0ji  is the value for j  of being a member of the coalition (maintaining a link to the 
principal). The cost *c  of coalition membership is assumed to be lower than c , reflecting the 
incentive of entering the coalition structure.  
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